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Though modern philosophers of science recognize the inappropriateness of the 
reduction of all scientific investigations to mathematics, mathematics and science share a 
long history with one another during which mathematics has been employed as a major 
component of scientific argumentation. Over the last twenty years, rhetoricians have done 
substantial work studying the role of argumentation in science (Bazerman 1988; Gross 
1990, 2002; Myers 1990; Fahnestock 1999); however, despite the importance of 
mathematics in making scientific arguments, little effort has been made to understand the 
role mathematics has played in making these arguments. This dissertation represents a 
move to resolve this shortcoming by investigating the role of mathematics in arguments 
in evolutionary biology from the middle of the nineteenth to the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  
 
In the first part of the nineteenth century, the mass collection and mathematical 
assessment of data for scientific purposes provides the cont xt for understanding some of 
the rhetorical choices of an important group of natural philosophers and biologists who 
developed arguments in the second half of the century about the nature of variation, 
evolution, and heredity. In the works of Charles Darwin, Gregor Mendel, Francis Galton, 
and Karl Pearson, arguments from probability and statistics play important roles as 
support for their arguments and as a source of invention for their claims. 
This investigation of the rhetorical situations of these four biologists, their 
arguments, and the role of the principles, operations, and formulae of probability and 
statistics supports the position that mathematization had a major impact on the nature of 
scientific evidence in the nineteenth century. What it also suggests is that, though 
mathematized arguments may have had a great deal of credibility within the scientific 
community in general, factors such as the stature of the rhetor and of their biological 
theory within their specific discourse communities played an equally important role in the 










 LIFE’S RICH PATTERN: THE ROLE OF STATISTICS AND PROBABILITY IN 
NINETEENTH CENTURY ARGUMENTATIION FOR THEORIES OF EVOLUTION, 




James Wynn  
 
 
Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements of the degree of 







Advisory Committee:  
 Professor Jeanne Fahnestock, Chair  
 Professor Gerald Borgia  
 Professor Jane Donawerth  
 Professor Michael Israel  





















































TABLE OF CONTENTS  
LIST OF FIGURES...............................................................................................v 
Introduction .........................................................................................................1 
Chapter 1: Arithmetic of the Species: Darwin and the Use of Mathematics in 
Argumentation ....................................................................................................6 
Mathematics and Argument ................................................................................7 
Mathematical Darwin?.........................................................................................8 
Mathematics in The Origin of Species..................................................................9 
Variation under Domestication..........................................................................14 
Variation under Nature ......................................................................................18 
The Struggle for Existence.................................................................................25 
Natural selection: calculating diversity..............................................................37 
Conclusion .....................................................................................................44 
Chapter 2: Drawing Back the Veil: Probability and Statistics from 1600 to 1900...46 
The Seventeenth Century: Pascal, Fermat, and Huygens......................................47 
Jakob Bernoulli and Abraham de Moivre.........................................................50 
Pierre-Simone Laplace.......................................................................................55 
Probability and Statistics in the Nineteenth Century.............................................60 
Conclusion .....................................................................................................69 
Chapter 3: Hidden Value: Mendel, Mathematics, and the Case for Uniform 
Particulate Inheritance...........................................................................................71 
The Hybridist Tradition .....................................................................................74 
Joseph Gottlieb Kölreuter..................................................................................75 
Carl Friedrich von Gärtner ...............................................................................81 
The Origin of Mendel’s Experiments................................................................85 
Mendel the Mathematician and Physical Scientist.................................................93 
The Role of Quantification, Combinatorics, and the Principles of Probability in 
Making Mendel’s Case.......................................................................................95 
From Word into Law .......................................................................................106 
Critical Responses to Mendel’s “Experiments in Plant Hybridization” .............124 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................132 
Chapter 4: Contours of Heredity: The Law of Error and Francis Galton’s 
Biometrical Approach to Heredity ......................................................................135 
Francis Galton: a Gentleman of Science..........................................................136 
The Development of a Mathematical Theory of Inheritance...............................142 
Natural Inheritance ...........................................................................................149 
Chapter One: The Author, the Audience, and the Journey.................................150 
Chapters Two and Three: Establishing Jurisdiction...........................................153 
Chapters Four and Five: Demonstrating Compatibility with the Law of Error .164 
Making the Case for Regression and the Geometric Diminution of Variation: 
Blended Inheritance.........................................................................................172 
Predicting Regression: Exclusive Inheritance...................................................182 




Chapter 5: Behind the Curve: The Place of Mathematics in Making Claims about 
Heredity at the Opening of the Twentieth Century.................................................195 
Karl Pearson (1875-92).....................................................................................196 
On the Road to Biometry (1893-96).................................................................204 
Weldon and Pearson.........................................................................................205 
Oil and Water? .................................................................................................209 
The Biometrik Response..................................................................................215 




Appendix A ......................................................................................................255 
Appendix B ......................................................................................................257 
Appendix C......................................................................................................258 
Appendix D......................................................................................................260 
Appendix E ......................................................................................................261 
Appendix F ......................................................................................................263 
Appendix G......................................................................................................264 
Appendix H......................................................................................................265 
Appendix I .......................................................................................................266 
Appendix J.......................................................................................................267 
Appendix K ......................................................................................................268 
Appendix L ......................................................................................................270 

















LIST OF FIGURES 
Fig. 1. Regression from Mid-Parent to Son.............................................................174 
Fig. 2. Geometrical Proof of the Filial Regression Value from Natural Inheritance.....176 


























I assert… that in any special doctrine of nature there can be only as much proper science 
as there is mathematics therein. For… proper science, and above all proper natural 
science, requires a pure part lying at the basis of the empirical part.—Kant in 
Metaphysical Foundations of Science1  
 
 
Though modern philosophers of science recognize the inappropriateness of the 
reduction of all scientific investigations to mathematics, mathematics and science share a 
long history with one another during which mathematics has been employed as a major 
component of scientific argumentation. Over the last twenty years, rhetoricians have done 
substantial work studying the role of argumentation in science (Bazerman 1988; Gross 
1990, 2002; Myers 1990; Fahnestock 1999); however, despite the importance of 
mathematics in making scientific arguments, little effort has been made to understand the 
role mathematics has played in making these arguments. This work represents a move to 
resolve this shortcoming by investigating the role of mathematics in arguments in 
evolutionary biology from the middle of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth 
century.  
In Science in Culture: The Early Victorian Period, Susan Cannon argues that in 
the opening half of the nineteenth century the sciences were transformed by two 
fundamental changes in the way that natural investigations were conducted. First, unlike 
the previous century, there was a greater drive to collect data of all kinds. This urge 
resulted in what historian Ian Hacking calls an “avalanche of numbers” (Hacking 5). Data 
on medical conditions, suicides, crimes, marriages, weather, geology, electricity, 
                                               
1 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, ed. Michael Friedman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2004) 6.  
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magnetism, etc. were called for by scientists, politicians, and tradesmen and collected as 
interest in these phenomena developed (Cannon 225-234).  
 Second, in addition to an increased drive to collect data, there was also a change 
in the manner of treating evidence. The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed the 
rise of the mathematically equipped scientist. Whereas the mathematical sciences had 
been confined to astronomy and geodesy in the eighteenth ctury, in the beginning of 
the nineteenth century mathematics began to expand to the study of magnetism, 
electricity, fluids, and even to sociology. This expansio , along with the reverence 
accorded to the already established mathematical sciences, suggests a growing belief 
among scientists and natural philosophers that mathematical rguments represented the 
gold standard for describing and reasoning about natural phenomena (Cannon 234).  
 The mass collection and mathematical assessment of data for scientific purposes 
which began in the first part of the nineteenth century provides the context for 
understanding some of the rhetorical choices of an important group of natural 
philosophers and biologists in the second half of the century who developed arguments 
about the nature of variation, evolution, and heredity. In the works of Charles Darwin, 
Gregor Mendel, Francis Galton, and Karl Pearson, arguments from probability and 
statistics play important roles, from ethical support for their arguments to sources of 
invention for claims.  
 In addition to showing the importance of these mathematical fields as resources 
for developing ethos and argument, the use of mathematics in these biological arguments 
also reveals the limitations which these types of arguments face. Despite the generally 
accepted belief among scientists that mathematics was a powerful ally, there were also 
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disagreements over what could be treated mathematically and who was qualified to speak 
on these issues. In certain cases, challenges trumped arguments inv nted from or 
supported by mathematical principles, operations, or formulae.     
 The goal of this work is to investigate the roles of stati ics and probability in 
making arguments about variation, evolution, and heredity in the late nineteenth century. 
In chapter one, “Arithmetic of the Species,” the role of quantification and arithmetical 
operations in Darwin’s arguments in the Origin of the Species will be examined. The case 
will be made that, though the Origin is not overtly mathematical, closer inspection of the
arguments in the text and other writings of Darwin willreveal the degree to which he 
employs quantification to add an ethos of precision to his arguments. In addition, it will 
also discuss the importance of arithmetical operations in helping him discover the 
principle of divergence of character.  
 The second chapter, “Drawing Back the Veil,” presents a brief history of 
probability and statistics for the purpose of explaining some of the mathematical concepts 
that come to play a prominent role in the development of biological arguments in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century.  In addition, it describes in greater detail the socio-
historical context in which these ideas and practices evolv d to become a central part of 
the debate surrounding these biological phenomena.   
 Chapter three, “Hidden Value,” examines the arguments of Gregor Mendel in his 
groundbreaking work in genetics, “Experiments in Plant Hybridization.” It investigates 
the role of the principles, operations, and formulae of combinatorics, probability, and 
statistical thinking in making his case for the regularity of the distribution of characters 
over generations, the independent segregation and integration of character pairs, and the 
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independent and equal contributions of parental characters in peas. Additionally, this 
chapter explores the reasons for the failure of these mathematically informed arguments 
to find an audience despite their mathematical rigor. 
 Francis Galton and his arguments for a theory of variation and heredity based on 
the law of errors in his seminal work Natural Inheritance is the subject of the fourth 
chapter, “Contours of Heredity.” This chapter examines th rhetorical factors that 
contribute to Galton’s success in approaching variation and heredity with the principles, 
operations, and formulae of the law of errors and statistics. It also examines his 
arguments and explains how the law of error serves as an organizing analogy for his 
description of the hereditary process and reproductive outcomes. The case is made here 
that the success of Galton’s persuasive campaign can be ttri uted to multiple factors 
including his ethos, his relatively orthodox position on heredity, and his use of an overt 
campaign to persuade his readers to accept the application of he law of error to 
biological phenomena. It will also be argued that Galton’s Natural Inheritance laid the 
groundwork for the resurgence of Mendel at the turn of the century.  
 The final chapter, “Behind the Curve,” explores the arguments of the 
mathematician Karl Pearson in his paper “On the Principle of Homotyposis and its 
relation to Heredity.” The central focus of this chapter is to understand to what degree 
mathematics was accepted by biologists in the last decade of th  nineteenth century and 
to what degree the acceptability of a mathematical line of argument is contingent on the 
acceptability of a biological line of argumentation. In order to answer these questions, I 
explore the rhetorical context in which the mathematical arguments in Pearson’s 
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Homotyposis paper are made and his theoretical assumptions ab ut variation and 
heredity.  
 This investigation of the rhetorical situations of these four biologists, their 
arguments, and the role of the principles, operations, ad formulae of probability and 
statistics supports the notion suggested by Cannon that mathematization had a major 
impact on the nature of scientific evidence in the nineteenth century. What it also 
suggests, however, is that, though mathematized arguments may have had a great deal of 
credibility within the scientific community in general, factors such as the stature of the 
rhetor and of their biological theory within their specific discourse communities played 
an equally important role in the persuasiveness of their arguments. 
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Chapter 1: Arithmetic of the Species: Darwin and the Use of 
Mathematics in Argumentation 
 
During the three years which I spent at Cambridge my time was wasted, as far as 
academic studies were concerned…. I attempted mathematics, and even went during the 
summer of 1828 with a private tutor… I have deeply regretted that I did not proceed far 
enough at least to understand something of the great and leading principles of 
mathematics…. But I do not believe I would have succeeded beyond a very low g ade.-
Charles Darwin in his Autobiography2 
 
The characteristic bent of Charles Darwin’s mind led him to establish the theory of 
descent without mathematical conceptions; even so Faraday’s mind worked in th  case of 
electromagnetism. But as every idea of Faraday allows of mathematical definition, and 
demands mathematical analysis in its modern statement, so every idea ofDarwin—
variation, natural selection, sexual selection, inheritance, prepotency, reversion—seems 
at once to fit itself to mathematical definition and to demand statisticl analysis. –Karl 
Pearson in Biometrika3 
 
 
 In order to follow the development of the role of statistics and probability in 
making arguments about evolution, variation, and heredity, it is important to start by 
looking at the man whose arguments provided not only theoretical foundations for the 
modern study of evolution and variation, but also inspiration for modern mathematical 
approaches to these subjects. That man, of course, is Charles Darwin whose seminal work 
The Origin of the Species, although not the first text to suggest evolution, was the first to 
present in a systematic and well-supported fashion the basic tenets of evolution including 
the all-important mechanism of natural selection.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the role that precise quantification and 
mathematical operations and principles play in the development and support of Darwin’s 
position in The Origin of Species as well as to establish a starting point from which to 
                                               
2 Charles Darwin, Autobiographies, eds. Michael Neve and Sharon Messenger (London: Penguin Books. 
1986) 30.   
 




understand the larger developments in the mathematization of arguments in evolution, 
variation, and heredity from the middle of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth 
century. To accomplish these goals, I will argue, contrary to most current scholarship, 
that Darwin employs mathematically informed arguments to upport his conclusions on 
variation in domestic and natural stocks of organisms, the existence of competition 
between organisms for resources, and the importance of diversity in succeeding in the 
struggle for existence. In these arguments, Darwin relies on mathematical symbols, 
operations, and principles to supply the evidence and, in some cases, the understanding of 
nature needed to build his case for evolution and natural selection.  
 
Mathematics and Argument 
 
Before discussing the specific mathematical features and practices that Darwin 
employs in supporting and inventing his biological arguments, it is first important to 
understand clearly what is intended here by the term “matheatics” as well as what roles 
mathematics can play in making arguments. Admittedly, “mathematics” is broad and 
fairly ambiguous term referring to a whole host of symbols, perations, formulae, and 
principles designed to represent quantities or magnitudes and their operations, 
interrelations, combinations, generalizations and abstractions.4 For the purposes of this 
investigation, however, the concept of mathematics will be imited to the particular 
symbols, operations, formulae, and principles from fields of arithmetic, statistics, 
probability, and combinatorics that are used to make arguments about variation, 
evolution, and heredity in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  
                                               
4 “Mathematics,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed. 1998. 
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When making an argument, mathematical symbols, operations, f rmulae, and 
principles can play two distinct roles. On the one hand, they can be used as support for 
non-mathematical conclusions or traditionally qualitative l nes of argument either by 
adding precision or by adding an air of rigor or deductive certitude to arguments. On the 
other hand, mathematical operations and principles can be used to discover or invent new 
lines of argument. New arguments can be discovered when mathe atical principles and 
operations guide the rhetor to adopt a particular qualitative rgument. They can be 
invented when mathematical principles themselves serve as the source for a new line of 
argument which does not exist in more traditional lines of non-mathematical argument.    
 
Mathematical Darwin?  
  
Although Pearson, in the quotation above, recognizes a fundamental mathematical 
inspiration in Darwin’s theories, Darwin scholars who have investigated The Origin of 
Species have either ignored or mostly dismissed the idea that mathe atics plays any 
significant role in his efforts to make the case for evolution and natural selection. A 
survey of 17 books and articles on this subject, most of which were published in the last 
twenty five years,5 reveals the uniformity of this scholarly dismissal. Among the book-
length works, few texts make any association between mathe atics and Darwin’s 
arguments and those that do (Gale 1982, Ghislen 1969, and Hull 1973) predominantly 
comment either on the lack of mathematical reasoning in the text or on Darwin’s inability 
                                               




to use mathematics even if he had wanted to. A review of six journal articles6 on the 
development of Darwin’s arguments also reveals a lack of discussion of the role of 
mathematics in The Origin of Species. Of the six journal articles surveyed, only two 
mention mathematical reasoning at all. Of those two, only ne (Browne 1980) clearly 
asserts the value of mathematical reasoning to Darwin’s arguments.7  
 
Mathematics in The Origin of Species 
 
An examination of selected books and articles which discuss Darwin’s arguments 
provides statistical evidence that the majority of modern Darwin scholars do not believe 
that mathematics plays an important role in supporting or inventing arguments in The 
Origin of Species. These statistical results raise the question: “If mathematics plays such 
an important role in The Origin why is it that so few scholars have bothered to write 
about it?” There are, I believe, several reasons for this. First, a cursory review of the text 
itself reveals that there are very few places where mathematical symbols, numbers, 
tables, equations, etc. are used. This scarcity of mathemical notation is puzzling even to 
those who argue in favor of the importance of mathematics in The Origin like Janet 
Browne,8 who comments on the scarcity of mathematics in the text.  
                                               
6 See Appendix B for a full listing of the journals used in the survey and the results of the survey for each 
text. 
 
7 All told, out of 17 texts specifically devoted to discussing the logical contents and/or development of 
Darwin’s argument, only three clearly suggest that mathematics has any significant role to play (Browne 
1980, Ghislen 1969, and Bowler 1990). That works out to about roughly 18% of texts recognizing the 
importance of the role of mathematics to Darwin’s argument, 11% dismissing it, and 71% ignoring it 
altogether. 
8 Janet Browne is a leading Darwin scholar and biographer w o has written extensively on Darwin and his 





That Darwin’s botanical arithmetic has been neglected by historians is partly his 
own fault. In On the Origin of Species he barely referred to his botanical statistics 
or the long sequence of calculations which he had undertaken from 1854 to 1858. 
He compressed and simplified these into a few meager paragraphs, giving his 
reader only six pages of statistical data to fill out the discussion of “variation of 
nature” in Chapter II. (53).  
 
Despite its absence in the actual text, a brief review of selected materials 
including Darwin’s notebooks, the published manuscript of his “big species book” and 
the first two chapters of that manuscript, which were published separately in 1868 under 
the title The Variation of Plants and Animals Under Domestication, reveal the extent to 
which mathematics influenced the development of his theories. In these publications, 
Darwin supplies his readers not only with lists of quantit tive evidence and calculations, 
but also with occasional glimpses of the degree to which t ese data and calculations 
helped him formulate his conclusions about natural selection and evolution.9  
The existence of mathematical symbols and operations in these extrinsic sources, 
however, still does not explain why, if they were so important to Darwin’s argument, the 
majority of them were left out of his text. The answer to this query is provided by Darwin 
himself in the introduction of The Origin. 
 
I can here give only the general conclusions at which I have arrived, with a few 
facts in illustration, but which, I hope, in most cases will suffice. No one can feel 
                                               
9 See Appendices C, D, and E. These examples are explained in d tail later in the chapter.  
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more sensible than I do of the necessity of hereafter publishing in detail all the 
facts, with references, on which my conclusions have been grounded; and I hope 
in a future work to do this. (4)  
 
 Here, Darwin explains that he is able in the text to give only a general outline of 
his theory and as a result has to forgo presenting all of the data and discussion that he 
might have otherwise provided. The reason for this brevity is hat he has been rushed into 
publication as the result of the emergence of Alfred Russell Wallace’s theory of evolution 
which, for all intents and purposes, offered the same conclusions as his own. In addition, 
Darwin’s lack of specific, quantitative detail may have be n a strategy to make his work 
accessible to a wider readership for whom a dense data-rich text would have seemed too 
formidable.  
Besides the infrequency of mathematical symbols and operations in The Origin, 
critics such as David Hull argue that Darwin could never have employed mathematics to 
model or predict the actions of evolution and natural selection even if he had wanted to. 
In his book Darwin and His Critics, Hull takes the position that because of the subject of 
his research – unpredictable forces that varied over time – th re was no available 
mathematics to aid him in prosecuting his argument:  
 
Darwin could not help but know the crucial role which mathematics had played in 
physics, since Herschel had repeatedly emphasized it in his Discourse, but it did 
not seem to be in the least useful in his own work in biology…. For Darwin, 
mathematics consisted of deductive reasoning, and he distrusted greatly 
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“deductive reasoning in the mixed sciences.” In his own work, he seldom was 
presented with a situation in which he could use such deductive reasoning. He 
was constantly forced to deal in probabilities, and no oe could tell him how to 
compute and combine such probabilities. (12-13)   
 
Here Hull reasons that because the forces with which Darwin was dealing were so 
complex, they could not possibly have been handled by the mathematics which existed at 
the time. Although basic mathematic principles of probability and statistics did exist at 
the time Darwin was working, Hull is reasonably justified in assuming that the 
mathematized statistics needed for modeling the spread of variation through populations 
of organisms, which would become the hallmark of population genetics in the 1930s, had 
not yet been developed. The fundamental problem with this position, however, is that 
Darwin’s goal was not to predict the probability or model th  detailed spread of 
variations through populations of organisms. Instead, the aim of his argument was to 
prove that in the past, organisms had varied over time and that the force guiding the 
spread of variation through populations was natural selection. If we understand Darwin’s 
work with regard to these goals, the sophistication of the mathematics necessary to 
support and discover arguments is drastically lowered.  
In addition to the fact that Darwin had the ability to use mathematical resources in 
his argument, he would want to present as rigorous an argument as possible for what he 
realizes is a controversial position. Hull recognizes Darwin’s interest in increasing the 




Darwin criticized Lamark and Chambers, not for suggesting mechanisms of 
evolution which he thought were mistaken, but for foisting heir views on the 
scientific community without sufficient effort at careful formulation and 
verification. Lamark and Chambers looked upon the process of scientific 
verification as a very casual affair. Darwin looked upon these matters as of utmost 
gravity…. Darwin emphasized the importance of providing empirical evidence for 
scientific hypotheses (10-11).  
 
Given that mathematics was becoming an increasingly important feature of 
scientific argumentation in the physical sciences, if Darwin really were trying to be more 
rigorous in his arguments, then using precisely quantified evidence and employing 
mathematical principles and operations to discover arguments would be obvious means 
of making his arguments more disciplined in the mind of “scientific” audiences. This I 
contend is exactly what Darwin is attempting to do in developing his arguments for The 
Origin.  
 A brief examination of the context, arguments, and motives of The Origin of 
Species suggests that Darwin could make his arguments using mathematical principles, 
symbols, and operations, despite his own admitted lack of mathematical genius. Though 
these types of arguments are admittedly not prominent i the text, their presence behind 
the scenes as a driving force for Darwin’s arguments is palpable and will be made clear in 
the following sections through a detailed analysis of Darwin’s arguments in the first four 




Variation under Domestication 
 
In the first chapter of The Origin, “Variation Under Domestication,” Darwin 
begins to carefully construct his arguments in support of ev lution and natural selection 
by providing evidence which suggests 1) that organisms are highly plastic and can be 
made to vary to a great degree and 2) that this variation ccumulates over time resulting 
in populations of organisms which were once related becoming physically distinct. In 
order to ease his readers into the critical evidence and arguments he will make later in the 
text, Darwin begins by approaching these issues in terms of a familiar process, domestic 
breeding. Though some of the persuasive strength of the argument in the first chapter 
comes from the breeding analogy, mathematical calculation from precisely quantified 
empirical evidence also supplies necessary support for the case that not only does 
variation exist in domestic breeds, but also that variations can be accumulated over time 
through breeding.  
One of the major hurdles that Darwin must overcome in order to convince his 
readers that species evolve over time is that he has to explain how organisms which were 
once similar to one another could become physically distinct. His strategy in the first 
chapter to overcome this obstacle is to present his reade  with a case of domesticated 
organisms which reveals how much a species can be varied th ough human intervention. 
Darwin chooses a population of organisms which was popular for breeding and which 
boasted many distinct varieties: pigeons.  
After a general introduction laying out the various positions n the degree and 
time of occurrence of variation in domestic breeds of anim ls and plants, Darwin 
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discusses the spectacular physical differences that exist between certain breeds of 
pigeons.  
 
In the skeletons of several breeds, the development of the bones in the face in 
length and breadth and curvature differs enormously. The shape, as well as the 
breadth and length of the ramus of the lower jaw, varies in a highly remarkable 
manner. The number of the caudal and sacral vertebrae vay as does the number 
of ribs. (20) 
 
Although no specific quantities are identified in Darwin’s assessment of the 
differences between varieties of pigeons in this passage, claims like, “The number of the 
caudal and sacral vertebrae vary,” suggest that the evidence, if it is to be at all reliable, 
had to have been derived from the actual counting and comparison of vertebrae in 
skeletal samples from the different breeds of pigeons. In fact, Darwin had indeed made 
these measurements but published them later in The Variation of Plants and Animals 
Under Domestication.10 A series of tables in this text provide the reader with 
measurements not only of the number of caudal and sacral vertebrae, but also of the 
average difference between the length of the feet of different species of pigeons and the 
proportional difference between the length of the feetand the size of their bodies.  
Darwin’s quantitatively supported argument of the degree to which pigeons vary 
is an important first step in making his case for variation because it reveals the magnitude 
of change that is possible in organisms. The next step is o show that existing pigeon 
varieties are related to a common progenitor and have developed differently over time as 
                                               
10 See appendix C for the measurement charts.  
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a result of active human selection. In making this case, Darwin challenges the primary 
theory of natural diversity at the time: special creation. Adherents to the theory of special 
creation held that variation in organisms could be explained not in terms of the 
transformation of a single distinct population of organisms into a multiplicity of varieties, 
but by the existence of wild stocks of organisms which accounted for each of the known 
varieties. In order to cast doubt on this position, Darwin relies on a comparison between 
the number of wild stocks and the number of domestic varieties of pigeons:  
 
If several breeds are not varieties, and have not descended from the rock-pigeon, 
they must have descended from at least seven or eight aboriginal stocks…. But 
besides C. livia, with its geographical sub-species, only two or three other species 
of rock pigeon are known; and these have not any of the characteristics of the 
domestic breeds. (21)  
 
 A quantitative comparison of the number of wild varieties and the number of 
domestic breeds reveals that there is no one-to-one crr lation between the number of 
domestic and wild varieties. This discrepancy castes doubt on the special creationist 
position of the fixity of organic forms. Darwin’s theory of evolution, however, is able to 
account for the difference. It suggests that if we allow that populations of organisms vary 
over time, there is no need for the existence of several f ral progenitors, only the 
existence of a series11 of related forms that reveals the incremental changes i  pigeons.  
                                               
11 In arguing for a series, i.e. an incrementum argument, Darwin is presenting his reader with what Jeanne 
Fahnestock argues in Rhetorical Figures in Science is quintessentially a quantitative scalar argument of the 
more and the less: “As its first essential feature, an incrementum has to be formed according to some 
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In The Origin Darwin argues that such series of forms do exist among the 
domestic breeds and that this series can be visually evidence  by juxtaposing closely 
related pigeons at different levels of the taxonomy with one another:    
 
Although an English carrier and a short-faced tumbler differ immensely in certain 
characters from the rock-pigeon, yet by comparing the sevral sub-breeds of these 
varieties, more especially those brought from distant countries, we can make an 
almost perfect series between the extremes of structure. (24)  
    
In this opening salvo of his argument, Darwin relies on quantitative comparisons 
in order to make the tentative case that selection provides a better accounting of the 
empirical evidence presented by an investigation of breeding practices than special 
creation. First, he relies on descriptive arguments supported by quantitative comparisons 
to make the case that selective breeding has been able to crea e significant variations 
within and among domesticated pigeon breeds. Next, he quantitatively compares the 
number of domestic and wild stocks of pigeons to support his contention that variation 
from a single wild progenitor has led to the current degree of diversity among 
domesticated pigeons. Finally, he argues for the existence of a series of forms, an 
argument which is based fundamentally on a quantifiable increase or decrease of some 
character. Although these traditional lines of comparative reasoning are often posed in 
natural language in The Origin or in terms of qualitative features, they are fundamentally 
quantitative comparisons which are supported in some cases by quantitative data.    
                                                                                                                                 
principle of ordering, and by far the most common principle of ordering is by increase or decrease in some 




Variation under Nature 
 
In the second chapter of The Origin, “Variation under Nature,” Darwin turns his 
discussion from the effects of selection on domestic species to the possibility of selection 
without human intervention. His goal in this chapter is to provide arguments and 
evidence that variation is a natural process that can spread without human intervention 
from isolated individual organisms to large populations through the process of natural 
selection. He achieves this goal with the help of quantitative comparisons and 
mathematical calculations, which prove that not only are the taxonomic categories found 
in catalogues of species fuzzy, but also that the source of this fuzziness can be accounted 
for by conceiving of diversity as the result of the dynamic process of continual variation.   
In the first portion of chapter two, Darwin sets up his argument by refuting the 
position of special creationists who believed that each species identified in a taxonomic 
hierarchy marked a unique creation which was readily identifiable by the existence of an 
indelible set of features. He argues that if this position were true, then there should be a 
definite consensus among naturalists about which organisms belonged in which particular 
category. In order to test the veracity of this assumption, Darwin undertakes a 
quantitative comparison of the categorizations made by several experts in the field:   
 
Compare the several floras of Great Britain, of France, or of the United States, 
drawn up by different botanists, and see what a surprising number of forms have 
been ranked by one botanist as a good species, and by another as m re varieties. 
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Mr. H.C. Watson, to whom I lie under deep obligation for assistance of all kinds, 
has marked for me 182 British plants, which are generally considered as varieties, 
but which have all been ranked by botanists as species…. Under gen ra, including 
the most polymorphic forms, Mr. Babington gives 251 species, whereas Mr. 
Bentham gives only 112, - a difference of 139 doubtful forms! (41)     
 
 Through this comparison, Darwin reveals that even those researchers who claim a 
high level of expertise in plant identification and categorization come to astonishingly 
little agreement concerning which organisms should be ranked as varieties within a 
species and which as separate species. By doing a quantitative analysis here, Darwin 
provides evidence, using the naturalists’ own numbers, that the boundaries between 
species, varieties, and genera are not as well defined as they believe. By casting doubt on 
the ability of the special creationist theory of cleary defined taxonomic categories to 
account for the empirical realities of nature, he creates the opportunity to present his own 
theories of evolution and natural selection, which he believes more adequately account 
for the data.  
 He opens the second portion of the chapter by clearly laying out for his readers 
his position:  
 
Hence I look at individual differences, though of small interest to the systematist, 
as of high importance for us, as being the first step towards such slight 
varieties…. And I look at varieties which are in any degre  more distinct and 
permanent, as steps leading to more strongly marked and more permanent 
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varieties, and at these latter, as leading to sub-species and to species…. I attribute 
the passage of a variety, from a state in which it differs very slightly from its 
parent to one in which it differs more, to the action of atural selection in 
accumulating… differences of structure in certain definite directions. (44).    
 
In these lines, Darwin presents his reader with a vision of diversity in nature as a 
dynamic process rather than a static condition. He argues that the small differences we 
observe in individual organisms can spread throughout successive generations making the 
offspring of those individuals slightly different from the general population from which 
they originated. These differences can widen through the continued accumulation of 
variation and eventually transform distinct varieties into distinct species. This whole 
dynamic process, Darwin argues, can be attributed to natural selection which he defines 
as, “the preservation of favorable variations and the rejection of injurious variations” 
(68).  
 Once he has established his position on the source and character of diversity, 
Darwin presents his readers with quantitative evidence to support it. Using available 
botanical compendiums, he calculates the number of botanical varieties belonging to 
species with the greatest estimated populations of organisms in hopes of discovering 
some general pattern in or connection between these specie : “I thought that some 
interesting results might be obtained in regard to the nature and relations of the species 
which vary most, by tabulating all the varieties in several well-worked floras” (45). The 
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results of his tabulation reveal that there is a correlation between the size and range of a 
species’ population and the number of varieties recorded for that species.12   
 
In any limited country, the species which are most common, that is abound most 
in individuals, and the species which are most widely diffused within their own 
country… often give rise to varieties sufficiently well-marked to have been 
recorded in botanical works. Hence it is the most flourishing, or, as they may be 
called, the dominant species… which oftenest produce well-marked varieties. (45-
46)  
 
What Darwin discovers, or confirms, as the result of his calculations, is that the 
more populous species tend to have a greater number of identi ied varieties associated 
with them. This correlation is accounted for by his dynamic theory of natural diversity 
because statistically such a correlation between the size of a population and the 
development of sub-populations would be expected as larger populations would have a 
greater number of variations which might be spread by natural selection. Darwin in fact 
suggests this correlation in the first chapter of the text when he writes, “I must now say a 
few words on the circumstances favorable or reverse, to man’s power of selection. A high 
degree of variability is obviously favorable, as freely giving the materials for selection to 
work on” (35).  
Although the correlation between the size of a species and the number of varieties 
connected with it seems to support Darwin’s argument that diversity in nature is the result 
of the spread of variations, he recognizes that more data must be presented if he is to 
                                               
12 See Appendix D for Darwin’s mathematical tables  
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prove that this relationship is a general fact of nature. Following his examination of 
species and varieties, he conducts further calculations to a sess whether or not the 
principle holds true for the relationship between genera and species.  
 
If the plants inhabiting a country and described in any Flora be divided into two 
equal masses, all those in the larger genera being placed on one side, and all those 
in the smaller genera on the other side, a somewhat larger number of the very 
common and much diffused or dominant species will be found n the side of the 
larger genera. (46)  
 
Here, Darwin reaffirms that the same quantitative correlation which exists 
between species and varieties also exists between genera a d species. His calculations 
reveal that the larger genera, those with five or more species, had species with a greater 
number of varieties.  
Strengthened by the accumulating evidence, Darwin makes a point to emphasize 
the success of his theory in accounting for the patterns r vealed by his calculations:  
 
From looking at species as only strongly-marked and well-defined varieties, I was 
led to anticipate that the species of the larger genera i  e ch country would 
oftener present varieties, than the species of the smaller genera; for wherever 
many closely related species… have been formed, many varieties or insipient 
species ought, as a general rule, to be now forming…. On the other hand, if we 
look at each species as a special act of creation, there is no apparent reason why 
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more varieties should occur in a group having many species, than in one having 
few. (47)  
 
In addition to playing up the success of his prediction, Darwin also challenges the 
special creationist position to account for the same results. If the different taxonomic 
categories did in fact represent unique populations of organisms that shared no 
relationship with other populations, then what would account for the correlations which 
his calculations reveal? Though opponents of his theory might argue that these 
correlations are random coincidence, Darwin suggests hre t at the fit between the 
patterns he describes in the quantitative data and the procss f variation that he proposes 
in his theory is too good to be coincidental.   
Not sufficiently satisfied with the scope of the evidenc  he has presented and 
analyzed thus far, Darwin ends this portion of his argument with the discussion of an 
even larger data set to ensure that his claims concerning the flora of England are not 
simply a unique case. In the final data set, he expands his evidentiary support from 
calculations of ratios of genera, species, and varieties in one country to an analysis of 
ratios between these different taxonomic levels in 12 different countries:13 
 
To test the truth of this anticipation I have arranged the plants of twelve countries, 
and the coleopterous insects of two districts, into nearly two equal masses, the 
species of the larger genera on one side, and those of th smaller genera on the 
other side, and it has invariably proved to be the case that a larger proportion of 
the species on the side of the larger genera present varie ies than on the side of the 
                                               
13 See Appendix E for Darwin’s mathematical tables  
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smaller genera. Moreover, the species of the larger genera which present any 
varieties, invariably present a larger average number of varieties than do the 
species of the small genera. (47)  
 As with the plants of England, Darwin finds in the plants and insects in 12 
different countries a correlation between the ratios of population sizes and the amount of 
variation in sub-populations at different levels of the axonomic hierarchy. This evidence 
supports his hypothesis that diversity in nature is a reflection of a dynamic process of 
variation driven by natural selection and challenges th existing paradigm of special 
creation because that theory cannot account for this recurrent pattern of correlation.   
 An analysis of Darwin’s argument in the second chapter thus shows the 
importance of quantitative comparison and other mathematical operations in supporting 
his theories of evolution and natural selection. In the op ning portion of the chapter, he 
uses quantitative comparison with precise numerical values to challenge the veracity of 
the existing paradigm of special creation by revealing that among experts there is no clear 
consensus on the categorization of organisms in nature. He uses this discrepancy as an 
opportunity to present his own theory, which, he argues, also accounts for the difficulties 
in developing taxonomies.  
Once he has cast doubt on the theory of his opponents and offered his own, he 
then accumulates evidence to support it. With the help of a previously calculated ratio, he 
concludes that patterns of correlation exist between th size of populations and the 
development of variation within related sub-populations. These connections between the 
sizes of these different taxonomic levels suggest a pattern of variation. Without the 
support of overt quantitative comparisons and behind the scene  mathematical operations 
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such as addition and the computation of ratios, Darwin’s argument for the existence of 
variation for natural selection would have been purely speculative. But by using and 
comparing actual data about variation in populations, Darwin is able to make a 
compelling case for variation based on the qualitative work of established floral and 
entomological experts.   
 
The Struggle for Existence  
 
 Now that Darwin has established the basic premise of his argument, that variation 
exists in natural and domesticated populations of organisms, with quantitative support, it 
is necessary for him to explain how this variation accumulates in natural populations. In 
order to accomplish this goal, he relies on arithmetical operations and quantitative 
evidence to support his case by rendering the difficult-to-observe action of natural 
selection visible for the reader. In addition, he also relies on Thomas Malthus’ arguments 
in his Essay on the Principle of Population as a source of inspiration and support for the 
existence of competition in populations, an argument which also relies on quantitative 
comparisons to make its case.  
For Darwin, a struggle between organisms had to exist in order for natural 
selection to operate. Without competition, there would no pressure driving the spread or 
the extinction of variations in organic populations. He makes the importance of this 
condition known at the very outset of the chapter where he admonishes his reader to keep 




Nothing is easier than to admit in words the truth of the universal struggle for life, 
or more difficult… than constantly to bear this conclusion in mind. Yet unless it 
be thoroughly ingrained in the mind, I am convinced that the wole economy of 
nature, with every fact on distribution, rarity, abundance, extinction, and 
variation, will be dimly seen or quite misunderstood. (52)  
 
Once he has highlighted the importance of the struggle for xistence to variation, 
he provides a definition of the term:  
 
I should premise that I use the term ‘Struggle for Existence’ i  a large and 
metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another, and including 
(which is more important) not only the life of the indivi ual, but success in 
leaving progeny. Two canine animals in a time of dearth, may be truly said to 
struggle with each other which shall get food and live. But a plant on the edge of a 
desert is said to struggle for life against the drought…. A plant which annually 
produces a thousand seeds, of which on an average only one comes to maturity, 
may be more truly said to struggle with the plants of the same and other kinds 
which already clothe the ground…. In these several sense, which pass into each 
other, I use for convenience’s sake the general term of struggle for existence. (53) 
 
Here, Darwin explains that the struggle for existence includes not only the efforts 
of an individual organism to stay alive, but also its struggle to leave as many progeny as 
possible. In addition, he makes clear that individual survival and the survival of offspring 
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are influenced by competition between organisms in the sam population, competition 
between organisms in different populations, and the struggle of an organism given the 
conditions of its physical environment. By providing this detail d definition with 
examples, Darwin reveals the complexity of the relationships that are in play in the 
struggle for existence.  
 Before Darwin can commence illustrating these different aspects of the struggle, 
however, he decides to provide the appropriate explanation of how such a struggle could 
develop in nature in the first place. For an explanatio, he turns to Thomas Malthus’ 
Essay on the Principle of Population:14  
 
A struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high rate t which organic 
beings tend to increase. Every being… must suffer some destruction during some 
period of its life… otherwise, on the principle of geometric increase, its numbers 
would become so inordinately great that no country could s pport the product. 
(53-54) 
 
 With these words Darwin summarizes the point made by Malthus which is that 
the growth of populations will eventually outstrip the amount of resources necessary to 
sustain them (Malthus 14). This mathematically informed argument itself is not novel to 
Malthus; however, he is the first, according to Donald Winch in his introduction of the 
Essay, to impart, “an added air of drama and precision to the subject y ontrasting the 
geometric rate at which population was capable of increasing with the arithmetic rate at 
                                               
14 Darwin’s work drew on the 6th and final edition of the text which was published in 1826. Malthus’ text 
was first published anonymously in 1798 with other editions appearing in 1803, 1806, 1807, and 1817.  
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which subsistence could be expanded” (Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population 
[1992], xi)  
In book one chapter one of the Essay, Malthus makes the case that if left 
unchecked a population will increase geometrically using American population statistics.  
He chooses America as a model for population increase because at the time it was a land 
with boundless resources and few inhabitants.  
 
In the northern states of America, where the means of subsistence have been more 
ample, the manners of the people more pure, and the checks to early marriages 
fewer, than in any of the modern states of Europe, the population was found to 
double itself for above a century and a half successively, in ess than twenty-five 
years. (Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population [1890], 4)  
 
In addition to using American population statistics, Malthus also turns to Leonard 
Euler’s (1707-83) calculations of mortality and births in which Euler also makes the case 
for a geometric expansion of the population.  
 
According to a table of Euler, calculated on a mortality of 1 to 36, if the births be 
to the deaths in the proportion of 3 to 1, the period of doubling will be only 12 
years and 4/5ths. And this proportion is not only a possible supposition, but has 




Euler’s calculations make a strong case that geometrical increase can occur in a 
short period of time; however, Malthus, in order to make his case seem reasonable, 
adopts the rate of geometric expansion based on the actual American statistics rather than 
the more hyperbolic rate of expansion suggested by Euler. Thus, Malthus writes, “It may 
safely be pronounced, therefore, that population, when unchecked, goes on doubling 
itself every Twenty-five years or increases in a geomtric ratio” (4).  
Once he has made the case for the geometric increase in population using a 
conservative estimate based on American population data, he hen turns to his home 
country of England as a model for making his point that food production increases only 
arithmetically. He begins this portion of his argument by stating that there is no available 
means of determining the rate of increase in food production: “The rate according to 
which the productions of the earth may be supposed to increase, it will not be so easy to 
determine” (4).  
Without available quantitative data to support his assertion, Malthus supplies his 
reader with a qualitative example of food production in Engla d. He argues that in British 
agriculture all of the best land was already in use so that any expansion of agriculture 
would be into land that yields less and is more difficult to farm. As a result, “the 
additions that could yearly be made to the former average produce must be gradually and 
regularly diminishing” (6). For the sake of argument, however, h  allows for the 
supposition that the gains to the yearly average production by the addition of these newly 
acquired farming acres would remain consistent. Based on this assumption, he concludes 
that, “the produce of this island [England] might be increased every twenty-five years by 
a quantity equal to what it at present produces” (6). In other words, it could only add 
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every twenty five years the amount which it currently produces. As a result, the best 
possible scenario for food production, “considering the present average state of the earth, 
the means of subsistence, under circumstances the most fav rable to human industry, 
could not possibly be made to increase faster than in an arithmetic ratio” (6). Malthus 
forecasts the differing rates of increase as follows:  
 
Let us call the population of this island eleven million; a d suppose the present 
produce equal to the easy support of that number. In the first twenty-five years the 
population would be twenty-two million, and food being also doubled, the means 
of sustenance would be equal to this increase. In the next tw n y-five years the 
population would be forty-four million, and the means of subsistence only equal 
to the support of thirty three million. (6)     
 
 Malthus thus employs both quantitative and qualitative assumptions and evidence 
to make the case that population growth if unchecked would quickly outstrip the food 
resources needed to sustain it. Darwin begins his arguments for natural selection based on 
this quantitative/qualitative reasoning. He argues that if weassume that a natural 
population will eventually outstrip the resources that are available for its members, then 
we must submit that eventually resources will diminish and  competition will ensue. 
Thus, a struggle for existence will develop.  
Following his postulation of how a struggle for existence develops, Darwin 
provides his readers with quantitative evidence that in many natural populations the limit 
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of resources has already long been reached, and the ensuing struggle for existence has 
begun to operate.  
  
Linnaeus has calculated that if an annual plant produced only two seeds… and 
their seedlings next year produced two, and so on, then in twe ty years there 
would be a million plants. The elephant is reckoned the slowest breeder of all 
known animals, and I have taken some pains to estimate its probable minimum 
rate of natural increase: it will be under the mark to assume that it breeds when 
thirty years old, and goes on breeding till ninety years old, bringing fourth three 
pair of young in this interval; if this be so at the end of the fifth century there 
would be alive fifteen million elephants, descended from the first pair. (54) 
 
Based on simple calculations of exponential increase in these two hypothetical 
situations, Darwin establishes that without the destruction of organisms or a diminution 
of the number of offspring that survive, populations of plants and elephants would far 
exceed the current numbers we observe in nature. The fact that they do not, however, is 
evidence that in some populations of organisms the limit between their numbers and the 
resources they need to sustain themselves has already been reached and the struggle for 
existence has taken hold. 
In other cases, however, Darwin describes situations in wh ch organisms are 
introduced into a new environment with less competition for resources. The result is an 
explosion of the organic population. This too provides evidence for the veracity of 
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Malthus’ principle of population by suggesting that in cases where resources are plentiful 
populations will increase geometrically.  
 
So it is with plants: cases could be given of introduce plants which have become 
common throughout whole islands in a period of less than en years. Several of 
the plants, such as the cardoon and a tall thistle, now mst numerous over the 
wide plains of La Plata, clothing square leagues of surface almost to the exclusion 
of all other plants…. In such cases… no one supposes that the fer ility of these 
animals or plants has been suddenly and temporarily increased in any sensible 
degree. The obvious explanation is that the conditions of life have been very 
favorable. (54-5)  
 
Once Darwin has provided compelling evidence that Malthus’ princi le of 
population is an established axiom of nature which accounts for he development of a 
struggle for existence, he then proceeds to provide his readers with detailed examples of 
the different manifestations of the struggle for existence. He accomplishes this by 
collecting and describing quantified evidence drawn from his own bservations or 
experiments. In order to illustrate the destruction of organisms through predation and the 
struggle for resources, he presents the results of his observation of and experimentation 
on a plot of weeds in his back yard.  
 
On a piece of ground three feet long and two wide, dug and cleared, and where 
there could be no chocking from other plants, I marked all the seedlings of our 
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native weeds as they came up, and out of the 357 no less than 295 were destroyed, 
chiefly by slugs and insects. If turf which has long been mown… be let to grow, 
the more vigorous plants gradually kill the less vigorous, though fully grown, 
plants: thus out of twenty species growing on a little plot of turf (three feet by 
four) nine species perished from the other species being allowed to grow up 
freely. (57)  
  
In this description of his experiment, Darwin begins by presenting his readers 
with a quantitative analysis of the destruction of plants by predators that takes place 
during the period of observation. His numbers reveal the magnitude of the destruction. In 
addition, the quantification of this commonly observed relationship between prey and 
predator sets the stage for the more-difficult-to-observe struggles between organisms 
competing for limited resources. In the second portion of the experiment, he presents 
evidence for the operation of these more intangible processes. In order to make this 
invisible competition visible, Darwin tallies the number of species that appear as 
seedlings and then allows them to grow up. Afterwards, he calculates the number of 
species which survive. This strategy allows him to provide quantitative evidence that, 
despite the difficult-to-observe nature of this competition, a struggle has indeed been 
taking place between the different species of weeds for the limited resources of this small 
plot of land.  
 In the portions of the chapter which follow his turf experim nt, Darwin moves his 
reader from simple, small-scale examples of the struggle for existence resulting from 
predation and the competition for resources to more sophisticated regional scenarios 
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involving complex natural forces. In the next part of his discussion in chapter three, he 
opens, as he did in the previous section, with a tangible familiar example of how changes 
in climatic conditions can effect the survival of populations of organisms.  
 
Climate plays an important part in determining the averag  numbers of a species, 
and periodical seasons of extreme cold or drought, I believe to be the most 
effective of all checks. I estimated that the winter of 1854-55 destroyed four-fifths 
of the birds in my own grounds; and this is a tremendous destruction, when we 
remember that ten per cent is an extraordinarily severe mo tality from epidemics 
with man. (57-58) 
 
Though his discussion of the destruction of birds by the cold need not necessarily 
employ quantitative data to reveal the reality of death from extreme cold in animals, 
Darwin’s use of a specific quantified example does have argumentative value. First, it 
provides his reader with a sense of the magnitude of the effect that climate can have on a 
species’ destruction. By giving an estimate of four-fifths of the birds on his grounds and 
by comparing this to quantified descriptions of the number of humans that die in a severe 
epidemic, ten percent, Darwin creates a contrast which he opes will connect with his 
readers. Second, it makes the death seem real not only by connecting it to human loss, 
which they can understand, but also by providing a quantified description of an actual 
population of birds in an actual place during an actual time, thus lending verity to 
evidence which might without specification seem more hypothetical than actual.  
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Once Darwin has provided concrete quantitative evidence to support the 
magnitude and reality of the direct effect that climate can have on populations of 
organisms, he then proceeds to give a more nuanced qualitative explanation connecting 
the destruction of populations through environmental factors to the struggle for existence 
in populations of organisms.    
 
The action of climate seems at first sight to be quite independent of the struggle 
for existence; but in so far as climate chiefly acts in reducing food, it brings on the 
most severe struggle between the individuals, whether of the same or of distinct 
species, which subsist on the same kind of food…. Each specie … is constantly 
suffering enormous destruction… from enemies or competitors for the same place 
and food; and if these enemies or competitors be in the least degree favored by 
any slight change in climate, they will increase in numbers. (58)  
 
 Here, Darwin provides his reader with a presentation of some of the abstract 
connections between the conditions of the physical enviro ment and their effect on the 
survival of organisms. For Darwin, the effect of climatic change in nature is more than 
simply a condition which eliminates portions of organic populations. Instead, it is a 
contributing factor to the struggle for existence because it adversely affects the amount of 
resources available to the surviving populations, requiring the survivors to enter into an 
even fiercer competition for sustenance. This explanatio  provides his readers with a hint 
of the complexity in the relationships between different lements in an organic 
environment and their effects on the magnitude of the struggle for survival.  
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 In the final section of the third chapter, Darwin attempts to verify the 
connectedness of organisms to one another and to their environment in regard to their 
struggle for existence. He accomplishes this by providing quantitative evidence from his 
own natural observations of how small changes in an “ecosystem” can have far reaching 
effects on the organisms that abide in them. One of the examples he gives is the 
introduction of a single type of fir tree to a portion f barren heath.  
 
There was a large and extremely barren heath, which had never been touched by 
the hand of man; but several hundred acres of exactly the same nature had been 
enclosed twenty-five years previously and planted with scotch fir. The change in 
the native vegetation of the planted part of the heath w s most remarkable… not 
only the proportional number of heath plants were wholly changed, but twelve 
species of plants… flourished in the plantations, which were not to be seen on the 
heath. The effect on the insects must have been still greater, for six insectivorous 
birds were very common in the plantations, which were not to be seen on the 
heath… here we see how potent has been the effect of the introduction of a single 
tree (59-60)  
 
In this example, Darwin supplies his reader with quantified evidence to illuminate 
the nearly invisible strands that link the survival of species together. His observation 
illustrates to his readers the wide-reaching effects that even small changes in an 
ecosystem, such as the introduction of the scotch fir and the enclosures which protect 
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them, can have on the success of many different types of organisms in their struggle for 
existence.  
 
Natural selection: calculating diversity 
 
With the evidence and arguments in place supporting Darwin’s position that 
diversity in nature is the result of the spread of variations through populations of 
organisms and that a struggle for existence takes place in nature, he can finally describe 
in full detail species formation by natural selection. In the fourth chapter of The Origin of 
Species, mathematical computations and representations help him to discover and provide 
evidence to support a new line of argument: that the more diversified an organism is, the 
better that organism will do in its struggle for existence.  
Darwin argues that when a population reaches an equilibrim between its 
numbers and resources the only way that that population can continue to grow is if it is 
able to expand into a new ecological niche with underexploited resources. He uses the 
example of a carnivorous quadruped to make his point.  
 
Take the case of a carnivorous quadruped, of which the number that can be 
supported in any country has long ago arrived at its full average. If its natural 
powers of increase be allowed to act, it can succeed in increasing… only by its 
varying descendants seizing on places at the present occupied by other animals: 
some of them, for instance, being able to feed on new kindsof prey… some 




This expansion, however, requires more than just a subtle variation of character. It 
requires a substantial change. As a result, Darwin reasons that the same struggle for 
existence which influences organisms to diversify also pressur them eventually to 
diversify to a great degree.  
Darwin’s principle of divergence of character is an important component in 
describing the development of variation in nature because it answers a question which he 
and his critics considered a major obstacle to any theory of variation: “How do the small 
differences that are observable between populations of closely related species and 
varieties grow into the large differences that we see between genera, families, etc.?” 
(Browne 74). Initially, Darwin thought that variation was lways minute; however, with 
the introduction of new mathematical techniques for calculting the boundary between 
large and small varieties, species, and genera he concluded that this was not always the 
case.  
In one of the few scholarly works confirming the value of mathematics in 
developing Darwin’s ideas, “Darwin’s Botanical Arithmetic and the ‘Principle of 
Divergence,’ 1854-1858,” Janet Browne argues that Darwin’s quantitative analysis of 
populations in the second chapter also encourages him to discover the principle of 
divergence of character that solves the problem of increasing variation.  
In the initial stages of his calculations of the ratios of varieties to species, Darwin 
divided the total number of organisms he was investigating into “large” and “small” 
groups and calculated the average number of species in the genera belonging to each of 
these groups. He then used the average number of species cal ulated for a large or a small 
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group as a benchmark for determining whether genera could be considered large or small 
(Browne 79).  
Though these calculations revealed that those genera in the “large” category had 
the most species and that those species had the most varieties, which supported his 
position on the relationship between the size of a population nd the number of favorable 
variations, these computations were based on assumptions ab ut what constituted a large 
genus or species to set the benchmark for category membership rather than on 
calculations of the actual average number of varieties for the species and species for the 
genera being examined. As a result, the categories represented only assumptions of 
relative estimates of size rather than precise estimates based on a standardized method of 
comparison (79).  
A communication from (Sir) John Lubbock, the son of Darwin’s neighbor at 
Down in the early summer of 1857, appraised Darwin that building his case on assumed 
estimates of size created problems in establishing rationally defensible definitions of the 
categories “small” and “large” for his genera. Although Darwin was initially skeptical 
about Lubbock’s proposed approach, he eventually did rework his estimates according to 
Lubbock’s suggestion with good results.  
 
I have divided the New Zealand Flora as you suggested, there are 32915 species in 
genera of 4 and upwards, and 323 in genera of 3 and less. The 339 species have 
51 species presenting one or more varieties. The 323 species hav  only 37. 
Proportionately (339 : 323 :: 51 : 48.5) they ought to have had 48 1/2 species 
                                               
15 This figure should be “339” but Darwin erroneously writes “329” in his letter. I am assuming that the 
former is the correct figure because it appears twice as the value for the number of species in genera of four 
and upwards.     
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presenting vars. So that the case goes as I want it, butnot s rong enough, without 
it be general, for me to have much confidence in. I am quite convinced yours is 
the right way; I had thought of it, but should never have done it had it not been for 
my most fortunate. (Darwin, The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, 461-62)  
 
Lubbock’s additional suggestion, to work out the projected ratios of species and 
varieties in the larger and smaller genera and compare them to the actual ratios, provided 
Darwin, according to Browne, with the evidence which inspired his principle of 
divergence (82-83). What Darwin discovered in working out the projected ratios of 
varieties to species in large and small genera is that in the case of small genera there are 
fewer varieties than are expected or in the case of larger genera there are more varieties 
than expected. The result of these calculations caused Darwin to shift his focus from the 
quantitative relationship between the size of populations and the number of variations 
they produced to the qualitative nature of their variations.  
 
This change in emphasis made Darwin shift his gaze to focus n the success 
which large genera so evidently enjoyed. He suddenly saw that it w s not just 
variation and the fortuitous production of “good” adaptations which induced large 
genera to produce yet more and more species, but it was also their potency…. 
They [large genera] were, in fact, the very acme of success, being more 
widespread and more abundant in individuals than their smaller confreres, and 
also turning out more varieties in which “good” adaptations were likely to 




  The realization, that larger genera not only have a gre te  number of species and 
varieties, but that this greater number of species and varieties increases the likelihood that 
a good adaptation will occur, led Darwin to the conclusion that a population’s ability to 
generate diverse offspring was the key factor to their success. Thus, the mathematical 
calculations that Darwin undertook to determine the existence of variation in nature also 
led him to the realization that there was a direct correlation between the success of large 
genera and species and number of variations they produced.  
In a letter to Hooker in August of 1857, Darwin’s belief in the importance of these 
calculations to the development of his theory is evident.  
 
I intend dividing the varieties into two classes, as Asa Gr y and Henslow give the 
materials, and, further, A. Gray and H.C. Watson have marked for me the forms, 
which they consider real species, but yet are very close to others; and it will be 
curious to compare results. If it will all hold good it is very important for me; for 
it explains, as I think, all classification, i.e. the quasi-branching and sub-branching 
of forms, as if from one root, big genera increasing and splitting up, etc., as you 
will perceive. But then comes in, also, what I call a principle of divergence, which 
I think I can explain. (Darwin and Seward 109).    
 
In addition to directing Darwin’s attention to the importance of the potential 
quality of diversification, mathematics also plays an important part in providing concrete 
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evidence for the magnitude of the divergence that takes place in nature. As in previous 
chapters, Darwin chooses literally to look in his own backyard to find the data he needs.  
 
The truth of this principle… is seen under many natural ci cumstances…. For 
instance, I found that a piece of turf, three feet by four in size, which had been 
exposed over many years to exactly the same conditions, supported twenty 
species of plants, and these belong to eighteen genera and to eight orders, which 
shows how much these plants differ from each other. (94) 
 
Here, Darwin’s description of a piece of turf provides quantit tive evidence that 
different niches exist in the polity of nature and that for an organism to be successful in 
its struggle for existence, it must find a way to diversify o that it might exploit what is 
now called a different ecological niche. The staggering number of different species, 
genera, and orders found in a three-feet-by-four-feet piece of turf serves as a striking 
illustration of the number of different ecological niches that can exist even in a small area 
and the amount of divergence that can occur as a resultof competition over resources.  
Although this small-scale example is able to give his readers an idea of the 
magnitude of diversity among closely competing organisms, it does not provide evidence 
of the benefits of diversity. Darwin attempts to rectify this shortfall in his previous 
example by providing further quantitative evidence which supports his conclusion that a 
high degree of divergence from competition aids an organism i  its struggle for survival. 
In order to make this point, he relies on a statistical an lysis of the success of non-native 




In the latest edition of Dr Asa Grey’s Manual of the Flora of the Northern United 
States, 260 naturalized plants are enumerated, and these belong to 162 genera. We 
thus see that these naturalized plants are of a highly diversified nature. They 
differ, moreover, to a large extent from the indigenes, for out of the 162 genera, 
no less than 100 genera are not there indigenous, and thus a large proportional 
addition is made to the genera of these states. (95) 
 
In order to argue that variation can lead to success in competition, Darwin 
identifies a sample of organisms that represent highly diverse populations that have been 
successful at colonizing a new geographic area. In the sample he uses, roughly 62 percent 
of the populations identified do not even share similarities at the level of genera with one 
another. Once he has established that his sample is extrem ly diverse, he provides 
evidence that this diversity has led to the success of these populations. He accomplishes 
this with his calculation that out of the total of 162 genera represented in non-native 
species no less than 100 genera are exclusive to introduced species while only 62 genera 
have counterparts in the natural population. The large percentage of exclusively non-
native genera thriving in North America, around 61 percent, provides evidence that these 
foreigners had more success in their adopted ecosystem because of their diversity. 
In the fourth chapter of The Origin of Species, mathematics supplies Darwin with 
both inspiration and evidence to support the development of his theories of the natural 
world. By working out the ratios for the number of species that might be expected in a 
large-sized genera and the number of varieties that might be expected for a given species, 
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Darwin discovers that the actual numbers are higher than the ratios. This leads him to 
adopt the line of argument that not only do larger genera and species produce more 
varieties, but also that the quality of the varieties hey are producing allows them to thrive 
more effectively by opening up new biological niches. As a result of these calculations, 
Darwin turns his attention to the role of diversity in the struggle for existence which 
encourages him to formulate the principle of divergence of character. Finally, he relies on 
a statistical comparison of the number of native and non-native plants thriving in North 
America to support this principle. The results of this comparison suggest that diversity 




By the time Darwin published The Origin of Species, mathematical arguments and 
evidence had already begun to make headway into sciences outside of physics, 
astronomy, and geodesy. The desire for rigor and precision in all areas of natural 
knowledge, which had encouraged this trend, is also evident in Darwin’s arguments. On 
inspection, these quantitative/mathematical arguments not only provide support for his 
position, but also inspiration. In the four opening chapters of The Origin where Darwin 
makes his case for the fundamental principles driving and directing variation in the 
natural world, he relies on calculations and quantitative comparisons to establish that 
domestic and wild organisms can undergo variation, that a fierce struggle for existence 
exists, and that organisms whose variation is more pronounced than others tend to be 
more successful in the struggle for existence. In all of these cases, the simple operations 
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of quantitative comparison as well as addition, subtraction, division, multiplication, and 
ratios suffice to offer illumination of and persuasive arguments for the nearly invisible 
forces of struggle, variation, and diversity that slowly shape and reshape the façade of 
nature.   
Although the mathematical elements of the arguments in The Origin may pass 
undetected by modern scholars accustomed to the sophisticated m hematical models of 
twentieth century biology, under the scrutiny of his nineteen h-century contemporaries 
such as Francis Galton (chapter four) and Karl Pearson (chapter five), Darwin’s 
arguments supplied inspiration to develop novel and more sophisticated mathematical 
approaches to the study of variation, evolution, and heredity. By looking at his work in 
this larger context, it is possible to see it as an encouragement, if not a precedent, for the 
use of mathematically informed arguments in the study of these biological phenomena.  
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Chapter 2: Drawing Back the Veil: Probability and Statistics from 1600 
to 1900 
 
It is of primary importance to keep out of view man as he exists in an insulated, separate, 
or in an individual state, and to regard him only as a fraction of the species. In thus 
setting aside his individual nature, we get quit of all which is accidental, and the 
individual peculiarities, which exercise scarcely any influence over the mass, become 
effaced of their own accord, allowing the observer to seize the general results. –Adolphe 
Quetelet in A Treatise on Man and the Development of his Faculties.16 
 
 
 The evidence provided in the previous chapter suggests that Darwin used 
quantitative comparisons of data describing organic populations to make his arguments 
for variation, natural selection, and the principle of divergence of character in The Origin 
of the Species. In chapters four and five, I will show how this method of argument 
influenced later researchers such as Francis Galton and K rl Pearson to look for 
inspiration and support for their hereditary theories in the special topics17 of probability 
and statistics. Before examining the role of these special topics in their arguments, 
however, a preview of the general concepts and methods and the socio-historical context 
in which they develop is in order. This chapter supplies a brief introduction to the basic 
philosophy and methodology of probability from its birth in the middle of the seventeenth 
century to the period right before its transformation at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.   
In addition, this chapter offers a more detailed account f conditions in the 
opening half of the nineteenth century which expand the philosophies and methods of 
probability from astronomy and geodesy to human physiology, psychology, and society. 
                                               
16 Adolphe Quetelet, A Treatise on Man and the Development of his Faculties (Gainesville, Florida: 
Scholar’s Facsimiles & Reprints, 1969) 5.   
 
17 Special topics are lines of arguments developed for use in a specialized field, or as Aristotle states in The 
Rhetoric, “there are also those special lines of argument which are based on such propositions as apply only 
to particular groups or classes of things” (Aristotle 31).  
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This expansion represents a revolution in probability and statistics and creates the context 
for the application of probability to the study of evolution, variation, and heredity and the 
debates leading to the establishment of a modern genetic paradigm informed by the 
methods and philosophies of probability.  
 
The Seventeenth Century: Pascal, Fermat, and Huygens  
 
 The earliest period in which probability theory was coherently developed, known 
as the period of classical probability, began in the middle of the seventeenth century and 
extended into the middle of the eighteenth century. In Classical Probability in the 
Enlightenment, Lorainne Daston characterizes probability in this initial stage as a rational 
calculus developed to combat the skeptical philosophy that absolute certainty was beyond 
human grasp (Daston xi). This new “calculus of good sense” drew inspiration from legal 
situations in which decisions concerning equity had to be made b sed on unknown future 
conditions (14). Gambling problems, for instance, served as the ource of discussion in 
the texts in which an organized concept of probability theory originated. The letters sent 
between Blaise Pascal (1623-62) and Pierre de Fermat (1601-65) in 1654 regard a 
question of stakes in an interrupted game of chance put to Pascal by the Chevalier de 
Mere. In these letters, Pascal and Fermat discuss the hypothetical situation presented by 
De Mere where a three point game18 is being played in which each player wagers 32 
pistoles. The game is interrupted when player A has won two games and player B one. 
The interruption raises the question, “How should the sakes be divided?” Pascal argues 
                                               
18 A three point game is essentially a series of three or more hands of cards in which the first player to win 
three hands wins the pot.  
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that since player A has won two games already even if he were to lose in the ext round 
he would still have walked away with half the pot, 32 pistoles. This leaves 32 pistoles up 
for grabs. Pascal reasons that because each man has a fifty percent chance of winning or 
loosing the remaining 32 pistoles, this portion of the pot sh uld be divided in half. 
Consequently, player A should get 48 pistoles (32+16) and player B should receive 16 
(Daston 15-16).  
 In the exchange between Fermat and Pascal, two central concepts of classical 
probability, equality of chance and expectation, play a central role in reasoning about 
probable outcomes. Expectation is evident in Pascal’s assumption that player A should 
automatically receive half of the pot because whether he won or lost in the next hand, he 
would still be entitled to half. Equality of chance is also present in the assumption that 
either player has an equal chance of winning or losing in the next round. This is the 
rationale behind his argument that the remaining half of the pot should be split between 
the two players. 
 At around the same time of Fermat and Pascal’s correspondence, Christian 
Huygens (1629-95) was developing his own mathematical treatments of gambling 
puzzles which were published in his 1657 treatise De Ratiociniis in Aleae Ludo 
(Computations in Games of Chance). In this first published treatise on probability, 
Huygens, like Pascal and Fermat, also creates a calculus of expectations which deals 
with, “the division of stakes or the ‘reasonable’ price for a player’s place in an ongoing 
game” (24).   
 The central axiom around which Huygens develops his theory of expectation is 
that of the fair game: “I take as fundamental for such games that the chance to gain 
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something is worth so much that, if one had it, one could again get the same chance in a 
fair game, that is, a game in which nobody stands to lose” (quoted in Hald 69). According 
to Anders Hald in History of Probability and Statistics, Huygens’ explains the axiom 
through example:  
 
Suppose that somebody has 3 shillings in his one hand and 7 in the other and that 
I am asked to choose between them; this is so much wort to me as if I had 5 
shillings for certain. Because if I have 5 shillings I canestablish a fair game in 
which I have an even chance of getting 3 or 7 shillings, as will be shown below. 
(69)  
 
 In this passage, Huygens reasons that with five shillings he can establish a fair 
game if the possible outcomes are to receive three or sven shillings in exchange for 
staking five shillings in the playing of the game. This is a fair game because 1) the player 
begins with an equal chance of receiving either the three or the seven shillings and 2) the 
possible gain from the bet is equal to the loss (both are two shillings). Though this 
explanation is slightly different from the rationale discussed by Fermat and Pascal, the 
essential parameters are the same: there is an expectation of a fair balance between risk 
and reward and either player has an equal chance of winning or losing.  
 Most, if not all, of the early discussions of probability, like those of Pascal, 
Fermat, and Huygens, were limited to problems of gambling (Chatterjee 157). The type 
of probability dealt with was strictly a priori probability, meaning that the calculations of 
expectations were made only in cases where the number of possible outcomes was known 
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before the calculations of probability were made. (In Huygens’, Pascal’s, and Fermat’s 
examples there are two known outcomes. In Huygens’ game, three or seven shillings can 
be won; and in Pascal and Fermat’s game, there is assumed to be a winner and a loser) 
(Daston 26). The outcomes in any trial are considered quiprobable.  In other words, it 
was just as likely that one outcome would happen as the other. This assumption is at the 
heart of the concept of a “fair game,” which Huygens employs as the fundamental axiom 
for his theory of probability. 
Unlike the modern sense of the term “chance,” which conveys a sense of 
randomness, the term “chance” in these early treatises had nothing to do with events 
which occurred without rhyme or reason. Instead, the concept was used to describe a 
preordained event whose precise outcome was unknown but was still in keeping with a 
predetermined set of outcomes (10).   
 
Jakob Bernoulli and Abraham de Moivre 
  
In classical probability, the mathematics was limited primarily to problems of 
gambling that involved very simple situations in which the degree of probability of an 
outcome was assumed known: for example, it was assumed that one player at a game of 
chance was as likely to win as another. In the late sev nteenth and early eighteenth 
century, however, probabilists and philosophers of logic began to complicate probability 
by introducing models in which the probability of an event could not be assumed.  
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The problem of assumed or a priori probability was raised initially by Pascal in 
what is understood to be his work in the Port Royal Logic19 (1662) and by the German 
mathematician/philosopher Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) in his philosophical 
discussions of jurisprudence. Essentially, these works explore situations in which rational 
decisions must be made with insufficient evidence. The decision maker begins with two 
choices: guilty or not guilty in Leibniz’s case and to lead a pious life or to live a worldly 
life in Pascal’s.  In these two choices, there exists a priori a true and a false answer. The 
problem faced by the decision maker is that though there is a correct answer there is an 
insufficient amount of evidence to identify which of the two options is correct. In 
Leibniz’s case, there is insufficient evidence to say with certainty whether the accused is 
guilty or not, and, in Pascal’s case, there is an insufficient amount of evidence for the 
existence of heaven or hell.  Because the true a priori bability of each event is not 
known, either 100% certain or 100% uncertain, the decision maker must decide based on 
the knowledge they have at the moment a decision has to be made. In other words, they 
must develop a subjective probability based on their own experience (Chatterjee 164-67).    
Though Pascal and Leibniz were the first to introduce the complication of 
insufficient evidence into the assessment of probability, the first person to develop 
mathematical tools to deal with this problem was Jakob Bernoulli (1654-1705). In his 
book Ars Conjectandi (The Art of Conjecture), published posthumously by his nephew 
Nicolas Bernoulli in 1713, Jakob Bernoulli developed a system for dealing with 
probability which operated on the assumption 1) that we can re ch a degree of reasonable 
certainty about the a priori probability of an event ad 2) that this can be accomplished 
                                               
19 The title of this text is actually Ars Cogitandi (The Art of Thinking), however, the Port Royal Logic is the 
more popular title adopted for the text.   
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through the use of many repeated trials (Chatterjee 168). In chapter four of Ars 
Conjectandi, Bernoulli describes these principles mathematically in what is known today 
as “Bernoulli’s limit theorem.” The theorem makes thecase that the calculated a 
posteriori probability of an event p gets closer to the true a priori probability of an event 
P the greater the number of trials n that are conducted.  
In his text, Bernoulli uses the example of a sealed urn of balls with a fixed ratio of 
black to white balls from which drawings are made at random and with replacement. 
Each ball is as likely to be chosen as any other (Daston 238). He argues that if the ratio of 
black to white balls is known a priori, we can calculate the number of trials necessary to, 
“ensure that the ratio of black-to-white balls falls within a certain margin of the true ratio 
with a given probability” (238). The limit theorem then provides the means of calculating 
the number of trials it would take to reach a specified degree of certainty about the 
underlying predetermined ratio of black-to-white balls.     
Although Bernoulli’s theorem allows that a high degree of certainty can be 
established through a large number of trials, he recognizes that it is never possible to 
reach complete certainty about an event, moving probability from the purview of the 
dialectic to the jurisdiction of the rhetorical. He suggests instead that a “moral certainty” 
can be established through probabilistic analysis.  
 
That is morally certain whose probability nearly equals the whole certainty, so 
that a morally certain event cannot be perceived not to happen; on the other hand, 
that is morally impossible which has nearly as much probability as renders the 
certainty of failure moral certainty. Thus one thing is considered morally certain 
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which has 999/1000 certainty, another thing will be morally impossible which has 
only 1/1000 certainty. (Hald 248) 
 
Bernoulli’s limit theorem reflects standard seventeenh- and eighteenth-century 
beliefs about nature. Like his predecessors, Bernoulli assume  that a certain order exists 
in nature. This belief is evident in his limit theorem which relies on the existence of a 
fixed and quantifiable a priori ratio of outcomes, even when the ratio is unknown, in 
order to calculate the relationship between the number of the trials and the degree of 
certainty that the outcome of those trials will point to the correct ratio.  
 Bernoulli’s belief in the transcendent order of things and his mathematical 
solution to finding patterns in nature through collective independent trials offered a 
method for natural philosophers seeking to decode the book of nature through empirical 
induction, and, according to Shoutir Chatterjee in Statistical Thought, a rational for the 
development of a program of natural investigation joining statistics,20 the collection and 
presentation of quantified information, and probability, the calculation, using the 
mathematical principles of probability, of the degree of certitude for an event based on a 
collection of quantified outcomes (Chatterjee 171).  
 In addition to supporting induction, Bernoulli’s limit theorem inspired the further 
development of both statistics and probability in the first half of the eighteenth century. 
Some of the most notable contributions based on his theory come from Abraham de 
Moivre (1667-1754), who is credited with developing the concept of a normal 
                                               
20 In this definition I am not using the modern sense of the term statistics which describes a discipline in 
which both probabilistic assessment and statistical collection are united.   
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distribution and with creating a formula by which the probability p of an event given a 
large number of trials n can be calculated (Daston 250).  
 In Miscellanea Analytica (1730) and The Doctrine of Chances (1718, 1738, and 
1756), De Moivre solves the problem of calculating a posteriori probability for a large 
number of trials. His solution involves, “finding the probability… when n symmetric dice 
with f faces marked 1, 2,… f are thrown” (Chatterjee 176). The function by which he 
solves this problem comes to be known as a probability generati g function. Creating a 
function by which the probability of an increasingly large number of trials can be 
calculated was an important contribution to the study of pr bability because, previous to 
its introduction, calculation of probabilities for a large number of trials was extremely 
arduous (Gonik and Smith 79). With this new relatively simple technique in hand, it was, 
“practicable to apply probability theory to an indefinitely large number of independent 
events” (Porter 93). This provided for both a practical and theoretical expansion of 
probability to work with large statistical samples and to create hypotheses about the 
number of trials required for high degrees of accuracy in induction.  
 In addition to solving the problem of computing the probability in cases with a 
large number of trials, De Moivre is perhaps more importantly credited with conceiving 
of the normal distribution, though it is clear that he himself did not fully understand the 
significance of his contribution. By deploying the newly invented tools of calculus, “De 
Moivre showed that when p, the assumed probability of an event was equal to .5, the 
binomial distribution was closely approximated by a continuous density function which 
could be described very simply” (Gonik and Smith 79). This density function, called in 
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modern parlance the “central limit theorem,” describes a distribution which is bell shaped 
with a mean of 0 and an area under the curve of 1.   
 The early eighteenth-century treatises of Bernoulli and De Moivre represent the 
first important forays into the development of inductive probability. Bernoulli’s limit 
theorem established quantitatively the degree of reasonableness of an inductive 
conclusion reached through repeated trials. This ability to quantify the degree of certainty 
for induction added a degree of validity to inductive reasoning. In addition, De Moivre 
refined Bernoulli’s work adding a methodology for calculating the probabilities for a 
large number of trails. This methodology expanded the application of Bernoulli’s limit 
theorem and made it more practical to apply in assessing experimental outcomes. Also, 
De Moivre was the first to describe the bell shaped binomial distribution which was to 
take center stage in the nineteenth century as the “normal” distribution for a large range 




The probabilistic endeavors of the seventeenth and early eighteen centuries to 
reach a degree of moral certainty about the a priori probability of a phenomenon through 
repeated trials continued to influence the study of induction in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries.  Importantly, it influenced the work of Pierre-Simone Laplace, 
who tried to develop a mathematical means of identifying the shape of the distribution of 
error and the limits for a homogeneous distribution of causes as well as means for 
identifying true value for a series of observations.  
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Between 1799 and 1825 Laplace published his five volume Treatise on Celestial 
Mechanics21 (Traite de Mecanique Celeste) whose primary goal was, “to show how all 
celestial phenomena derive from the principle of universal gravitation” (Hahn 144). In 
book three volume one, Laplace addresses the problem of how to assess whether or not a 
comet’s orbit was parabolic. Laplace’s solution was to formulate an orbit shape from the 
known data points with the smallest range of error. If the shape was parabolic, then his 
hypothesis stood. If it was not, then the hypothesis of a parabolic figure could not stand 
for the given data within the limits of observational error (Gillispie 188).  
Laplace’s earliest work on statistical induction in Celestial Mechanics ought to 
determine the range of observational error on the basisof calculations of the distribution 
of values gathered from actual observations of comet trajectories. Finding this method 
intractable, he abandoned it in favor of an approach based on a priori probability. The 
point of view regarding the range of observational error he developed with this approach 
was similar to that used in statistical sampling in which the mean error in a large number 
of observations falls within predetermined limits (218). What he hoped to do was to 
determine the limits of error, its distribution, and therue value of a measurable 
phenomenon. In order to do this, he developed what became known as the “central limit 
theorem” which made the case that if observations, “are repeated an indefinite number of 
times, their mean result converges on a limit such that, if an equal interval on either side 
be made as small as one pleases, the probability that the result will be contained therein 
can be brought so close to certainty that the difference is less than any assignable 
magnitude” (Gillespie 218).   
                                               
21 Volumes one and two were published in 1799: volume three in 1802, volume four in 1805 and volume 
five in 1825.  
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In this new approach, Laplace made the case that there is regularity in the sources 
of errors in astronomical observation. Assuming that the “real value” of an observation is 
the mean value of the curve where the probability of error approaches 0, there is an equal 
probability of over or underestimating the true value. Also, he suggests that because big 
mistakes are rarer than small mistakes in observation, i  is more probable that a given 
measurement is closer to the true value of an observed phenomenon than farther away 
from it. All of these parameters are illustrated in the bell curve where the actual value is 
located at the highest point in the curve being the observation most frequently made, and 
other observational values fall in frequency in equal measure from this maximum value 
down both sides of the curve, hence above or below the true value (Daston 271).  
Underpinning Laplace’s mathematical description of the relationship between the 
“real value” of observations and observational errors is the belief that even the “errors” 
themselves are the result of an unknown mixture of causes which have a regular pattern. 
Daston explains,   
 
Laplace envisioned nature as a composite of “regular” (or “constant”) and 
“irregular” causes. Even the irregular causes exhibited a collective regularity, 
however: in the long run their effects were symmetric and canceled one another 
out, revealing the steady operation of the underlying constant cause. (270)   
 
The “irregular” causes described by Daston here are synonymous with the 
category of “errors” in the sense that they are false outcomes which interfere with 
uncovering the “true value” of an observation. Drawing on Bernoulli’s work, Laplace 
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makes the case that the more observations that are condu ted, the easier it is to separate 
the regular or true value of an event from the series of irregular or false outcomes.  
Laplace’s probabilistic model of true outcomes versus error supported a 
philosophy of determinism in which the physical universe was conceived of as an 
intricate mechanism which functioned according to predetermin d laws. Because of the 
imperfection of human senses, however, these inner workings are largely obscure and can 
appear chaotic to human observers. Despite this appearanc  of randomness, Laplace 
firmly believed that every entity, from the smallest atom to the largest cosmic body, 
obeys predetermined laws. This belief is evident in the first section of his Essai 
Philosophique where he writes:  
 
An intelligence which for a given instant knew all the forces by which nature is 
animated and the respective situations of the existences that compose it; if further 
that intelligence were vast enough to submit these given qua tities to analysis; it 
would embrace in the same formula the greatest bodies in the universe and the 
lightest atom: nothing would be uncertain to it and future as the past would be 
present before its eyes. (Laplace 2)  
 
Based on his conception of errors having irregular sources and the size of errors 
as a means by which to judge whether or not a researcher had discovered the true value of 
a phenomenon, Laplace developed a method for testing whether differences in the data 
gathered in separate observations to prove the same hypothesis were sufficiently 
significant to warrant further investigation into the possible causes of the differences. To 
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illustrate his method, Laplace took on what was for eight enth-century statisticians and 
probabilists a popular set of issues: “the problems…. related to sex ratios at birth” 
(Chatterjee 214). Using his formulae for estimating the probable outcome of a future trial 
based on the outcomes of past trials, he estimated that the probability of a male child 
being born in Paris rather than a female child was greater than 50 percent (p>1/2). Then, 
using his estimation of the distribution of error, he found that the chance that this 
estimation was wrong (i.e. p≤1/2) was .  This led Laplace to conclude, “that 
‘one can regard it as equally certain as any other moral truth’ that for Paris p>1/2, or in 
other words, nature favors more the birth of boys than of girls” (quoted in Chatterjee 
214).  
Although John Arbuthnott (1667-1735) and Daniel Bernoulli (1700-82) preceded 
Laplace in their efforts to employ hypothesis testing in their own work, Laplace was the 
first to explicitly test hypotheses and to provide the mathematical tools for doing these 
tests. Laplace argued that these mathematical tests were an important element in a 
disciplined approach to induction because they allowed the natural philosopher to 
determine mathematically whether a difference between statistical results was significant 
enough to encourage further investigation. This determination helped them avoid what 
Laplace described as “vain speculations” about whether observed differences were 
significant or not (Chatterjee 215).  
In his work, Laplace made significant strides in developing practical methods for 
testing hypotheses, assessing the distribution of errors, and determining the true value of 
observations. These tools, though rough, strengthened reasoning from induction because 
they allowed researchers to describe quantitatively the probability of their conclusions 
1.5    X10 −42  -42 
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and the validity of their programs of research. In addition, these tools were important 
because they provided the mathematical support for Friedrich Gauss’s law of error which 
represents for this study an important watershed in the dev lopment of a relationship 
between inductive probability and the study of evolution, variation, and heredity in the 
nineteenth century.  
 
Probability and Statistics in the Nineteenth Century 
 
 The methods that Laplace developed in order to more accurately assess the true 
values of celestial observations were also used by him and others to determine with 
greater precision the shape of the earth. The study of the earth’s shape, called “geodesy,” 
was an undertaking of national importance because it led to improvements in navigation 
which impacted military and economic concerns. The expansion of probability and 
statistics into geodesy in the eighteenth century was a product of its obvious economic 
and military value as well as its close connection to as ronomical observations. In the 
opening of the nineteenth century, however, the applications of probability and statistics 
expanded to fields such as human physiology, behavior, and psychology which were less 
obviously beneficial than geodesy and less closely related to astronomy. This new era for 
statistics and probability was ushered in by 1) the increasing availability and range of 
statistical data, 2) the development of the “law of errors” by Friedrich Gauss (1777-
1855), and 3) the vision and energy of astronomer Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874). The 
expansion of probability and statistics in physiology, human behavior, and psychology as 
a result of these factors accounts in large part for the influence of the philosophy and 
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methodology of probability and statistics on investigations f evolution, variation, and 
heredity.  
One of the most important developments in the nineteenth century affecting the 
expansion of the mathematics of probability is what Ian H cking calls “an avalanche of 
numbers” (5). Although various religious and political institutions had been gathering 
statistical information about human populations since the seventeenth century, the 
amount and availability of that information was extremely limited.  
In the opening decades of the nineteenth century, however, the statistical flood 
gates opened and there was a deluge of data pouring from the government printing houses 
of Western and Eastern Europe. Part of the reason for this sudden increase, according to 
Ian Hacking, was that the Industrial Revolution, in full swing at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, required greater precision in measurement (Hacking 5). In order to 
develop a transportation infrastructure, for example, standards had to be described and 
released to industry for values such as the width and height of train cars and their towing 
capacity. In addition to the economic exigence for releasing statistical data, Hacking cites 
the period of peace that descended on Western Europe following the end of the 
Napoleonic wars as an influence on the amount of data which was made publicly 
available. With the end of the war there was less fear among Western European states 
that their own statistical data could be used against them. As a result, they felt more 
comfortable about releasing statistical data, making more information open to the general 
public for scrutiny and academic investigation (Chatterjee 267).   
 The avalanche of numbers precipitated by peace and trade provided the material 
for a probabilistic revolution; however, this revolution also required skill, innovation, and 
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inspiration to expand the application of probability from the study of gambling, geodesy 
and astronomy to investigations of biological phenomena other than mortality and birth. 
Arguably, two of the most influential suppliers of these ingredients were Friedrich Gauss 
and Adolphe Quetelet.  
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, an important advancement in the 
mathematics of probability paved the way for its expansion into the study of evolution, 
variation, and heredity. This advancement was the development in 1809 of a 
mathematically defensible “law of error” by German mathematician-scientist Friedrich 
Gauss. As an astronomer, Gauss first came into contact with probability as a means by 
which he could manage the data from his observations of the heavens (Chatterjee 225).  
For Gauss, as for Laplace, there were two kinds of errrs: errors which were 
irregular—the result of a collection of numerous imperceptible causes that were always 
present—and errors which were regular or systematic—the result of inaccuracies 
introduced by conditions, instruments, etc. (Hall 73). With an eye towards Laplace’s 
work on error and hypothesis testing, Gauss believed that systematic errors could be 
discovered if researchers could accurately describe the distribution and boundaries of 
irregular errors. By comparing the limits and distribution of these errors to the 
distribution of their observational values, astronomers could tell whether these values 
were within the range of the norm for error or whether y fell outside that range and 
were, therefore, under the influence of some systematic or significant causal variable.  
Although it  was a widely held belief at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
that the “true value” of a set of observations was the arithmetic mean of a sample of 
independent measurements, there was still as yet no satisfactory way of proving that the 
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mean of a set of observations was in fact its true mean (Chatterjee 225). The major 
problem that remained to be solved was that there was no tenable index of error against 
which the distribution of observational results could be checked to find out whether or 
not the distribution was within the limits of acceptable error.  
Gauss’s primary contribution to probability was that he successfully calculated 
the limit and distribution which random errors should ideally t ke. His approach to the 
problem was somewhat different from Laplace’s who had trie earlier but failed to come 
up with a generally applicable distribution of error. Whereas Laplace began with models 
of error and then tried to fit them to models of observation l results, Gauss began by 
assuming theoretically that the mean of an observation l sample is a good estimate of the 
“true value.” Starting from this assumption, Gauss then considered what form of density 
function (f(.)) coincided with the mean in the observational sample (Chatterjee226). The 
answer, based on this method of calculation, was the normal distribution described earlier 
by De Moivre.   
 Gauss’ development of the “law of error” represented a watershed in probability 
because for the first time a mathematical method existed whereby the “true value” of a 
set of observations could be mathematically substantiated by comparing it to a 
predetermined distribution of errors. This index of verity could, on the one hand, be a 
powerful tool for identifying fixed patterns in nature and, on the other, the true value of 
any measurable phenomena. These capabilities made it attractive to astronomers and 
geographers in their study of the heavens and earth; however, they also supported a 
greater potential for general philosophical interest in the possibility of demonstrating 
other underlying patterns in nature.  
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 That the mathematics of probability was ripe for applications in other fields does 
not, of course, explain why it expanded from specific applications in geodesy and 
astronomy to the study of a wide range of human physiological, behavioral, and 
psychological phenomena. That probabilists had already conceived of applying 
probability to the study of human social and biological phenomena is already clearly 
indicated in its history. Though, at its inception, probability was linked to assessing legal 
questions of fairness in contracts and gambling disputes, latr probabilists such as John 
Arbuthnott and Laplace used it to determine human birth ratios.  
Though these earlier applications are directed towards some aspects of human 
phenomena, they do not automatically warrant the application of probability and statistics 
to all aspects. Whereas the outcomes of games of chance and births follow relatively 
stable patterns of frequency and are, therefore, amenable to probabilistic analysis, other 
aspects of humanity, such as the psychological disposition  of individuals and the pattern 
of inherited traits, are not. As a result, before probabilists would venture out into the 
murky worlds of human physiology, psychology, and behavior, they needed to be 
convinced that there was enough stability in these categories t  warrant their efforts.  
With the growth of available statistical data and a widening range of statistical 
subjects, a latent conviction began to develop that there w underlying patterns in these 
phenomena; however, it required someone to apply the matheics of probability to 
non-traditional categories of human data and to produce persuasive evidence and 
arguments that regular patterns could be found in this data. That someone was Adolphe 
Quetelet—a Belgian astronomer who applied ideas and methodologies from probability 
and statistics, specifically Gauss’s law of error, to human populations for the purpose of 
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constructing laws describing underlying regularities in human physiology, psychology, 
and behavior. 
 During a short visit to Paris in 1823, Quetelet came under the influence of 
[Joseph] Fourier and Laplace whose works introduced him to the basics of probability 
and the theory of errors which he was inspired to use to tudy human populations 
(Chatterjee 270). He explores this application in his groundbreaking book Sur l'homme et 
le developement de ses facultés, essai d'une physique sociale (1835) (A Treatise on Man 
and the Development of his Faculties, an Essay on Social Physics) in which he makes the 
case that the theory of error can be used to describe human attributes. He assumes that 
despite the differences across individuals in a human population there are underlying 
regularities within the whole. From this assumption, he argues that for any relatively 
homogeneous population, or race, there is a stable relative frequency of a particular trait 
which represents a characteristic of that group. By combining all the average frequencies 
of all the quantifiable characters, it is possible to determine “the average man” (l’homme 
moyen) for a particular homogeneous population (271).  
In a later 1844 monograph entitled Sur l’appreciation des documents statistiques, 
et en particulier sur l’application des moyens (An Appreciation of Statistical Documents 
in Particular on their Application of Averages), Quetel t provided evidence for his theory 
by studying the actual distribution of characteristics in a real human population (Hacking 
108). Specifically, he analyzed the distribution of chest measurements of nearly 6,000 
Scottish soldiers which had been collected by a military t iloring contractor and had been 
recorded in the Edinburgh Medical Journal in 1817 (Chatterjee 271, Hacking 109). He 
took the measurements and fitted them to a normal symmetric binomial distribution 
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(Chatterjee 271). The results confirmed a satisfactory fit between the two. This meant 
that the chest size of soldiers distributed according to the “law of errors” (272).   
The fact that Quetelet’s measurements distributed in the shape of a normal 
binomial distribution described by the law of errors supported his assumption that there 
was an underlying regularity within homogeneous populations and that the mean of his 
sample represented the “true value” of Scottish men with regards to their chest size. He 
argued that the regular differences, i.e. errors, in the distribution of values could be 
accounted for by “accidental causes” such as climate, nutrition, etc. which interfere with 
the underlying “constant causes” of nature that act in a predictable fashion to achieve a 
“true value” for a particular trait (Porter 108).  
Quetelet’s conceptualization of variation in the biology f humans in the same 
terms as errors of observation from astronomy and geo esy is a rhetorical tour de force 
which relies on the development of an analogy between observations of the heavens and 
the earth and observations of human physiology. In the 1844 monograph he begins to 
make his case for this analogy with the statement, “‘Let us suppose that I can measure the 
height of some individual several times, with great care’” (108). He follows this with the 
assertions, “The measurements won’t be identical. If the causes of error work equally 
towards measuring high and low, there will be a distribution with values clustering 
around the average height. There will also be a dispersion measured by probable error” 
(108).  
In the next step of his argument, Quetelet makes the case th t this procedure for 
measurement is the same as the procedure for measurements made in astronomical 
observations: specifically to measurements made at the Gre nwich Observatory. As 
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Hacking describes Quetelet’s explanation, “There [in astronomical observation] we have 
mean, probable error, and the whole Gaussian analysis. This established practice is 
exactly analogous, he [Quetelet] said, to measuring the height of one man over and over 
again” (Hacking 108).  
At this point, Quetelet makes an important leap from thinking of the height of an 
individual as a single value which can be measured many times to height as a single value 
within a larger series of measurements of a population. He suggests that if, in measuring 
many examples of a certain type of phenomenon, the overall distribution of values 
follows the distribution of the law of error, then we can assume that the “collection of 
statistics is derived from a single homogeneous population defi ed by a real quantity” 
(109). If, on the other hand, the values do not distribute in rms of this scheme, then the 
population being investigated is most likely made of “several distinct but mixed 
populations” (109).  
Quetelet’s argument and proof that the law of errors could be used to identify a 
“real quantity” for a population of humans had important philosophical and rhetorical 
ramifications. It allowed that particular features of human populations could be 
objectively described through the compilation of statistical data and the analysis of that 
data using the law of errors. This allowance provided support for the idea that like natural 
physical phenomena, human biological phenomena occurred in knowable law-like 
patterns. This revelation would engender later nineteenth-cetury programs to investigate 
not only the regularities in human biology, but also the regularities in human psychology 
and behavior. Though Quetelet himself did not pursue actual data an lyses on these last 
two sets of phenomena, he did suppose that, “even non-measurable normal characteristics 
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such as propensity (‘penchant’) for acts like marriage, drunken ess, suicide, or crime 
were similarly distributed over the group [i.e. homogeneous racial population] around a 
true value representing the ‘average man’ in the group” (Chatterjee 272).  
Quetelet’s statistical method and his goal of using it to es ablish a social physics 
were well received in Belgium and across the channel in England. His work was read by 
a generation of British scientists and social philosophers who embraced his philosophy 
and methodology and attempted to apply it to understanding society and nature. His 
followers included a wide range of luminaries from historian H.T. Buckle, who authored 
a history of civilization which sought to establish that the course of human societies was 
rigidly determined by conditions of climate and locality, to physicists Clerk Maxwell 
(1831-1879) and Ludwig Boltzmann (1844-1906), who used Quetelet’s simplification of 
the heterogeneous individual characteristics of a population into a statistical “average” to 
explain the behavior of molecules in a body of gas under heat transmission in terms of the 
average probabilistic speed of a molecule (278, 281).  
 In addition to contributing to the theoretical discussion about the usefulness of 
probability and statistics in examining human behavior, Quetelet also had a substantial 
impact on developing institutions for statistical-probabilistic research. In an 1833 meeting 
of the British Association for the Advancement of Scien e, he took a leading role in 
successfully advocating for the formation of a separate statistics section (275). As a result 
of his successful campaign, the Statistical Society of London, the progenitor of the Royal 
Statistical Society, was formed the following year in March of 1834 (Cullen).  
 Along with his instrumental role in the formation of a n tional statistical society 
in England, and a Central Statistical Commission in Belgium in 1841, Quetelet was also a 
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leading force behind the establishment of an international statistical congress. In 1853 the 
first such congress met in Belgium under his presidency to, “s andardize the terminology 
and methods of collection of official statistics in different countries and make them 
internationally comparable” (275). This body was the predecssor of the International 




In order to understand the source of supporting arguments in debates about the 
nature of evolution, variation, and heredity, and the int llectual and social context in 
which these debates developed, it is necessary to understand both something about the 
general history of ideas in probability and about specific developments in the fields of 
statistics and probability that led to the introduction of pr bability into the study of 
heredity, variation, and evolution in the nineteenth century. The general history provided 
in this chapter offers a glimpse into the methodological and philosophical developments 
in probability from which arguments regarding the nature of variation and heredity will 
be made in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Chapter three will show that the 
concepts of equiprobability and a priori probability established in the early classical 
period and carried on throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth c uries play a central 
role in the invention and delivery/development of Mendel’s arguments in “Experiments 
in Plant Hybridization.” Chapter four will reveal the importance of Gauss’s “law of error” 
and Laplace’s philosophy regarding “regular” and “irregular” er ors in the development 
of Francis Galton’s theory of heredity. Finally, the fifth chapter will examine the use of 
 
70 
the law of error and Bernoulli’s limit theorem by Karl Pearson to support arguments in 
favor of a statistical\probabilistic approach to the study of heredity and evolution. It will 
also include a discussion of how a more cautious assessment of the descriptive power of 
the normal curve is used by Pearson’s adversary, William B teson, to challenge the 
validity of his position.  These examples provide evidence of the emergence and the 
spread of a new line of argument for researchers hoping to develop and support their 
theories of variation, evolution, and heredity as well as illustration of the rhetorical 
problems attached to the application of the operations, f rmulae, and principles of 





Chapter 3: Hidden Value: Mendel, Mathematics, and the Case for 
Uniform Particulate Inheritance  
 
In the study of evolution progress had well-nigh stopped…. Such was our state 
when two years ago it was suddenly discovered that an unknown man, Gregor 
Johann Mendel, had, alone, and unheeded, broken off from the rest—in the 
moment that Darwin was at work—and cut a way through. William Bateson in 
Mendel’s Principles of Heredity.22 
 
Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species provided arguments and evidence which 
paved the way for a more sophisticated understanding of organic forms and their 
relationships with each other and their environment. Through the use of quantified 
evidence and arithmetical calculations, he offered arguments and evidence that organisms 
varied and that variation could spread through populations and accumulate to such a 
degree that organisms would physically diverge from their progenitors.  
Despite Darwin’s important work describing variation and its spread throughout 
populations, there were still important pieces of the puzzle missing. He had no reasonable 
theory for the mechanism of inheritance nor could he answer critics such as Fleeming 
Jenkin, who pointed out that if variations were small and needed to be accumulated 
regularly over vast amounts of time, they would become swamped, blended away over 
repeated generations of cross-breeding within the normal population (i.e. the majority of 
the population which does not exhibit a particular variation). Although Darwin did offer 
his theory of pangenesis, in which he argued that different characteristics of the parents 
were transferred to their offspring by gemmules in the blood, this theory was unproven 
and could not explain how characters could remain stable over time.  
                                               
22 William Bateson, preface, Mendel’s Principles of Heredity: A Defense (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1902) v.  
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Unknown to him, and the majority of natural philosophers at the time, the problem of 
character stability was being worked out by a monk laboring over carefully selected and 
organized samples of peas. The monk, of course, was Gregor Mendel and the carefully 
planned series of breeding experiments that he undertook fr m 1856 to 186423 provided 
the evidence for what we now recognize as the first modern theory of genetic inheritance.  
Although Mendel had described in the published findings of his resea ch “Versuche 
über Plfanzen-Hybriden” (“Experiments in Plant Hybridization” 1865) the basic pattern 
of inheritance of seven separate traits in peas, the valu  of his work was not recognized 
until his findings were simultaneously “rediscovered” by three researchers, Hugo De 
Vries, Carl Correns, and Erich von Tschermak, in 1900. Since the rediscovery of his 
findings, Mendel has earned a top place along with Darwin in the pantheon of great 
thinkers in the science of evolutionary biology, as both Darwin’s theory of evolution and 
Mendel’s theory of inheritance are necessary complements to one another in providing a 
full picture of the process of evolution.  
From a rhetorical perspective, Mendel’s work and its reception elicit two important 
questions: 1) why were Mendel’s arguments so compelling to reade s such as William 
Bateson who would, in the beginning of the twentieth century, successfully persuade the 
English biological community to accept Mendel’s theory of uniform particulate 
inheritance? And 2) why to his contemporaries was his argument so unpersuasive that 
only one of them ever bothered to respond to it critically and only a few even mention his 
work until its rediscovery in the twentieth century?  
                                               
23 These dates vary in different historical accounts from as early as 1854 to as late as 1865. I have chosen 
these dates based on majority opinion in the sources (Henig 2000, Iltis 1932, Olby 1966, Orel 1984).    
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The answer to the first question, I believe, can be found in Mendel’s 
counterintuitive results and his unorthodox methods of arguing from the principles of 
probability and combinatorics.24 Whereas Darwin held that species varied over time, a 
widely held belief among breeders, Mendel believed that species characteristics remained 
constant. Mendel’s particular take on heredity allowed for traits to remain stable over 
time and to accumulate in a population whereas in Darwin’s model they might quickly 
erode due to interbreeding. In addition, though Darwin does rely on quantitative 
comparisons to support and discover arguments, Mendel relies on a more robust program 
of argument using mathematical and quasi-mathematical formulae to argue for regular 
patterns in his data, quasi-deductive proofs that elevate thes patterns to the status of a 
law, and the existing laws of combinatorics and probability to both inform the 
construction of his experiments and support the law-like regularity of his conclusions. 
Mendel’s use of mathematical and quasi-mathematical formulae, operations, and laws 
added rigor to his biological arguments which appealed to his later supporters for whom, 
in 1900, mathematically describable laws were quickly becoming the gold standard for 
making arguments about evolution, heredity, and variation.  
Interestingly, however, whereas Mendel’s use of mathematics appealed to later 
audiences, this approach provoked an adverse reaction in his contemporaries who thought 
that Mendel was being presumptuous. In answer to the second question, I intend to make 
the case that, at least in part, Mendel’s use of mathematical formulae and principles to 
make his arguments was rejected by his contemporaries because they believed that 
inherited characters were variable not stable and, therefor , c uld not be described using 
                                               
24 Combinatorics is described under the definition for “combinatorial” as, “relating to the arrangement of, 
operation on, and selection of discrete mathematical elements belonging to finite sets or making up 
geometric configurations.” (“Combinatorial” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. 10th ed. 1998.) 
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a discrete mathematical system such as probability and combinatorics. In addition, they 
also objected to Mendel’s use of mathematical formulae and principles to suggest that his 
results represented deductive laws of inheritance because his r sults only applied to seven 
trait pairs on a handful of pea species.   
The tension created by Mendel’s reliance on mathematics to express and argue his 
position, in addition to the non-conformity of his result  to the traditionally accepted 
description of inheritance, provide important clues as to why for more than 30 years 
Mendel’s work went unrecognized. Though Mendel makes a valiant rhetorical effort to 
persuade his audience to accept his conclusions and his methodology, the silence of 30 
years bears witness to the failure of his persuasive approch with his intended readers 
regardless of the verity of his procedures and results.   
 
The Hybridist Tradition  
  
In order to understand the traditional sources of Mendel’s argument and why 
Mendel’s use of quantification, mathematical formulae, mathematical operations, and 
mathematical principles to make that argument represents a radical departure from his 
predecessors, it is important to known something about their arguments, beliefs and 
practices. Although experimentation in hybridization was considered as far back as 1694 
by Rudolph Jacob Camerer25 in his work Über das Geschlecht der Pflanzen (About the 
Gender of Plants.), systematic research in hybridization, the crossing of plants considered 
to be different varieties and species, began in the mid-eighteenth century with the work of 
Joseph Gottlieb Kölreuter (1733-1806) and was carried on in the ineteenth century by 
                                               
25 Better known under his Latinized name Camerarius. 
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Carl Friedrich von Gärtner (1772-1850). In general, these eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century researchers dealt with questions regarding the variation or fixity of natural forms 
and the physiological process by which either variety or homogeneity was transferred 
from one generation to the next. Specifically, they wanted to know how much parents 
contributed of their characters to their offspring, whether their contributions were 
qualitatively similar, how the characters of the parents were carried into the offspring, 
and how they developed in the offspring. 
 
Joseph Gottlieb Kölreuter  
 
Joseph Gottlieb Kölreuter was born on April 27, 1733 in the Sawbian village of 
Sulz in the Black Forest region of Southwest Germany. His early hybridization 
experiments were conducted in his hometown of Sulz, in the garden of Achatius Gärtner 
in the nearby town of Calw as well as in St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Leipzig. Later, after 
1764, all of his work was done at Karlsruhe where he was employed as a professor of 
natural history (Roberts 35-36).   
Kölreuter’s four-volume work, which included Vorläufige Nachricht von einigen 
das Geschlecht der Pflanzen betreffenden Versuchen und Beobachtungen (Preliminary 
Report about some Observations and Experiments Regarding the Gender of Plants) and 
its three Fortsetzungen (Continuations), which were written in the above mentioned 
places from 1761 to 1766, became the foundational writings for the plant hybridists of the 
nineteenth century. In these works, Kölreuter sets down many of the central principles of 
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hybridization held also by Mendel, though his own work offers important deviations from 
them. 
In this work, Kölreuter describes experiments in which he creates hybrids by 
crossing a total of 13 genera and 54 species over a six-year period, including his famous 
crossing of two different varieties of tobacco Nicotina paniculata and Nicotina rustica 
which represents the first recorded experiment in artificial plant hybridization (Roberts 
36). These experiments were conducted by Kölreuter as a means of exploring 
reproduction in plants, especially the manner in which and the degree to which male and 
female reproductive material contributed to the formation of a new organism. 
Hybridization provided an ideal method for conducting such an investigation because the 
contrast between the features of the parents offered a means by which the experimenter 
could determine the nature of each of their contributions. If hybrid characters favored one 
or the other of the parents, Kölreuter could assume that the generative force of that parent 
was stronger than the other.  
 What he found, however, in the crosses of tobacco was that the hybrid always 
seemed to be a form intermediate between the two parents. The outcome of these crosses 
led Kölreuter to reconfirm Camerer’s position that plants do have different sexual 
components which contribute material to the reproductive process. It also suggested to 
him that not only do both the male and female parents contribute to the production of 
offspring, but also that each of their contributions is approximately equal and blended as 
the hybrid seems to be a perfect intermediate of matern l and paternal characteristics 
(Roberts 42-43).  
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Despite the answers that his initial experiments seemed to offer in terms of the 
role of the parents in reproduction, they also led Kölreuter to an uneasy contemplation of 
the “naturalness” of the crosses he had created and whether or not they revealed a change 
in the essence of the two species involved. As a proponent f the philosophy of 
essentialism, inherent in the Christian doctrine of special creation, which held that each 
species was a unique and unalterable act of creation, Kölreuter was troubled by his ability 
to create a hybrid type challenging the notion that species were stable. When the first 
generation of crosses matured, however, to Kölreuter’s r lief, they were found to be 
completely infertile. This confirmed to his satisfaction that, though they might be 
crossed, a divine barrier existed which would not let the transformation continue further 
and, therefore, disturb the essence of the species (45).  
As he progressed in his experiments, however, Kölreuter was faced with more 
challenges because he discovered that crosses of plants which were more closely related 
than the tobacco species in his first experiment did prouce viable seeds. After closer 
inspection of the number of seeds, though, Kölreuter concluded that these crosses were 
always less fertile than their parents, a fact which seemed, at least partially, to shore up 
the essentialist nature of the species. In addition, his convictions were reconfirmed by 
further experiments in which he back-crossed hybrids with their original parent species. 
These crosses resulted in plants most of which were similar to one of the two original 
species, a few of which were related to the form of the other parent species, and a few of 
which displayed faint mixed traces of both parents. The rev rsion of most plants to their 
parental forms in these experiments led Kölreuter to conclude that this, too, was evidence 
of a barrier in nature against the mixing of specific essences (Mayr 644).  
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 From the results of these back-crosses, Kölreuter developed a theory of the 
process of inheritance in plants which held that each species or variety involved in 
hybridization expressed itself in different degrees, depending on the strength of a 
particular species’ essence. (This concept of dominance pp ars in Mendel’s work, 
though it is a characteristic of a particular genetic trait rather than a species’ essence.) 
Those species with strong essences would be more present in back-crosses than those 
with weaker essences because their reproductive material asserted itself more vigorously 
or in greater amounts than the material provided by the weaker species.  
 
Since these materials are of different sorts, or in their essence are different from 
each other, it is easy to comprehend that the strength of the one must be different 
from the strength of the other. From the union and commingling of these two 
materials, which occurs in the most intimate and orderly manner, according to a 
definite relationship, there originates another, which is of an intermediate sort…. 
All the movements and changes, which from the embryo to the time of flowering, 
take place in every masterpiece of nature, appear to be directed simply to the great 
work of reproduction. They all aim at gradually liberating that compound material 
upon which they are based, and at dividing it again into the two original ground 
materials; or, to speak more properly, to bring these latt r themselves into a 
complete, and, especially from the one side, into masses of unlike size than were 




Here Kölreuter explains that reproduction is a process of combining and 
separating the essences of species. In the initial stage, the two essences are “commingled” 
and create an “intermediate material” for the hybrid plant. During the plant’s process of 
development, however, the commingled essences are separated nd expressed in what 
would now be called the phenotype,26 the outward physical appearance of the plant, 
according to the original strength of their essence. The result is a hybrid offspring (F1) 
which resembles both the parental species in keeping with the degree of vitality of their 
essences.  
Kölreuter’s reasoning about the combination and expression of reproductive 
elements in the case of closely related species relies on an argument from antithesis. First, 
he believes that each species has its own essence which is unique from and contrasts with 
the essence of other species. Second, though these specis combine in the process of 
hybridization, they separate out again in the phenotype where each exhibits dominion 
over one specific aspect of the phenotypic expression.   
Kölreuter’s work provided the essential material and methods for all of the 
hybridists who came after. Most importantly they took up his ideas 1) that hybrids 
represented an equal or near equal commingling of parental specie  essences, 2) that 
hybrids of species are generally infertile with closely r lated forms showing a higher 
degree of fertility, 3) that in the offspring of fertile hybrids, a few of the offspring 
reverted to the parental hybrid form while most reverted to the grandparent forms in the 
original cross, and 4) that the degree to which traits are expressed in the physical 
                                               
26 Neither Kölreuter nor Gärtner had a theory which included the genotype, the collection of both expressed 
and hidden characters.     
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characteristic of hybrids is directly related to the strngth of species’ essences which are 
commingled.  
In addition to his ideas, later researchers also adopte  many of Kölreuter’s 
methods for conducting experiments, drawing conclusions, and presenting results in 
writing. In the bulk of his work, Kölreuter worked with crosses between what were at the 
time labeled distinct species, e.g. Nicotiana paniculata X Nicotiana rustica, though the 
subsequent fertility of crosses led him to believe in some cas s that certain species might 
be better described as varieties. From these carefully recorded crosses, he gathered both 
qualitative and quantitative data on the appearance of hybrids and their relations to their 
parents from which he inductively drew conclusions about the manner in which and 
degree to which traits were passed on from parents to offspring by their expression within 
the offspring.  
The results of Kölreuter’s crosses were presented graphic lly using natural 
language, brackets, and the symbols for male ♂ and female ♀. 27 He also employed 
quantitative measurements in order to catalogue the generatio s in crosses and to present 
comparative quantitative measurements of various physical features of the parents and 
their hybrid offspring.28 The latter application of quantification represented an important 
component of Kölreuter’s case because, by juxtaposing the measurements of parent 
plants and their offspring in a chart format, he was able to show that in some cases hybrid 
crosses were intermediate forms of their parents and in other cases one parent’s character 
dominated. For the most part, however, Kölreuter’s work did not rely heavily on 
                                               
27 See Appendix F 
 
28 See Appendix G  
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quantification nor make an effort to deduce any laws of regularity based on mathematical 
principles.   
 
Carl Friedrich von Gärtner  
 
In the German village of Calw, in the same garden where Kölreuter had 
conducted some of his hybridization experiments, one of the greatest supporters of his 
work, Carl Friedrich von Gärtner, undertook his own research program of crossing 
hundreds of species and varieties in the early nineteenth c tury (Olby 49). A physician 
by trade and son of a distinguished botanist, Joseph Gärtner (1732-91),29 Carl Gärtner did 
25 years worth of meticulous hybrid crossing experiments o his own30 which he 
carefully recorded. The initial motivation for carrying out these experiments is not clear. 
In fact, Gärtner’s results might have passed into obscurity altogether if not for a prize 
offered by the Dutch Academy of Sciences at Haarlem for essays answering the query, 
“What does experience teach regarding the production of new sp cies and varieties, 
through the artificial fertilization of flowers of the one with pollen of the other, and what 
economic and ornamental plants can be produced and multiplied in this way?” (Roberts 
167)  
In October of 1835, Gärtner learned of the prize and sent th  academy a brief 
sample of his work. Because he had not formally compiled a l of his results, he asked for 
                                               
29 Author of an authoritative work on the seeds and fruits of plants De Fructibus et Seminibus Plantarum 
(1788) 
 
30 Based on the estimate given in Robert’s for the number of years Gärtner spent on these experiments and 
the fact that the results were published in 1837, I assume that these experiments began around 1811 or 
1812. (Roberts 168) 
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an extension to complete his work. The extension was grnted and two years later he 
presented them with a two-hundred page memoir which in 1849 was publi hed as a 
monograph under the title Versuche und Beobachtungen über die Bastarderzeugnung im 
Pflanzenreich (Experimentation and Observation of the Creation of Hybrids in the Plant 
Kingdom). In this monograph Gärtner details nearly 10,000 separate experiments in 
crossing among 700 species belonging to 80 different genera of pl nts (168).  
From these experiments Gärtner concludes, as Kölreuter had, that the essences of 
the different species are commingled in the hybrid; however, unlike Kölreuter, who 
believed in only one true hybrid form,31 Gärtner divides hybrids, based on the nature of 
their commingling, into three categories: 1) intermediate, 2) commingled, and 3) definite. 
Hybrids which expressed in equal amounts pure traits from each of their parent species 
were identified as members of the intermediate class of hybrids because “a complete 
balance occurred of both fertilizing materials, in respect to either mass or activities” 
(168). In this definition, Gärtner describes what he understand  are two important factors 
which affect the degree of expression of a particular species’ essence in the hybridized 
offspring: 1) the mass or amount of a particular species essence present in a  offspring 
and 2) the activity or potency of the essence present.   
What Gärtner argues is that the presence of more or less ma s or activity on the 
part of one species’ essence results in the expression of a lesser or greater number of that 
species’ characters in the phenotype of the hybrid offspring. Like Kölreuter, Gärtner 
believes in the expression of different aspects of the two species’ essences in different 
parts of the phenotype, but makes no attempt to experiment on specific traits because he 
sees traits as expressions of different facets of the unified fabric of a species’ essence 
                                               
31 The form that Gärtner identifies as “intermediate.”  
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rather than as a mosaic of separate units.  He describe the antithesis of essences and their 
expression in different domains of the phenotype when he writes,    
 
In the formation of simple hybrids, as in sexual reproduction in general, two 
factors are active. This unlikeness of activity, flowing from the specific 
differences of species, expresses itself through the mor pr nounced or the 
weaker manifestation of the individual parental charactes in the different parts of 
the hybrid. (Quoted in Roberts 171) 
 
 Whereas the intermediate form is created by an exact balance of contributions 
from one parent or the other, the d finite hybrid, according to Gärtner, is one, “among 
which the resemblance of a hybrid to one of its parents, either to the father or the mother, 
is so marked and preponderating that the agreement with the one or with the other is 
unquestioned” (169). Here, Gärtner suggests that when the mass or ctivity of one of the 
species is greater than the other, the pure features of the predominant species are 
preponderant in the form of the offspring. Though Gärtner’s concept of preponderance 
appears similar to Mendel’s notion of dominance, it is different in the sense that Gärtner 
has no recessive counterpart. There is no sense of what happens to the reproductive 
material for a particular feature contributed from the non-dominant parent.    
 Gärtner’s sense that dominance is an all or nothing phenomenon in which features 
are inherited in pure form or eliminated entirely is clear in his definition of the second 
category of hybrid, the commingled hybrid, and in his understanding of the distribution of 




Now this and now that part of the hybrid approaches more to the maternal or to 
the paternal form, whereby, however, the characters of the parents, in their 
transference to the new organism, never go over pure, but in which the parental 
characters always suffer a certain modification. (Roberts 168)  
 
 Though there is no statement here about the forces which might affect 
modification in the parental characters, there is no hi t that this modification of character 
is influenced by the mixing of characters from one parent with the other. Instead, there is 
a sense that the characters are modified before they are blended in pollination.  
In his discussion of back-crosses, however, Gärtner seem  to suggest that the 
modification in the pure characters might have something to do with the presence of the 
essence of the different parent species. However, again, the modification is not one in 
which different contributions from each of the parents are mixed to create a new 
character which is not purely one or the other. Instead, the presence of each of the 
species’ essences has a modifying influence on the manner in which the dominating 
features of the other is expressed.   
 
[The fundamental ground material of the hybrid] behaves differently in the second 
and in the further stages of breeding, where, on account of the different nature of 
the two factors of the hybrids in the succeeding fertilizations, an altered, shifting, 




 In their work, Gärtner and Kölreuter raised important questions about the 
processes of reproduction in plants. They asked: What happens when two species are 
combined? And they answered: In the process of hybridization, the essences of two 
species combined and separated out with each species expressing itself in a particular 
domain of the offspring. They queried: Why do the characters of one species predominate 
in some cases and not in others? And they responded: Because the mass or activity of one 
species in the case of a particular character was greater th n the other. Gärtner wondered: 
Why are features not always purely expressed in offspring and in later generations? And 
he theorized: That either outside influences or influences from the presence of the 
essence of the other species affected the pure expression of characters.  
Mendel’s understanding of the fundamental precepts of plant hybridization theory 
and his primary argument for the stability of traits came from the works of Kölreuter and 
Gärtner. However, the impetus for his research was the result of questions which still 
lingered in the minds of hybridists regarding the quality and quantity of the contribution 
that each different parental species made to the hybrid. Though Gärtner and Kölreuter 
had theorized about why hybrid forms had a mixture of characters from either parent 
which, in certain cases, varied in different degrees, researchers still sought a clearer 
understanding of what accounted for such differences in the expression of characters.  
 
The Origin of Mendel’s Experiments 
 
In 1856 Mendel began eight years worth of hybridization experiments with peas. 
Although the results of these experiments are recorded in “Experiments in Plant 
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Hybridization,” there is no discussion within the text, or in any other document for that 
matter, which explains why Mendel set out to do these exp riments in the first place. 
There are two theories, however, which have been widely discussed by Mendel scholars 
(Henig 2000, Iltis 1932, Orel 1984).  
First, there is the belief that the experiments were inspired by Mendel’s second 
failure in 1856 of the examination for high school teachers. The legend goes that in the 
examination Mendel had disagreed with one of his examiners, Eduard Fenzl. Fenzl was 
the director of the Vienna botanical gardens and was firmly of the opinion that, “The 
plant embryo resided, microscopic but entirely preformed, in the pollen and passed to the 
ovary through the pollen tube. All it needed to do was grow; the female part of the plant 
offered nothing more than an environment that made growth possible” (Henig 62).  
Conversely, Mendel believed that there was no a priori existence of a complete 
embryo in the male. Instead, he held that the embryo was created only with the coming 
together of the male and female reproductive material. As the story goes, this position 
became a point of contention in the examination. Mendel chose to fail rather than 
capitulate to Fenzl’s point of view.  
Angered by the debate and his second failure, Mendel presumably returned to 
Brünn and set to work to prove, once and for all, that his position was correct. The series 
of carefully planned breeding experiments with peas, therefore, was his defiant scientific 
gesture to Fenzl and the spermist theory of reproduction.  
Although the importance of Mendel’s run-in with Fenzl as a source of inspiration 
is entertained by some Mendel scholars (Henig 2000), ignored by others (Olby 1966 and 
Orel 1984), and dismissed altogether by still others (Iltis1923), that a theory of 
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fertilization is at the heart to his work cannot easily be ignored. Though there is no telling 
whether Mendel’s dispute with Fenzl, even if it did happen, inspired him to develop his 
hybridization experiments, I will argue that Mendel certainly was aware that 
understanding this process was key to supporting his theory of the distribution of 
characters.  
In fact, the work of Max Ernst Wichura (1817-66) on the hybridization of 
willows, cited by Mendel in his “Experiments in Plant Hybridization,” is the first text in 
the hybridization literature which argues that during amphimixis, the joining of the male 
and female reproductive material, each of the parents must contribute an equal amount 
because in reciprocal crosses the traits of each of the parents seemed to segregate out in a 
regular pattern (Roberts 181-2).  
In the analysis of Mendel’s text, I will show that, like Wichura, Mendel also 
argues that equality must exist in the combination of reproductive material because of the 
mathematical regularity in the offspring of hybrids. In fact, this position, I will argue, is 
crucial in designing his hybridization experiments and, therefore, must have been clear to 
Mendel and an important influence on him either before or in the early stages of his 
breeding experiments.    
A second theory about why Mendel undertook his program of hybridization, one 
that has the broadest support among historians, is that he was interested in providing 
support for the concept that populations of organisms varied ov r time. This theory is 





Although since the famous dispute between Cuvier and Geoffroy Saint-Hiliare the 
doctrine of the permanence of organic forms seemed to have definitely gained the 
upper hand over any theory of their progressive evolution, all far-seeing biologists 
were still cudgeling their brains over the problem, “How is the extraordinary 
multiplicity of living forms to be explained?” Mendel’s interest in his ornamental 
flowers may first have been aroused by… pure delight… but the peas and the 
other plants… were in the end to furnish him with answers to serious problems. 
(106-07)  
 
 The theory is also supported by Henig:   
 
Maybe Mendel set out, in his pea experiments, to confirm his idea of “perennial” 
progressive change as a driving force for the appearance of ew species from the 
old. If he designed his experiments correctly, he could len empirical support to 
the theories of two botanists he had come most to admire: Nägeli and Unger. (64)  
 
During the 1840s and 1850s a radical biological movement developed in the work 
of Franz Unger, Karl Nägeli, and others which rejected Gärtner and Kölreuter’s position 
that species were fixed categories and embraced Jean Baptist L marck’s (1744-1829) 
position in Philosophie Zoologique (1809) that species could change over time. Franz 
Unger (1800-70) was Mendel’s professor of physiology and plant leontology in Vienna 
from the fall of 1852 to the spring of 1853. In his weekly “Botanical Letters” column in 
the Vienna Times (Wiener Zeitung) in the winter of 1856 Unger wrote, “Who can deny 
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that new combinations arise out of this permutation of vegetation, always reducible to 
certain law combinations, which emancipates themselves from the proceeding 
characteristics of the species and appear as a new specie ” (quoted in Henig 63).  
 These words of Mendel’s instructor are companions to the sentiments of Carl von 
Nägeli who, in a work published in 1856 Individuality in Nature with especial Reference 
to the Vegetable Kingdom (Die Individualitat in der Natur mit besonderer 
Berucksichtigung des Pflanzenreiches), writes,  
 
Like natural phenomena in general, species cannot persist in complete repose. Just 
as the offspring of the first individual were a little different from that individual, 
so also must the germs which engendered them diverge to some extent from those 
out of which they themselves originated. A process of change must be perennially 
at work, and this change cannot fail, in the end, to bring about the disappearance 
of the species or its transition into another. (Quoted in Iltis 186)    
  
Although Nägeli had no direct connection to Mendel until the year after Mendel’s 
hybridization experiments were in print, Unger was a proponent of Nägeli’s work and 
most likely referred to him in his lectures (Orel 40).  
In addition to there being evidence that there were academic influences in 
Mendel’s life that might have encouraged him to undertake exp riments to prove 
variation in organisms, Mendel himself suggests in the opening of “Experiments in Plant 
Hybridization” that, at least in part, his experiments had been undertaken o contribute to 




It requires indeed some courage to undertake a labor of such far-reaching extent; 
this appears, however, to be the only right way by which we can finally reach the 
solution of a question the importance of which cannot be overestimated in 
connection with the history of the evolution of organic forms.[32](Mendel 2)   
 
 Though there seems to be sufficient evidence to support the view that Mendel 
undertook his experiments to support Unger and Nägeli’s position on the variability of 
species, a crucial piece of evidence has been overlooked in these assessments. In the 
conclusion of the text, Mendel argues that species are in most cases not variable. 
 
He [Gärtner] perceives in the complete transformation of one species into another 
indubitable proof that species are fixed within limits beyond which they cannot 
change. Although this opinion cannot be unconditionally accepted, we find on the 
other hand in Gärtner’s experiments a noteworthy confirmation of that 
supposition regarding variability of cultivated plants which has already been 
expressed.[33] 
                                               
32 Es gehört allerdings einiger Muth dazu, sich einer so weit reichenden Arbeit zu unterziehen; indessen 
scheint es der einzig richtige Weg zu sein, auf dem endlich ie Lösung einer Frage erricht warden kann, 
welche fur die Entwicklungs-Geschichte der organischen Formen von icht zu unterschätzender Bedeutung 
ist. The original German is from a reprint of Mendel’s original text: Gregor Mendel, Versuche über 
Plfanzen-Hybriden, ed. J. Cramer and H.K. Swann (1865; New York: Hafner Publishing, 1960) 4. All 
subsequent footnotes containing the original German will be from this text.   
 
33 On page 32 of “Experiments” Mendel writes, “But nothing justifies the assumption thate tendency to 
the formation of varieties [in cultivated plants] is so extraordinarily increased that the species speedily lose 
all stability, and their offspring diverge into an endless series of extremely variable forms.” (Allein nichts 
berechtigt uns zu der Annahme, das die Neigung zur Varietätenbildung so ausserordentlich gesteigert 
werde, dass die Arten bald alle Selbstständigkeit verlier n un ihre Nachkommen in einer endlosen Reihe 
höchst veranderlicher Formen auseinander gehen. (V rsuche, 36))   
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 Among the experimental species there were cultivated plants… and 
hybrids between these species lost none of their stability after four or five 
generations. [34] (41)  
 
Though Mendel’s results failed in the end to support Nägeli and Unger’s belief in 
variability, this failure does not itself preclude the possibility that Mendel began his 
experiments with the intention of supporting their positin. In the “Introductory 
Remarks” section of his text, however, Mendel suggests otherwise by citing as his 
precursors Gärtner, Kölreuter, and Wichura, all of whom believed in the fixity of the 
species. The work and ideas of Unger, Nägeli, and Darwin35 are not mentioned here or 
anywhere else in the text.  
 
The striking regularity with which the same hybrid forms always reappeared 
whenever fertilization took place between the same species induced further 
experiments to be undertaken, the object of which was to follow up the 
developments of the hybrids in their progeny.  
                                               
34 Es [should read “Er”] sieht in der vollendeten Umwandlung einer Art in die andere den unzweideutingen 
Beweis, dass der Species feste Grenzen gesteckt sind, uber welche hinaus sie sich nicht zu ändern vermag. 
Wenn auch dieser Ansicht eine bedingungslose Geltung nicht zuerkannt warden kann, so findet sich doch 
anderseits in den von Gärtner angestellen Versuchen eine beachtenswerthe Bestätigung der früher über die 
Veränderlichkeit der Culturpflanzen ausgesprochenen Vermuthung.  
 Unter den Versuchsarten kommen cultivirte Gewächse vor… und auch diese hatten nach einer 4 
bis 5 maligen hybriden Verbindung nichts von ihrer Selbstständigkeit verloren. (Versuche 46-47)   
 
35 Of Darwin Mendel has been reported as saying that he was, “greatly interested in the ideas of evolution, 
and was far from being an adversary of the Darwinian theory.” However, he is said to have stated that, 
“there was still something lacking” (Orel 71).  
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 To this object numerous careful observers, such as Kölreuter, Gärtner, 
Herbert, Locoq, Wichura, and others, have devoted a part of their lives with 
inexhaustible perseverance.36 (1)   
 
 In this section of the introduction, Mendel puts his work in the context of those 
hybridists who have been struck by the “regularity” and “reappearance” of traits during 
hybridization, not by their variability or disappearance. Though he is reverent regarding 
the conclusions of these earlier researchers, Mendel expresses dissatisfaction with the 
methods by which they came to their conclusions. He argues that in order to rigorously 
confirm or refute the stability of species, a more precise quantitative program of breeding 
experiments has to be carried out to ascertain what patterns, if any, might exist in the 
distribution of traits.  
 
Those who survey the work done in this department will arr ve at the conviction 
that among all the numerous experiments made, not one has been carried out to 
such an extent and in such a way to make it possible to determine the number of 
different forms under which the offspring of the hybrids apper, or to arrange 
these forms with certainty according to their separate generations, or definitely to 
ascertain their statistical relations.37 (1-2)  
                                               
36 Die aufallende Regelmässigkeit, mit welcher dieselben Hybridformen immer wiederkehrten, so oft die 
Befruchtung zwischen gleichen Arten geschah, gab die Anregung zu weiteren Experimenten, deren 
Aufgabe es war, die Entwicklung der Hybriden in ihren Nachkommen zu verfolgen.  
 Dieser Aufgabe haben sorgfältige Beobachter, wie Kölreute , Gärtner, Herbert, Lecocq, Wichura 
u.a. einen Theil ihres Lebens mit unermudlicher Ausdauer geopfert. (Versuche 3) 
  
37 Wer die Arbeiten auf diesem Gebiete überblickt, wird zu er Ueberzeugung gelangen, dass unter den 
zahlreichen Versuchen keener in dem Umfange und in der Weise durchgeführt ist, dass es möglich wäre, 




Unlike his predecessors Mendel was uniquely situated to develop the quantitative 
hypethetico-deductive experimental design that was required to ascertain the number and 
arrangement of forms over many generations of breeding. The reason for his success is in 
part the result of Mendel being a hybrid himself: part biological scientist, part physical 
scientist, and part mathematician.  
 
Mendel the Mathematician and Physical Scientist  
 
A brief foray into Mendel’s personal history reveals the extent of his interest and 
training in the physical sciences and mathematics. As a student at the University of 
Vienna from 1851-53, Mendel enrolled in courses with the great physicist Christian 
Doppler and with the renowned mathematician Andreas von Etti gshausen. In fact, 
Mendel’s interest in mathematics and the physical sciences was so pronounced that it 
made up, according to Alain Corcos and Floyd Monhagan (in the r book Gregor 
Mendel’s Experiments on Plant Hybrids) at least half of his academic schedule (24).  
Along with learning the subject matter of mathematics and physics, Mendel also 
had an education in how to apply the knowledge in these fields to investigations of the 
natural world. He was chosen by Doppler as an assistant demonstrator at the Physical 
Institute at the university. In this capacity, he learned how to perform experimental 
demonstrations of various physical phenomena. This practical education in the 
methodology of experiments in the physical sciences was employed by Mendel in the 
                                                                                                                                 
auftreten, dass man diese Formen mit Sicherheit in den einzelnen Generationen ordnen und die 
gegenseitigen numerischen Verhältnisse feststellen könnte. (Versuche 3-4)   
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careful planning and design of his Pisum experiments, which, unlike traditional hybrid 
experimentation that relies on a process of first compiling and cataloguing information 
and then drawing conclusions based on these observations, employs the Newtonian 
hypothetico-deductive approach where a hypothesis is given and experiments are then 
carefully designed to prove the truth or falsity of that ypothesis. 
 In addition to the methodology of experimentation, Mendel was also introduced 
to the use and importance of mathematics as a tool for predicting and modeling physical 
phenomena. At the time of his studies, the mathematics of statistics and probability had 
become an important part of this area of knowledge (Orel 31). Orel suggests that Mendel 
might have learned something of the subject from Doppler, who had published a 
mathematical textbook38 in 1844 with a chapter on, “combinatorial theory and basic 
principles of probability calculation” (31).    
Orel also suggests that Mendel could have gained some understanding of the 
theoretical application of probability to natural philosophy from the work of Joseph 
Johann von Littrow (1781-1840) with whose small volume, Probability Calculation as 
Used in Scientific Life (1833), Mendel was also familiar. In the text, Littrow discusses the 
application of Laplace’s theory of probability to all phenomena arguing that, “the 
relationships of all phenomena in nature seem at first completely random; but the greater 
the number of those phenomena that are considered, the closer they approach to certain 
constant relationships” (32). Orel explains that Mendel relied on the book as a resource 
for compiling meteorological records and for making meteorological forecasts of the 
                                               
38 Orel does not provide the name of the textbook. I assume, however, that he is referring to Arithmetik und 
Algebra: mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Bedürfnisse des practischen Lebens und der technischen 
Wissenschaften: nebst einem Anhange von 450 Aufgaben pu lished in 1844.   
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weather in Moravia and that he may have also applied the methodology developed from 
this experience to his work with peas (32). 
Although mathematical symbolization for the purpose of quantifying and then 
comparing experimental results were used by Kölreuter in his hybrid experiments, there 
was neither an effort on his part to use mathematical principles as a source of invention 
for his arguments, nor to make deductive arguments from thse principles. Mendel’s 
background in probability and his work with meteorology, however, suggests that even 
before he set out on his experiments with pea hybridizat on he may have been relying on 
established mathematical principles as aids for understanding atural phenomena.    
 
The Role of Quantification, Combinatorics, and the Principles of Probability in 
Making Mendel’s Case 
 
 With no primary record by Mendel of how he developed his arguments in 
“Experiments in Plant Hybridization,” the only way to understand the role that 
quantification, combinatorics and the principles of probability played in developing his 
case for 1) the regularity of the distribution of characters over generations, 2) the 
particulate non-interacting nature of characters, and 3) the equality of the contributions of 
parental characters in offspring is by closely examining the arguments themselves in the 
text of the “Experiments.” What this analysis reveals is that though Mendel’s arguments 
have their source partially in the positions and methods of previous hybridists, they also 
rely for support on quantified data and on the principles of combinatorics and probability 
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to elevate the status of his findings from a series of observations to a set of deductive 
natural laws.   
 In the first five sections of Mendel’s text following the “Introductory Remarks” 
(“Einleitende Bemerkungen”) Mendel does exactly what he claims he will do in his 
introduction: 1) “determine the number of forms under which the offspring of hybrids 
appear” and 2) “arrange these forms with certainty according to their separate 
generations.” His work in this section is very much informed by the traditional practices 
of hybridization; however, Mendel adds precision to his hybrid experiments by purposely 
choosing specific features to observe, carefully ensuring that plants are not accidentally 
pollinated, and precisely describing the relationship between different forms in different 
generations quantitatively.  
 In the first two sections following the introduction, Mendel provides his readers 
with a careful accounting of and rationale for both the materials and the methods of his 
experiments. He begins the first section, “Selection of Experimental Plants,” by 
describing the three basic criteria he employed when choosing and controlling his 
experimental subjects.  
 
1. [That they] Possess constant differing characters.  
2. That the hybrids of such plants must, during the flowering period, be protected 
from the influence of all foreign pollen, or be easily capable of such protection. 
3. The hybrids and their offspring should suffer no marked disturbance in their 
fertility in the successive generations.39 (2)  
                                               





Of these criteria, the one which is unique to Mendel’s work is the first one. It is 
unlike the criteria of earlier hybridists because 1) it begins experimentation from the 
position that a species is made up of a mosaic of separat features, and 2) it seeks to 
ensure that those features are pure or constant. These conc pts are extremely important to 
Mendel’s case. The idea that traits are separate elements is important because it allows 
Mendel to clearly identify a characteristic of a plant s a single unit and follow that unit 
from one generation to the next. The traditional beliefs held by Kölreuter and Gärtner, 
that all of the characters, or describable features of a plant, were part of a species essence 
and, therefore, had to be considered en toto, made describing the assortment of characters 
extremely difficult because it was impossible to follow all of the features at once from 
one hybrid cross to the next.  
In addition to positing separate characters, the first criterion also requires that the 
features to be experimentally bred remain pure. This criterion is crucial to Mendel’s 
arguments because if he is to prove that traits remain st ble over many generations he 
must begin his experiments with traits that do not varybefore hybridization. In addition, 
it provides evidence that Mendel was designing his experiments around a preconceived 
position that heredity could be described by mathematical principles, which require 
regularity. In order to ensure the stability of the traits in the seeds he was breeding, 
Mendel explains he has allowed the plants to self-breed. Then, after examining the 
offspring, he eliminated any plants which did not breed true (3).   
                                                                                                                                 
1. Constant differirende Merkmale besitzen 
2. Die Hybriden derselben mussen während der Blüthezeit vorder Einwirkung jades fremdartigen 
Pollens geschützt sein oder leicht geschützt warden können.  
3. Dürfen die Hybriden und ihre Nachkommen in den aufeinander folgenden Generationen keine 
merkliche Störung in der Fruchtbarkeit erleiden.  (Versuche 5) 
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Though the first criterion is perhaps the most innovative of Mendel’s experimental 
parameters, the second and third criteria are no less important. In the case of the second 
parameter, Mendel reveals the importance of protecting the experimental plants from 
foreign pollen. He explains that if the experimental subjects are open for fertilization the 
results of the experiment will not be accurate. In order to ensure that uncontrolled 
fertilization does not occur, Mendel takes two precautions. Fir t, Mendel uses peas, 
Pisum, because they self-fertilize and second, he follows the time honored practices of 
emasculating and crossbreeding plants just before self-ferti ization can occur.   
The final criteria, that species whose hybrids are fertile must be crossed, is important 
because without an observable series of all the possible permutations of offspring in 
successive generations it would be impossible to ascertain with any certainty whether or 
not there was any regularity in the expression of traits from one generation to the next. In 
The Growth of Biological Thought, Mayr explains that this particular parameter was also 
extremely fortunate for Mendel because, “Differences among intrapopulation variants are 
usually single-gene differences and display uncomplicated M ndelian segregation, while 
differences between species are often highly polygenetic and fail to segregate cleanly” 
(Mayr 713). Had Mendel chosen less fertile forms, which would have varied genetically 
to a greater extent, the regularity of the relationship in the different generations of hybrids 
would not have been so clearly observed. Mendel explains at the end of this section that 
after some preliminary crossings he was led to adopt 22 different varieties of the species 
Pisum as candidates for his crossing experiments (Mendel 4). 
Once Mendel has introduced and explained his experimental criteria, he provides 
his readers with a list of the character traits that he intends to observe in his experiments.  
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There are seven characters including 1) the difference in the form of the ripe seeds 
(smooth/wrinkled), 2) the difference in the color of the seed albumin (pale yellow, bright 
yellow, or orange/intense green), 3) the difference in the color of the seed coat 
(white/grey, grey-brown, leather brown, or violet), 4) the difference in the form of the 
ripe pods (smooth/wrinkled), 5) the difference in the color f the unripe pods (light to 
dark green/vividly yellow), 6) the difference in the positi n of flowers (axial along the 
main stem/terminal at the end of the stem), and 7) the difference in the length of the stem 
(long 6-7ft./short ¾-1½ ft.) (5-6). Mendel then explains that these traits were chosen due 
to their high degree of visibility and the regularity of their behavior.  
 In some ways, this a priori choice of traits is a radic l departure from previous 
hybridization experiments; however, in others it follows classical lines of thought 
regarding hybridization. It is radical on the one hand because, as mentioned before, most 
traditional hybridists did not think of the character traits s separate elements. Having 
separate antithetical traits, however, is necessary for Mendel if he is to complete the 
primary mission of his experiments which is to present a quantitative description of the 
distribution of traits within the organism over generations. This task is immensely 
simplified if 1) he can be assured that the traits being counted have been shown to breed 
true and 2) he can discriminate between one trait and another. In this way, Mendel’s 
desire for quantified results influences the specific featurs of the experimental design 
making it amenable to the application of the formulae, operations, and principles of 
mathematics.  
 In other ways, of course, the choice of traits is very traditional. This is especially 
true of his interpretation of characters in terms of antitheses. This either/or distinction 
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reflects Kölreuter and Gärtner’s impression that each species had a distinct essence and 
that that essence had a certain degree of dominance in th  fi al form. Mendel does not 
question whether or not a species or variety might havethree or four forms for the same 
feature. Instead, he is perfectly content to follow the traditional opinion of one species or 
variety, one form.  
 This mixture of the novel and the traditional in Mendel’s xperimental design 
seems to continue in the next three sections in which Mendel describes the results of 
crossbreeding experiments of the different varietal forms and the first and second 
generations created by allowing the hybrids to self-breed. In the first section, “The Forms 
of the Hybrids” [F1], Mendel describes the results of his crossing of varieties with the 
seven pairs of antithetical characters listed in the previous section. He begins by 
describing the conclusions made in previous work about the outcomes of crossing 
different species.  
 
Experiments which in previous years were made with ornametal plants have 
already afforded evidence that the hybrids, as a rule, are not exactly intermediate 
between the parental species. With some of the more striking characters… the 
intermediate, indeed, is always to be seen; in other cases, however, one of the two 
parental characters is so preponderant that it is difficult, or quite impossible, to 
detect the other hybrid.40 (Mendel 7) 
                                               
40 Schon die Versuche, welche in Früheren Jahren an Zierpflanzen vorgenommen wurden, lieferten de 
Beweis, dass die Hybriden in der Regel nicht die genaue Mittelform zwischen den Stammarten darstellen. 
Bei einzelnen mehr in die Augen springenden Merkmalen… wird in der That die Mittelbildung fast immer 
ersichtlich; in anderen Fällen hingegen besitzt das eine der beiden Stamm-Merkmale ein so grosses 
Uebergewicht, dass es schwierig oder ganz unmöglich ist, das andere an der Hybride aufzufinden. 




In this explanation, Mendel acknowledges that in earlier crossbreeding 
experiments there have been two distinct results, either 1) the characters of the resulting 
hybrid offspring are intermediate between the characters of the parents, or 2) the 
character of one of the parents predominates. In the case of all of his experimental 
characters, the latter outcome has been the result (8).  
 Though it may seem coincidental that in all of the pairs of traits that Mendel 
chose for experimentation one form tends to predominate over the other, he makes it 
clear that this coincidence is no accident. The clear presence of one predominating form 
is necessary for quantifying the distribution of traits in different generations of 
crossbreeds. With a clear predominance of one or the other feature, it is possible for 
Mendel to categorize a form as form x or form y and tabulate the ratio of forms in each 
generation. If the forms were blended, this task would be impossible because there would 
be no reliable way of sorting offspring into one category or another, and, therefore, there 
would be no way of making quantitative comparisons. In a very real way, then, Mendel’s 
desire for a mathematically based argument dictates the type of characters—those that do 
not blend—he uses as evidence for his theory.  
 For the character in a pair which predominates, Mendel uses the term dominant 
(dominirende) and for that character which disappears in the first hybrid generation he 
uses the term recessive (recessive).41 These names designate a different aspect of the 
relationship between the paired traits. This relationship remains the central focus in the 
rest of the paper. The actual qualitative differences—wrinkled and smooth etc.—lose 
                                               
41 In der weiteren Besprechung warden jene Merkmale, welche ganz oder fast unverändert in die Hybride-
Verbindung übergehen, somit selbst die Hybriden-Merkmale repräsentiren, als dominirende, und jene, 
welche in der Verbindung latent warden, als recessive bezeichnet. (Versuche 11) 
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purchase in all but the parts of the discussion in which he uses them to distinguish 
between the different character pairs present in bi- and tri-hybrid crosses.  
 Following this distinction between dominant and recessive, Mendel adds that it 
does not matter whether the character which is dominant comes from a male or female 
plant. This, he argues, is in keeping with the observations of Gärtner, who also believed 
that the dominance of a character was not linked to gender. This fact is important for 
Mendel to establish because it eliminates sexuality as a source of dominance.  
After setting up all the parameters of the subjects used in the hybrid crosses, 
Mendel describes the result of two generations of self-crosses from the hybrids. Because 
of the way he has set up the experiments, it is possible for him to present the results 
quantitatively.  In “The Generation from the Hybrids” [F2] (Die erste Generation der 
Hybriden), Mendel begins by explaining that the dominant traits from the previous 
generation appear, but the recessive traits, which had disappeared in the first cross, 
reappear as well and the dominant and recessive plants appear in an average proportion of 
three to one. After describing this trend, he provides his readers with the actual quantified 
results of his crosses. For example, Mendel describes the data obtained from observing 
the forms of the seeds generated from self-crossing F1 hybrids which were the result of 
crossing parents F0 with the dominant trait, round seed form, and the recessive trait, 




Expt. 1. Form of seed. – From 253 hybrids 7,324 seeds were obtained in the 
second trial year. Among them were 5,474 round or roundish ones a d 1,850 
angular wrinkled ones. Therefrom the ratio 2.96 to 1 is deduc d.42 (Mendel 9)   
  
Following quantitative descriptions of the first two experiments, Mendel stops to 
explain the manner in which the different dominant and recessive forms were distributed 
within individual plants. This aside is extremely important because with it Mendel makes 
the case from the probabilistic principle of large numbers that the ratio he is describing 
can only be discovered by looking at a large sample of plants. According to the principle 
of large numbers, the more observations/measurements inve tigators make of a particular 
phenomenon the closer they can get to the true value of that phenomenon. This principle 
is particularly important in the investigation of peas because the ratio is not exhibited in 
each example, i.e. if you split open a single pod there will not be three dominant round 
seeds and one recessive angular one. Instead, the observer needs to collect and quantify 
the instances of dominant and recessive seeds from many plants and add them up to 
arrive at the ratio (10).  
Having explained the rationale driving his experimentation, Mendel proceeds to 
accumulate more empirical evidence to support his 3:1 ratio of d minant to recessive in 
the first generation of hybrid crosses. He reports the results from the crossing of all seven 
characters all of which, in varying degrees, approximate three to one.   
After having made the case for his 3:1 ratio of dominant to recessive in the F2 
generation, Mendel prepares his reader for the argument he plans to make in the next 
                                               
42 1. Versuch. Gestalt der Samen. Von 253 Hybriden wurden im zweiten Versuchsjahre 7324 Samen 
erhalten. Darunter waren rund oder rundlich 5474, und kantig runzlig 1850 samen. Daraus ergibt sich das 
Verhältniss 2,96: 1 [the comma is used instead of a decimal point]. (Versuche 12) 
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section. He explains that of the three dominant forms in the ratio two of them are 
heterozygous,43 i.e. they contain within their genetic pool one dominant and one recessive 
character (11-12). This distinction between pure or “parental forms” and mixed “hybrid 
forms” creates a second set of antithetical relationships, this time based on the genotype 
rather than the phenotype.  
 Just as the recessive trait could only be uncovered after the self-breeding of the 
hybrid generation F1, the existence of heterozygous dominant could only be revealed 
when the dominants of the F2 generation were bred to reveal that some, the heterozygous 
dominants, had dominant and recessive offspring while others, t homozygous 
dominants, bred true. Using the collective number of instances of dominant and recessive 
offspring produced by self-breeding F2, Mendel arrives at a definite ratio of the number 
of hetero- to homozygous plants in F2 and supports his previous 3:1 ratio of dominant to 
recessive (12).  
 As in the previous section, Mendel follows this conclusion with the quantified 
results of his experiments. Using these results, he accumulates evidence supporting his 
position. Then, he provides his reader with a summative quantitative expression of his 
findings, “The ratio of 3 to 1… resolves itself therefor in all experiments into the ratio 
2:1:1 [two, in contemporary terms, heterozygous dominants, oe h mozygous dominant, 
and one homozygous recessive]” (13).44 Following the accumulation and quantitative 
                                               
43 In order to differentiate heterozygous from homozygous plants in the “Experiments” Mendel uses the 
quasi mathematical letter combination Aa and the phrases “hybrid character” (hybrides Merkmale) and 
“hybrid forms” (Hybridformen). He contrasts these phrases with “dominant character” (dominirenden 
Merkmale) and “parental character” (Stamm-Character) which describe the homozygous forms. He never 
uses the term “heterozygote,” which was coined in 1902 by William Bateson the leading advocate of 
Mendel’s work in England.  (“Heterozygote,” Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 27 Mar. 2006 <http://dictionary.oed.com/>.)    
  
44 Das Verhältniss 3:1… löst sich demnach fur alle Versuche in d Verhältniss 2:1:1 auf. (Versuche 16)  
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description of his evidence, Mendel ends the section with a qualitative statement of what 
he is convinced is a regular pattern or law of heredity. The italicized presentation of the 
statement highlights its importance as a significant coclusion.  
 
It is now clear that the hybrids form seeds having one or other of the two 
differentiating characters, and of these one-half develop again the hybrid form, 
while the other half yield plants which remain constant and receive the dominant 
or the recessive characters [respectively] in equal numbers.45 (Mendel 13) 
 
In the five sections following the introductory remarks, Mendel relies on a 
mixture of traditional experimental techniques and non-conventional mathematical 
practices and principles to develop his experiments and present hi  arguments. His 
experimentation with two antithetical forms and his methods for cross-pollination and 
emasculation of plants followed the tried and true practices of the hybridists before him. 
Also, his assumption that dominance was not an exclusive characteristic of either the 
male or the female plant was supported by Gärtner and other hybridists of the time.  
However, the primary mission of Mendel’s experiment, to provide a quantified 
description of forms, had not been embraced by other hybridists. This goal of 
quantification affected Mendel’s experimental design such that i  differed radically from 
his predecessors. First, the move towards quantification encouraged him to simplify the 
subject of observation from all of the characteristics of each contributing species/variety 
in the cross to particular traits of each. Second, it encouraged him to look only at 
                                               
45 Wird es nun ersichtlich, dass die Hybriden je zweier differirender Merkmale Samen bilden, von denen 
die eine Hälfte wieder die Hybridform entwickelt, während die andere Pflanzen gibt, welche constant 
bleiben, und zu gleichen Theilen den dominirenden und recessiven Character erhalten. (Versuche 17) 
 
106 
characters which, when crossed, resulted in offspring that cle rly exhibited one trait or 
another. Without these simplifications, quantification would have been extraordinarily 
difficult, if not impossible.  
In addition to quantification, there is also evidence in Mendel’s methodological 
explanations that the principles of statistics and probability were driving his experimental 
design. The influence of probability is evident in his discus ion of the appropriate 
quantity and quality of data for calculating ratios. In this explanation, he makes the case 
for his data collection practices based on the theory of large numbers, which suggests that 
the more data collected the closer the researcher can get to the true value of a particular 
phenomenon. In addition, it reveals Mendel’s tendency to think of character ratios in 
terms of the population because he looks at the cumulative ratio of all traits in all plants, 
rather than of the specific ratio of traits in and between individual plants.  
In the first five sections following the introduction, Mendel takes the initial steps 
in making his case for the non-variability of characters using mathematics. First, he 
quantifies the phenomenon, translating it into the correct form to be assessed 
mathematically. Second, he suggests a series of fixed quantifiable relationships between 
characters. These initial steps of moving from the qualitative to the quantitative domain 
do not require Mendel to rely heavily on mathematical notation or principles.  
 
From Word into Law  
  
 Once his evidence is quantified and the relationship between th  characters has 
been described both qualitatively and quantitatively, Mendel turns to the special topics of 
 
107 
combinatorics and probability to provide deductive arguments to support the claims made 
from inductive reasoning in the first part of the text: that the characters he is examining 
remain fixed over time and in a constant, quantifiable relationship to one another. 
Further, he turns to the deductive principles of mathematics to support his contention that 
this relationship should be considered a law of nature. As a result of this movement from 
quantification to rational certification, the role of mathematics in making his arguments 
becomes much more visible and extensive in the text.  
Mendel moves to the next phase of his argument in the section titled “The 
Subsequent Generations from the Hybrids” (“Die weiteren G erationen der Hybriden”). 
In the opening lines of this section, he makes it clear to his readers that his aim is to 
establish a law of heredity based on the results of his experiments. He writes, “The 
proportions in which descendents of the hybrids develop and split up in the first and 
second generations presumably hold for all subsequent progeny”46 (Mendel 13).  
The first step Mendel takes in making his case, that the relationships he has 
witnessed in his experiments represent a law of nature, is to transform the dominant and 
recessive character traits and their quantitative relationship to one another into a single 
quasi-mathematical expression: A+2Aa+a.  
 
If A be taken as denoting one of the two constant characters, for instance the 
dominant, a, the recessive, and Aa the hybrid form in which both are conjoined, 
the expression 
A+2Aa+a 
                                               
46 Die Verhältnisse, nach welchen sich die Abkömmlinge der Hybriden in der ersten und zweiten 




shows the terms in the series for the progeny of the hybrids of two differentiating 
characters47. (14) 
  
After the initial presentation of this mathematical exprssion describing the ratio 
of traits in a hybrid generation, Mendel, realizing perhaps that his audience might object 
to his mathematical transformation, attempts to win their consent by showing that his 
expression provides deductive proof for an observation made by Kölreuter that had long 
been an accepted commonplace for hybridists. 
 
The observation made by Gärtner, Kölreuter, and others, that hybrids are inclined 
to revert to the parental forms, is also confirmed by the experiments described…. 
If an average equality of fertility in all plants in all generations be assumed, and 
if, furthermore, each hybrid forms a seed of which one-half yields hybrids again, 
while the other half is constant to both characters in equal proportions, the ratio of 
numbers for the offspring in each generation is seen in the following summary. 48 
(Mendel 14)  
  
                                               
47 Bezeichnet A das eine der beiden constanten Merkmale, z. B. das dominirende, a das recessive, und Aa 
die Hybridform, in welcher beide vereingt sind, so ergibt der Ausdruk: 
  
A + 2Aa + a 
 
die Entwicklungsreihe für die Nachkommen der Hybriden je zweier differirender Merkmale. (Versuche 17) 
  
48 Die von Gärtner, Kölreuter und Anderen gemachte Wahrnehmung, dass Hybriden die Neigung besitzen 
zu den Stammarten zurückzukehren, ist auch durch die besprochenen V rsuche bestätigt…. Nimmt man 
durchschnittlich für alle Pflanzen in allen Generationen eine gleich grosse Fruchtbarkeit an, erwägt man 
ferner, dass jede Hyride Samen bildet, aus denen zur Hälfte wieder Hybriden hervorgehen, während die 
andere Hälfte mit beiden Merkmalen zu gleichen Theilen constant wird, so ergeben sich die 




 Following these comments, Mendel provides the reader with a chart in which his 
expression for the distribution of traits is applied hypothetically over multiple 
generations.  
 
       Ratios  
Generation  A Aa a  A  :  Aa  :  a  
 1 1 2 1  1   :   2    :  1 
 2 6 4 6  3   :   2    :  3 
 3 28 8 28  7   :   2    :  7 
 .     . 
 .     . 
 .     . 
 n     2ⁿ - 1:  2  :  2n - 1 (14)  
  
 
As a persuasive device, this chart has two functions. On the one hand, it serves as 
a means of gaining the support of Mendel’s readers who might be skeptical regarding the 
law-like nature of his findings by showing them that his ratios over time support one of 
their most cherished beliefs: that most plants tend to revert to parental forms. The result 
of this application reveals that over each successive gen ration the pure parental forms do 
increase dramatically while the hybrid forms remain constant. This suggests, 
mathematically, that the expression that Mendel is arguing in favor of predicts the widely 
supported observation of reversion.  
On the other, the chart facilitates the reader’s acceptance of the law-like nature of 
his findings by logically transitioning them from static empirical data to dynamic 
mathematical relationship that the data suggest. The chart begins with the fixed ratio that 
he has uncovered through empirical observation of peas. It then moves the reader through 
successive hypothetical generations to reveal a dynamic but reg lar pattern of change. 
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This movement eventually leads them to a general mathemtical formula which, if they 
have accepted the regular pattern of trait distribution in the empirical data and its regular 
action on successive generations, they are compelled to accept. This final formula—2n - 
1:  2 :  2n - 1—is described by Mendel as the law of development (Entwicklungs-Gesetz). 
With a mathematically describable law stipulating the regularity of the appearance 
of a single pair of traits over many generations in hand, Mendel moves on to prove that 
this law applies to a whole suite of traits in an individual organism, so long as those traits 
breed true before crossing. In the next section of the text, “The Offspring of Hybrids in 
Which Several Differentiating Characters are Associated” (Die Nachkommen der 
Hybriden, in welchen mehrere differirende Merkmale verbunden sind) he accomplishes 
this task by relying on many of the same tactics that he used to persuade his audience in 
the previous section. Again, he uses accumulated empirical evidence from controlled 
hybridization experiments to make his case and moves his aud ence from the static 
empirical results towards dynamic abstract mathematical manipulations which offer 
deductive support for his position.  
 He begins his argument in the section with natural language descriptors but 
quickly moves to reduce them to capital and lower case letters. This reduction allows his 
readers to understand what traits he is discussing without his having to write out those 
traits every time he discusses them.  
 
Expt. 1 – AB, seed parents;   ab, pollen parents;  
        A, form round;                    a, form wrinkled;  
       B, albumen yellow.    b, albumen green.49 (15) 
                                               
49 Erster Versuch: AB samenpflanze, ab Pollenpflanze, 
     A Gestalt rund,    a Gestalt kantig, 




 After he has established his system of notation, Mendel gradually moves from 
natural language descriptors of his data towards quasi-matheical expressions to 
describe the combinatorial relationships between the suites of traits he discusses. This 
progression is apparent in the manner in which the results of the second-, third-, and 
fourth-round crosses are described with increasing abstraction. The first round of 
dihybrid self-crosses F1 are described using numbers and natural language phrases in a 
fashion similar to the descriptions of the data in the first three sections of the results 
portion of the text, except that they are listed rather an presented within the syntax of a 
natural language sentence. 
 
  315 round and yellow,  
 101 wrinkled and yellow,  
 108 round and green,  
 32 wrinkled and green.50  (Mendel 15)   
 
 
 In the next section, describing the second round of dihybrid self-crosses F2, 
Mendel introduces abstraction by including the letter symbols for the traits alongside the 
natural language descriptions.  
 
 38 had round yellow seeds ………………………………………AB 
 65 round yellow and green seeds ………………………………. ABb 
 60 round yellow and wrinkled yellow seeds ……………………AaB 
 138 round yellow and green, wrinkled yellow and green seeds ...AaBb51 (16) 
                                               
50 315 rund und gelb. 
    101 kantig und gelb, 
    108 rund und grün,  






Following this initial chart, however, he offers a more rderly accounting of the results of 
the second round of dihybrid crosses without natural language. 
 
 38 plants with the sign52 AB 
 35 “ “ “         “ Ab 




  (16)  
 
 
 As the number of possible results increases, the amount of natural language text 
decreases. This transition is warranted because it permits Mendel to control the clarity of 
his results as they increase in complexity. At the same ti e, however, the movement 
away from natural language affords him the opportunity to lead his readers from the 
concrete results of his experiments towards the abstract qu si-mathematical expressions 
that he wishes to establish as general descriptors for the pattern of inheritance. In fact, by 
the end of his description of the results of the dihybrid crosses, Mendel has reduced all of 
the relationships into quasi-mathematical expressions summarizing the result of the 
crosses.  
 
                                                                                                                                 
51 38 runde gelbe Samen …………………………………………...AB 
    65 runde gelbe und grün Samen …………………………………ABb 
    60 runde gelbe und kantig gelbe Samen …………………………AaB 
    138 runde gelbe und grüne, kantige gelbe und grüne Samen ……AaBb (Versuche 19)  
 
52 38 Pflanzen mit der Bezeichnung (Versuche 20)  
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Consequently the offspring of the hybrids [F2]—if two kinds of differentiating 
characters are combined therein—are represented by the expression [:]53  
 
 AB+ab+Ab+aB+2AaB+2Aab+2ABb+2aBb+4AaBb. (Mendel 17) 
 
 It is not hard to imagine that this neat expression of the final result of the dihybrid 
crosses would be cumbersome for readers if it were written in natural language. Mendel’s 
expression, on the other hand, does a great deal to make the r sults accessible while at the 
same time leading readers towards two important conclusions. First, by transitioning 
through a series of forms moving from raw data expressed in natural language towards 
increasingly abstract quasi-mathematical representation, Me del encourages his reader to 
see in the concrete semi-variable empirical data the expression of a fixed, regular natural 
law. Second, Mendel proves for a second time the validity of his first law stated in the 
expression A+2Aa+a by deriving it again deductively from the expression 
AB+ab+Ab+aB+2AaB+2Aab+2ABb+2aBb+4AaBb.   
 
This expression [AB+ab+Ab+aB+2AaB+2Aab+2ABb+2aBb+4AaBb] is 
indisputably a combination of series in which the two expressions for the 
characters A and a, B and b are combined. We arrive at the full number of classes 
of the series by the combination of the expressions:54 
                                               
53 Daher entwickeln sich die Nachkommen der Hybriden, wenn in denselben zweierlei differirende 
Merkmale verbunden sind, nach dem Ausdrucke. (V rsuche 20)  
 
54 Diese Entwicklungsreihe ist unbestritten eine Combinatio sreihe, in welcher die beiden 
Entwicklungsreihen für die Merkmale A und a, B und b gliedweise verbunden sind. Man erhält die Glieder 
der Reihe vollzählig durch die Combinirung der Ausdrücke. (V rsuche 21)  
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A+2Aa+a       
 
B+2Bb+b.  (17) 
 
 In the last portion of this section, Mendel follows the same procedures in order to 
prove that character traits maintain a constant ratioof distribution in trihybrid crosses. He 
begins again by presenting the raw data and then transitions towards a more abstract 
presentation as the data becomes more copious. Finally, he presents the data in the form 
of a quasi-mathematical expression from which he derives once again the basic formulas 
for the ratio of traits for a given series of crosses.  
After accumulating the evidence from both the dihybrid an trihybrid crosses and 
showing that the ratio of characters can be mathematically deduced from their results, 
Mendel, drawing on his knowledge of combinatorics, concludes: 
 
There is therefore no doubt that for the whole of the c aracters involved in the 
experiments the principle applies that the offspring of hybrids in which severally 
essentially different characters are combined exhibit the terms of a series of 
combinations, in which the developmental series for each pair of differentiating 
characters are united.”55 (19) 
 
Now that Mendel has established through the accumulation of inductive proof and 
through mathematical deduction that the result of the combination of different traits in 
dihybrid and trihybrid crosses is always simply the combinatio  of the separate expected 
                                               
55 Es unterliegt daher keinem Zweifel, dass für sämmtliche in die Versuche aufgenommenen Merkmale der 
Satz Giltigkeit habe: die Machkomme der Hybriden, in welch n mehrere wesentlich verschienden 
Merkmale vereinigt sind, stellen die Glieder einer Combinationsreihe vor, in welchen die 
Entwicklungsreihen für je zwei differende Merkmale verbunden sind. (Versuche 22)  
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ratios for each of the individual characters, he concludes that, “the relation of each pair 
of different characters in hybrid union is independent of the other diffeenc s in the two 
original parental stocks” 56 (19). With this statement, Mendel issues his formal challenge 
to traditional theories of inheritance that empahsized a homogeneous species essence by 
arguing, based on his ability to mathematically extract e h of the ratios independently 
from the combined expression of traits, that character pairs are separate and non-
interacting.  
 Having proved deductively that characters assort independently, Mendel uses the 
mathematical law of combinations to predict the number of non-variable traits that should 
appear if all the possible combinations are made. He begins by providing the formulae for 
calculating 1) the number of combinations possible for a given number of character pairs, 
2) the number of individuals that will occur for all possible combinations, and 3) the 
number of trait unions which will remain constant in subsequent generations of self-
crossing.57 Collectively, Mendel refers to these formulae as The Law of Combination of 
Different Characters.58  
 
If n represents the number of the differentiating characters in the two original 
stocks, 3n gives the number of terms of the combination series, 4ⁿ the number of 
                                               
56 Verhalten je zweier differirender Merkmale in hybrider Verbindung unadhängig ist von den 
anderweitigen unterschieden an den beiden Stammpflanzen. (Versuche 22)  
 
57 If, for example, there are two different characters pairs Aa and Bb (n=2) then there should be nine (32) 
possible combination possibilities AB+ab+Ab+aB+2AaB+2Aab+2ABb+2aBb+4AaBb which describe 
sixteen different individuals (42) and have four (22) constant unions AB, ab, Ab, and aB. 
  
58 Das Gesetz der Combinirung der differirenden Merkmale. (V rsuche 32)  
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individuals which belong to these series, and 2ⁿ the number of unions which 
remain constant.59 (Mendel 19)  
 
 Based on the laws of combinatorics, the number of forms which remain constant 
can be calculated by plugging the number of pairs of traits (n) into the expression 2ⁿ. 
Although he does not supply the data of all of the possible combinations for seven 
crosses, Mendel argues that his crossings have yielded 128 constant unions, the exact 
number predicted by his law for seven character pairs. Thi fact, he argues, gives 
practical proof, “that the constant characters which appear in the several varieties of a 
group of plants may be obtained in all the associations which are possible according to 
the laws of combination, by means of repeated artificial fertilization”60 (19). In other 
words, no matter what trait or variety is crossed, a predictable number of forms will 
always remain constant. Thus, Mendel is able to deduce and to provide empirical 
evidence to support his primary claim for the fixity of species.  
 After proving both inductively from empirical results and deductively using 
mathematical manipulations and principles 1) that a single trait varies regularly over 
many generations, 2) that multiple traits combined in a si gle organism assort 
independently, and 3) that the constant characters will al ays predictably reappear in 
exact numbers, Mendel moves the focus of his investigation to the reproductive process. 
In the section “The Reproductive Cells of the Hybrids” (Die Befruchtungs-Zellen der 
                                               
59 Bezeichnet n die Anzahl der characteristischen Unter schieden an den beiden Stammpflanzen, so gibt 3ⁿ 
die Gliederzahl der Combinationsreihe, 4ⁿ die Anzahl der Individuen, welchein die Reihe gehören, und 2n  
die Zahl der Verbindungen, welche constant bleiben. (Versuche 22-23)  
 
60 Dass constante Merkmale, welche an verschiedenen Formen einer Pflanzsippe vorkommen, auf dem 
Wege der weiderholten künstlichen Befruchtung in alle Verbindungen treten können, welche nach den 
Regeln der Combination möglich sind. (Versuche 23)  
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Hybriden) he provides his readers with evidence and arguments to support the conclusion 
that the egg and pollen cells, “represent in equal numbers all constant forms which result 
from the combination of the characters united in fertilization”61 (25). In order to persuade 
his audience to accept this conclusion, Mendel makes a classi  hypothetico-deductive 
argument. 
 The hypothetical experiment he proposes to confirm the equality of both the 
quantity and quality of parental contributions is similar to his dihybrid experiment in the 
sense that he crosses two sets of plants—one with pure dominant traits for seed shape and 
albumen AB and the other with pure recessive versions of those traits ab. In this 
experiment, however, he carefully makes the point to cross exactly half of the flowers on 
one set of plants in the experiment with the pollen from the other half and vice versa. If 
the contribution of characters by each parent is equal, as he predicts, then the first round 
of crosses C1 should result in offspring whose pollen and egg cells contain the following 
trait combinations: AB, Ab, aB, and ab. This result, of course, reflects and, therefore, 
reaffirms his previously posited ratio of 1:2:1.  
Once he has created a set of organisms with these mixed traits in their cells, 
Mendel explains he will then cross the mixes with pure bred AB and ab again.62 He 
explains that if his previous assumptions are correct—that both the male pollen and the 
female eggs will contain the exact same qualitative featur s in the exact same amount—
then the resulting offspring should divide out into two distinct sets of plants. In the first 
                                               
61 Welche ihrer Beschaffenheit nach in gleicher Anzahl allen constanten Formen entsprechen, welche aus 
der Combinirung der durch Befruchtung vereinigten Merkmale hervorgehen. (Versuche 29)   
 
62 In this second round of crosses C2, he will combine in equal amounts the pollen and egg cells of the C1 
mixed-trait plants with pollen and egg cells of pure-bred AB plants. The same procedure will also be 
applied in the crossing of the egg and pollen cells of C1s and pure-bred ab plants.  
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set,63 all of the plants should express only the dominant traits AB, ABb, AaB, AaBb 
(Mendel 21). In the second set,64 he predicts that the offspring should present the 1:2:1 
ratio of dominant and recessive traits AaBb, Aab, aBb, ab (21). Once he has made his 
predictions, he reveals to his readers the results of his actual experiments in which the 
data supports his experimental predictions.   
The brilliance of these experiments is that they are abl to provide evidence for 
both of Mendel’s conclusions in a single set of trials. With the third set of crosses 
between plants with pure bred traits AB and mixed hybrids, Mendel proves that both the 
egg cells and the pollen cells can contribute exactly the same qualitative traits. If they had 
not, then half of the offspring in the resulting generation would have had dominant traits 
and the other half recessive. Because they all expressed the dominant traits, each of the 
parents had to have contributed equally to the offspring. With the second set of crossings 
between plants with recessive traits ab and mixed hybrids, he proves that not only are the 
traits qualitatively similar in the egg and pollen cells, but also that they exist in 
approximately the same amount on each. If they had not, then the ratios between pure 
bred and hybrid offspring would not have been maintained.  
Unlike his previous arguments, Mendel begins making his case here by positing a 
hypothetical scenario using his previously established conclusions. He predicts 
completely new conclusions which he then verifies using experimental results. This 
change of logical approach shifts the emphasis towards his theoretical statements and 
                                               
63 In which mixed trait C1s are crossed with the pollen of a dominant AB plant and AB plants are crossed 
with the pollen of a mixed trait C1s 
 
64 Which introduces the pollen of a recessive ab plant to mixed trait C1 eggs and the pollen of mixed trait 
C1s with the eggs of an ab 
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emphasizes their strength in making predictions about the natural world which, in turn, 
provides support for his contention that he has discovered laws of heredity.  
After establishing credibility with his readers that he is describing a law of nature 
by making successful predictions, Mendel provides them in the final section with a 
complete description of the hereditary process, from fertilization to expression, based on 
these laws. He begins by appealing to the principles of probability to make the case that 
the results of self-crossing a hybrid plant should lead to a situation in which every 
possible combination of the dominant and recessive traits is expressed because each of 
these characters is equally represented in the pollen and egg cells. This argument from 
the principles of probability is important because it supports both the veracity of his 
character ratios as well as his claims of equal qualitative nd quantitative contributions of 
characters in fertilization.  
 
It remains… purely a matter of chance which of the two sorts of pollen will 
become united with each separate egg cell. According, however, to the law of 
probability, it will always happen, on the average of many cases, that each pollen 
form, A and a, will unite equally often with each egg cell form A and a65. (Mendel 
25)  
 
What Mendel is describing here under the title “the law of pr bability” (Regeln 
der Wahrscheinlichkeit) is actually a combination of principles. The first is the principle 
                                               
65 Es bleibt ganz dem Zuffalle überlassen, welche von den beiden Pollenarten sich mit jeder einzelen 
Keimzelle verbindet. Indessen wird es nach den Regeln der Wah scheinlichkeit im Durschnitte vieler Fälle 




of elementary outcomes which suggests that given a single fair and independent trial, the 
result of any given outcome will be 1/number of possible outcomes. Since there are two 
possible outcomes in this situation, a dominant trait A or recessive trait a, there is exactly 
always a .5 percent chance that a particular variable will appear. Because, however, 
Mendel is interested not only in the individual probability of the appearance of one trait 
or another but in the probability of the appearance of either n conjunction with another, it 
is also necessary to calculate the probability of the two independent equiprobable events 
occurring together. This can be easily done by referring to Pascal’s Arithmetical Triangle, 
which permits the calculation of the binomial coefficient or the possible successes of a 
particular outcome given a certain number of trials n.  
In Mendel’s model, we must imagine that each joining of a dominant with a 
recessive trait involves the same probability as the flipping of two separate coins with the 
possible pairings either both dominant A, both recessive a, or one A and one a. Accepting 
that the probability P of each event is ideally .5 and that the number of trials n taking 
place in each pairing is 2, Pascal’s triangle reveals th t the probability distribution is AA 
= .25, aa =.25, and Aa or aA = .50 (Gonick and Smith 77). These calculations reveal that 
the average distribution of these traits in any given generation should be ideally 1:1:2, the 
exact ratio that Mendel describes in his expression A+2Aa a.  
Starting with the assumption that the action of fertilization is random and 
independent in each case, as in a probabilistic trial, Mendel presents his reader with a 
step-by-step walkthrough of the process of trait combination. He presents this 
information visually, interspersing mathematical symbols into the description and giving 
it the air of a mathematical proof.  
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He begins by describing the traits in the soon-to-be-crossed parents as equally 
manifested in the egg and the pollen of each. His choice of the ordering and juxtaposition 
of traits reinforces his position on the similarity of their contributions.  
 
The pollen cells (die Pollensellen)  A+A+a+a 
The egg cells (die Keimzellen)       A+A+a+a (25)  
 
Once he has defined the starting scene of the process, he then proceeds to a visual 
diagram describing the action of crossing using arrows to indicate the direction of the 
coupling of the characters. This visual is, of course, based on the ideal probable outcome 
of the situation, rather than what might really happen in any given crossing of two 
characters.  
 
Pollen cells (Pollensellen) A     A         a         a     
 
 Egg cells (Keimzellen)  A    A         a          a(25) 
 
 Once Mendel is finished showing the action of cross-pollination combining two 
traits into a single plant, he symbolically presents his readers with the results of the 
combinations.  
 
A + A + a +a 




In this expression of the results, the symbols for division and addition play 
important roles. The horizontal line reinforces for the reader the idea that the traits in a 
new organism are both together but at the same time existing as separate, particulate, and 
non-interacting entities. The addition symbol “+” betwen the sets of traits signals that 
the traits are part of a series of results obtained from the same procedure. In neither of 
these cases do the symbols actually entail the usual mathe tical relations for which they 
are used; however, in addition to the functions mentioned above, they suggest that 
Mendel is describing the steps of the process in terms of the steps of a mathematical 
proof.   
 That these symbols represent separation and membership is fa rly evident in 
Mendel’s final transformation in which he restates the relationship of these traits in the 
set in terms of his familiar 1:2:1 ratio expression.  
 
A + A + a +a  =  A+2Aa+a  
A    a     A   a         (26).  
 
 By starting with what he believes are established premis s from his previous 
proof and from established principles in the field of probability, Mendel ends this major 
line of argumentation in the results section with a step-by-step deduction of the 
foundational ratio describing the distribution of traits in a given generation that he had 
derived from his experimental data in the opening sections of the paper. This allows 
Mendel to visually represent for his readers all of the pieces of the logical puzzle he is 
constructing and the mathematical neatness with which tey all fit together. In doing so, 
he suggests the logical deductive veracity of his conclusion.  
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 Whereas the first portion of Mendel’s “Experiments” is dedicated to making the 
case for a regular pattern in the expression of inherited features, the focus of the second 
portion of the paper is on proving that these patterns are expressions of regular and 
predictable natural processes which, because they are regular and predictable and find 
expression and support in existing mathematical principles, can rightly be considered 
laws of nature. In the first section, Mendel argues for a mathematical law of development 
from the assumptions 1) that the ratios described in the first section are accurate and 2) 
that they hold true over every generation. In the next, he makes the case for the law of 
segregation by recovering his ratios for all the charactes combined in bihybrid and 
trihybrid crosses. In the third section, he proves the ind pendent and equal contribution of 
characters from the egg and sperm through hypothetico-deductive experiment: first, by 
predicting the outcome of his experiments based on his previously established law of 
development; then, by reporting the experimental results proving his predictions were 
correct.  
 In all of these arguments, mathematical symbols, operations, and principles play 
an increasingly crucial role. In the case of the law of development, a mathematical 
expression for constant unions 2ⁿ from the laws of combinatorics is used to present the 
value for constant forms. This suggests that Mendel looked to combinatorics not only as a 
source for the descriptive notation for his theory, but also for the invention of his 
arguments about what the ratios of dominant, recessive, and mixed should be.  
 In the second argument for segregation, Mendel relies on quasi-mathematical 
notation and the law of combination of different characters to make the case not only that 
the combination and segregation of trait pairs do not influence the combination and 
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segregation of other traits, but also that traits breed true in a regular fashion over time. By 
using mathematical principles and quasi-mathematical notations and operations, Mendel 
lends a deductive ethos to his conclusions to convince the readers of the law-like property 
of his findings.      
 In the final section, Mendel supports his conclusion, that t e traits of the male and 
female are equally represented and independent in the process f fertilization, by 
invoking the special topics of probability. In addition, he also relies on a quasi-
mathematical format to suggest to his reader that his description of the reproductive 
process is analogous to a deductive mathematical proof of the law of development.   
 As a whole, Mendel’s mathematization of his arguments a d his use of 
mathematical principles to support his work make the cas  that characters do not vary 
over time. In order for phenomena to be subject to mathematical description and 
prediction, they need to display a regular pattern of behavior. By providing mathematical 
descriptions which lead to predictions, i.e. mathematical laws, Mendel boldly asserts the 
persistence of characters over generations.  
 
Critical Responses to Mendel’s “Experiments in Plant Hybridization”  
 
 In addition to the role that mathematics plays in making Mendel’s biological 
arguments, the most fascinating rhetorical aspect of the story of Mendel’s work is why, 
given its current importance to the development of the modern theory of genetics, it 
received so little attention when it was published. The route to publication for Mendel’s 
work was the most common one for amateur naturalists t the time, through the 
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proceedings of a local natural history/philosophy society to which they belonged. In 
Mendel’s case, this was the Natural History Society of Brünn.  
The results of his experiments were first presented in two one-hour lectures in 
February and March of 1865 at the Society’s meetings. The reaction that Mendel got 
from his colleagues foreshadows to some degree the reception that his paper would get 
from the wider scientific audience after its publication in the Society’s Proceedings. 
According to Mendel’s own account of the paper’s reception, his findings were 
controversial because of their unorthodoxy and none of the Society member’s felt they 
were sufficiently important to replicate.  
 
I knew that my results were not easy to harmonize with contemporary science, 
and that in view of this publication of an isolated experimnt might be doubly 
dangerous…. I did my best to institute control experiments, and for that reason at 
the meeting of the Society for the Study of Natural Scien e [Iltis’ translators 
version of the society’s title “naturforschenden Vereines in Brünn”] I described 
my experiments with Pisum. As was only to be expected, I ncountered very 
various views, but, so far as I know, no one undertook a repetition of the 
experiments (Iltis 180).  
 
Even though the Society’s members found Mendel’s results controversial at best 
and forgettable at worst, his complete lecture was published, t  customary procedure for 
all papers presented at the Society’s meetings, in the Proceedings of the Brünn Natural 
History Society (Henig 142). Undaunted by the lukewarm response he received from the 
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Brünn Society, Mendel requested forty reprints from the journal editor so that he might 
share his findings with important figures in hybridization and related fields in hopes that 
they might recognize and support what he believed were ext mely important results. 
 Of the forty reprints Mendel requested, twelve are known to have been sent out. 
Among the recipients are some of the most important figures studying variation, 
evolution, cytology, botany, hybridization, and reproduction at the time Mendel was 
writing. The most famous recipient was Charles Darwin, ho was found to have a reprint 
on his shelf, the pages uncut. Perhaps Mendel’s motivation for sending Darwin the paper 
was a belief that his laws were relevant to Darwin’s struggle to understand the hereditary 
process and its role in variation. Perhaps he believed that his theory of non-variable 
characters, though on the face of it contradictory to the Darwinian doctrine of continuous 
variation, might help Darwin solve the problem of the dispersion of useful variation over 
many generations of breeding. Why Darwin didn’t open the reprint is unknown. Perhaps 
it was because it was from a relatively obscure journal put out by a small natural history 
society. Perhaps it was because he had never heard of Gegor Mendel before.  
 Though a language barrier might have contributed to Darwin’s disinclination to 
look at the paper, this same factor cannot be said to have influenced the prominent 
German and Austrian, and perhaps even the Dutch scientists who received copies. The 
recipients included scientific luminaries such as Martinus Beijerinck, a Dutch biologist 
and co-discoverer of viruses; M.J. Schleiden, the establisher of cell theory; and Carl von 
Nägeli, a well-respected cytologist who worked with Schleiden. A fifth copy was sent to 
a classmate of Mendel’s from Vienna, Kerner von Marilaun, who was at the time of the 
manuscript’s publication a biologist in Innsbruck. There is also speculation, but no 
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substantive proof, that a sixth reprint was sent to Franz Unger, Mendel’s and Marilaun’s 
botany professor from Vienna. Although six other copies ar  known to exist, there is no 
evidence of who their original owners were (Henig 142-46).  
 Among the German and Austrian biologists and cytologists there is a common 
thread of connection which suggests why Mendel believed they would be receptive 
audiences for his mathematically described theory of inher tance. During the 1840s and 
1850s in Germany and Austria, there was a small but persistent trend in research away 
from the qualitative descriptive methodologies of traditional hybridists and towards the 
more disciplined experimental/mathematical approach used in the physical sciences. 
According to Robin Henig, this method, described in the work of the cytologists Matthais 
Schleiden and Theodor Schwann, gained traction under the moniker “scientific botany” 
and found supporters in both Nägeli and Unger (Henig 57). Given the important role of 
mathematics in Mendel’s arguments, it seems only fitting that he would target a group of 
biologists who would appreciate his attempt to express his conclusions mathematically 
and use mathematic principles to make his arguments.  
Of this group of influential and mathematically inclined biological researchers, 
Carl von Nägeli was the only known to have fully read, considered, and responded to 
Mendel’s work. His critique of Mendel’s theory offers us the only solid evidence about 
what concerns the recipients who did read the paper might have had with it.  
The reason that Mendel sent Nägeli his theory appears to be his belief that the 
cytologist would appreciate and support his mathematical approch t  heredity. However, 
there is evidence that Mendel was not certain that the common ground of methodology 
was sufficient to solicit Nägeli’s attention to his work. To add relevance to his work for 
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the cytologist, he also suggested in the letter which accompanied the monograph that he 
was interested in doing further hybridization experiments o  Hieracium (Hawk Weed) a 
species on which Nägeli was an expert.  
The correspondence between the two suggests that Mendel’s expressed interest in 
the Hieracium experiments was an important factor in Nägeli’s motivation to write back. 
In his response to Mendel’s first letter and his article, th  only existing communication of 
Nägeli’s to Mendel, Nägeli writes at length about Hieracium and asks for Mendel’s help 
in doing some breeding experiments with it.  
 
Your design to experiment on plants of other kinds is excellent, and I am 
convinced that with these different forms you will get no ably different results (in 
respect of the inherited characters). It would seem to me esp cially valuable if you 
were able to effect hybrid fertilizations in Hieracium. (Iltis 192)  
 
 In this response, Nägeli provides evidence not only of his interes  in Mendel’s 
proposed experiments with Hieracium, but also of the reasons why he believes the results 
of Mendel’s first experiments are aberrant if not outright wrong. First, his statement that 
Mendel will “get notably different results” suggests that he rejects Mendel’s primary 
conclusion that character traits remained unaltered and regularly distributed through the 
process of combination and separation. Nägeli’s rejection of this position is not surprising 
given that he is a firm believer that during fertilization the characters of the parents 
typically blend to create a new intermediate character. H  expresses these views in an 
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article “Hybridization in the Plant Kingdom66” (Die Bastardbildung im Pflanzenreich) 
published in the very same year as Mendel’s “Experiments.”  
 
The rule, however, is that the characters of the father and the mother combine and 
interpenetrate, whereby a new individual character originates which holds more or 
less the mean. The way and the manner in which the union occurs cannot be 
determined in advance. (Quoted in Roberts 96)   
 
In addition to believing that Mendel’s conclusion was incorrect, Nägeli also 
provides his opinion about why Mendel got it wrong. In his estimation, Mendel fails to 
make his case because he has not done a sufficient number of experiments. Although this 
seems like a ridiculous accusation given that Mendel’s conclusions were based on the 
crosses of nearly 10,000 pea plants, Nägeli’s complaints are not that Mendel didn’t do 
enough experiments with peas but that he didn’t do a sufficient number of experiments 
with other species. Because his sample is deep but not wide, Nägeli argues that Mendel 
cannot assume that his belief in the inalterability of traits is good in all cases.  
Nägeli’s comment about the breadth of Mendel’s sample ay have also 
encouraged him to attack Mendel’s move in his argument to present his empirical 
findings as the source for a predictable, mathematically describable, law of nature. 
According to Mendel, in his second letter to Nägeli written April 18, 1867, Nägeli had 
written him that he, “should regard the numerical expressions as being only empirical, 
because they cannot be proved rational” (Stern and Sherwood 63). The point that Nägeli 
was trying to make to Mendel with this piece of criticism is that Mendel could not rely on 
                                               
66 Karl von Nägeli, “Die Bastardbildung im Pflanzenreich,” Botanische Mittheilungen 2 (1865): 187-235.    
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rational proof from the principles of mathematics to support his argument for the 
regularity in the distribution of traits in hybridized peas. In his reply, Mendel defends his 
use of deductive reasoning to argue his position.  
 
My experiments with single traits all lead to the same result: that from the seeds 
of hybrids, plants are obtained half of which in turn carry the hybrid trait (Aa), the 
other half, however, receive the parental traits A and  in equal amounts…. 
Therefore 2Aa+A+a or A+2Aa+a is the empirical simple series for two differing 
traits. Likewise it was shown in an empirical manner that, if two or three differing 
traits are combined in the hybrid, the series is a combination of two or three 
simple series. Up to this point I don’t believe I can be accused of having left the 
realm of experimentation. If then I extend this combination of simple series to any 
number of differences between the two parental plants, I have indeed entered the 
rational domain. This seems permissible, however, becaus I have proved by 
previous experiments that the development of a pair of differing traits proceeds 
independently of any other differences. (Stern and Sherwood 63)  
   
 In his reply, Mendel argues that because he has shown that the same pattern 
describable with the same mathematical expression can be found in independent 
empirical observations across at least three different t aits, he should be able to assume 
that it will be the same for all traits through subsequent generations. Though Nägeli is no 
stranger to the application of mathematics to describe biological phenomena in his own 
 
131 
work,67 he was not particularly enthused about Mendel’s use of mathematical claims to 
support a theory which directly opposed his own position, especially because Mendel’s 
ability to mathematize his claims served as a compelling argument that Mendel’s belief in 
the non-variability of characters should be accepted.  
 By investigating Nägeli’s response to Mendel and Mendel’s defens  of his own 
work, it is possible to understand at least in Nägeli’s ca e why Mendel’s work was not 
compelling. To some degree it failed to make a strong impression because it supported 
the conservative theory held by Kölreuter and Gärtner that the essence of the species 
remained separate and inalterable in the offspring of hybrids an  tended to separate out 
over multiple generations. This position was in conflict with Nägeli’s position that a 
completely new character was formed from the blending of the parents’ essence during 
the process of hybridization. 
 The concept of non-variable traits was also in conflict with evolutionary theories, 
both Darwinian and Lamarkian, which had gained ascendancy during the period Mendel 
was distributing his reprints. Because many biologists including Unger and Nägeli had 
embraced this position, it is likely that at least some portion of Mendel’s audience 
rejected his findings on evolutionary grounds.  
 In addition to challenging the substance of Mendel’s conclusions, the belief that 
organisms vary from one generation to the next or blend to form new characters also 
challenged the manner in which Mendel argued for, arrived at, and presented his 
conclusions. If organisms vary and or new characteristics are formed in each generation, 
then the laws of combinatorics and probability which Mendel used to design his 
                                               
67 Iltis explains that in Nägeli’s cytological work his research, “led him to… formulate upon a mathematical 
basis his theory of growth [in which]…. Cells constitute th elements out of which we can construct the 
organs in accordance with mathematical rules” (Iltis 184). 
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experiments and to deduce his laws are inapplicable because these laws require outcomes 
to be as fixed and clearly discernable as the results of a c in toss. If characters vary or 
blend, neither of these conditions is possible.  
 Though mathematical models developed in the 1920s and 1930s and the 
recognition that mutation was a natural source of variation allowed for a grand synthesis 
between Mendel and Darwin’s work, at the time Mendel was sending out his work it 
would have been impossible for his audience to reconcile his conclusion with Darwin’s. 
Given the general excitement during that period generated by The Origin, it is not 
surprising that Mendel’s insistence on the persistence of s ven traits in a single species of 
plant did not draw much attention. In fact, it was not until Darwin’s concept of 
continuous variation was repeatedly challenged and Mendel’s b lief in the stability of 
characters was three times confirmed by De Vries, Tschermak, and Correns that his 




 An investigation of Mendel’s rhetorical situation, his background, and his 
arguments reveals the complexity of forces affecting the rhetorical situation surrounding 
the publication of “Experiments in Plant Hybridization.” As a participant in the discourse 
regarding plant hybridization, Mendel was guided by the information, methodologies, 
and arguments that had come before him. His work shows knowledge of and reverence 
for the observations of the hybridists who preceded him, though his methods for 
confirming their position on the fixity of character trai s were radically different. 
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Drawing from his experiences as a student of mathematics and the physical sciences, 
Mendel applied the hypothetico-deductive approach to his experiments which required 
him first to state his proposed conclusions and then plan experiments to prove their 
validity. In this planning process he relied on the principles of combinatorics and 
probability to supply him with direction in the a priori framing of his investigation. By 
starting with these principles to develop his hypothesis, designing an appropriate set of 
experiments, and rigorously carrying out those experiments, Mendel was able to 
demonstrate the regularity of the distribution of characters over generations, the 
independent segregation and integration of character pairs, and the independent and equal 
contributions of parental characters in offspring.    
Mendel is interesting rhetorically, on the one hand, because his arguments 
represent a novel first case in which mathematics begins to be employed to make 
arguments about heredity. A close examination of his “Experiments in Plant 
Hybridization” reveals that Mendel used methods of deductive reasoning to elevate his 
empirical results to the status of a natural law. In order to persuade his readers that traits 
are not variable across generations and that their appearance follows a law of nature, 
Mendel used quantified data, argued for regularity in the data using mathematical and 
quasi-mathematical formulae, and elevated these patterns o the status of a law through 
the use of quasi-deductive proofs and the argument that the regula  patterns he described 
follow existing laws of combinatorics and probability.  
 On the other hand, Mendel’s failure to find an audience for his work, despite the 
eventual importance of his conclusions to modern genetics, represents something of a 
modern rhetorical mystery. How could such a clearly argued and currently celebrated 
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paper have been ignored for so many years? A detailed examination of his rhetorical 
situation, background, and arguments, however, reveals that the reasons why Mendel’s 
work was ignored are numerous. Perhaps his work was passed over because of language 
barriers. Perhaps it was overlooked because the journal he published in wasn’t held in the 
highest esteem. It could have been ignored because Mendel was a geographically and 
academically obscure figure.  
Though Nägeli’s response to his work gives no hints about whether these 
possibilities were a factor, it does provide evidence that he was overlooked because his 
work challenged the theory of evolution which expected variation in each generation. In 
addition, it made great claims about inheritance based on experiments on a single species. 
Without social or professional credibility, which might encourage his readers to look past 




Chapter 4: Contours of Heredity: The Law of Error and Francis 
Galton’s Biometrical Approach to Heredity 
 
To those who are acquainted with the statistics set forth by Galton in Natural 
Inheritance…it will be well known that measurements of certain quantities…group 
themselves around a mean form in such a way that the curve representing the frequency 
of occurrence of the several measurements has the form known as a curve of F equency 
of Error. – William Bateson in Variation in Secondary Sexual Characters68 
 
It was Galton who first freed me from the prejudice that sound mathematics could only be 
applied to natural phenomena under the category of causation. Here for the first time 
was the possibility… of reaching knowledge—as valid as physical knowledge was then 
thought to be—in the field of living forms and above all in the field of human conduct. –
Karl Pearson69 
 
 Although it may seem historically that Mendel’s “Experiments in Plant 
Hybridization” represents a lone voice advocating a systematic mathematical approach to 
the study of heredity informed by the special topics of probability, the reality is that he 
was not the only researcher in the latter half of the nineteenth century applying 
mathematical principles to the investigation of inheritance. In fact, a decade before 
Mendel’s arguments on the subject were widely read and appreciated in England, Sir 
Francis Galton (1822-1911) broke ground for a probabilistic/statistical approach to the 
investigation of heredity in his book Natural Inheritance (1889).   
Like Mendel, Galton develops in his work a theory of heredity which employs 
quantitative evidence and the special topics of probability. However, while Mendel used 
basic principles of probability codified as combinatorics, Galton used the law of error to 
establish meaningful patterns in hereditary data. Also, Galton’s efforts to persuade his 
readership of the efficacy of mathematical principles in describing patterns in inheritance 
                                               
68 R.C. Punett., ed., Scientific Papers of William Bateson,  2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1928) 194. 
 




were a success, whereas Mendel’s were a failure. The rhetorical issue in this chapter, 
therefore, concerns what unique characteristics of the rhetor, the argument, and the 
audience may have resulted in the successful reception of Galton’s arguments where 
Mendel’s arguments failed. After examining each of these factors in detail, I conclude 
that Galton’s success is due to a combination of 1) the degree of notoriety and respect he 
commanded in the scientific community, 2) the inclusiveness of his views about the 
hereditary process, and 3) the extensive rhetorical effort he made to persuade his 
audience that the special topics of probability and statistics have jurisdiction in making 
arguments about variation and its distribution in human populations. The use of 
mathematics to inform and describe his arguments and the acceptance by the biological 
community of this method of argumentation are important because the success of 
Galton’s arguments set a precedent for employing mathematical formulae and principles 
in arguing about heredity in English biology, helping to establish a positive atmosphere 
for the reacceptance of Mendel’s work.   
 
Francis Galton: a Gentleman of Science  
  
One of the factors in Galton’s success in his arguments for a mathematically 
informed theory of heredity was his status in English social and intellectual circles, a 
status due in part to an accident of birth and in part to his devotion to science. From birth 
Galton enjoyed a comfortable position within the wealthies strata of the English middle 
class. His father, Samuel Tertius Galton (1783-1844), was a successful Quaker 
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industrialist and his mother, Violetta (Darwin) Galton, was the daughter of Erasmus 
Darwin and aunt to Charles Darwin (Brookes xv, 4).  
In addition to being born into a family of material wealth, Galton was also born 
into one with intellectual fame as well. His father Samuel was an amateur scientist who 
contributed to the theory of color vision and his grandfather Erasmus Darwin, a member 
of the intellectual society the Lunar Club, devised a steering mechanism for carriages, 
published a classic paper explaining the formation of clouds, and crafted the poem 
Zoonomia which argued that all living things were descended from a single microscopic 
ancestor (Bulmer 3). The propensity and talent for science of these illustrious forbearers 
seem to have been genetically gifted, or at least Galton would have thought so. He was 
considered as a child prodigious in his capacity to learn.  
In the formal system of education Galton’s brilliance was not so obvious. In his 
opinion, his lack of enthusiasm for his studies was due to the restrictiveness of the 
subjects he was forced to study. In his autobiography he writes of hi early educational 
experience: “I learnt nothing and chafed at my limitations. I had craved for what was 
denied, namely, an abundance of good English reading, well-taugh  mathematics, and 
solid science” (Memories 20).  
At the age of sixteen, he was given the chance to pursue hi  scientific interests a 
little more freely by his mother who hoped that Francis would join his grandfather and 
his uncle in the medical profession. He was sent for a year to study medicine at 
Birmingham General Hospital and the following year to King’s College Medical School 
in London. In these more scientific settings, Galton’s academic performance briefly 
improved (Bulmer 5).  
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In 1840, however, he left King’s College to read mathematics at Cambridge. This 
interruption had been suggested not only by his father, but also by his cousin, Charles 
Darwin. Francis agreed to it whole heartedly and enterd Trinity College Cambridge in 
October of 1840. His academic career at Cambridge, however, like his earlier secondary 
education, was lackluster.  
About his studies in mathematics, Galton says relatively little. He admits that he 
had a little catching up to do in elementary mathematics when he first arrived and that he 
had several mathematical coaches during his time at school. In his third year reading for 
mathematics, however, he suffered a mental breakdown which ended his studies in the 
subject (Memories 79)  
 Galton’s struggles to keep his restless mind confined to a rigid institutional 
academic program ended in 1844 with the death of his father. T  considerable wealth 
that he inherited left him financially independent and free of his responsibility to finish 
medical school. He quit school, abandoned the medical profession, and took off for the 
Near East to travel and experience the world.  
 From 1845 to 1846 he traveled to Egypt and Syria, embarking on an expedition 
up the Nile with two Cambridge friends, Montague Boulton and Hedwith Barclay, and 
from there traveling to Jerusalem and Jordan. He returned to England in 1846 after facing 
potential trouble from the family of a guide who was killed during the journey and after 
the death of one of his sister’s husbands.  
 After four years of hunting and general idleness in England, Galton decided to 
return to adventuring, this time in southern Africa. The importance of this exploration to 
Galton’s interest and success in science cannot be underestimated. In the planning and 
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execution of the trip, Galton made a serious connection between his life’s pursuits and 
science for the first time (Memories 122-23). In addition, the trip provided him with his 
first opportunity to gain recognition for scientific work.  
The inspiration to make the trip a journey for science iitially came from Francis’ 
cousin Douglas Galton, a Fellow of the Royal Geographic Society, who suggested that 
Francis might incorporate in his adventure some scientific activity. He provided Galton 
with introductions to some of the Geographical Society’s members who worked with him 
to develop a plan of exploration for his journey which was to take him from Cape Town 
to Lake Ngami, recently discovered by David Livingstone. Memb rs of the Society 
suggested that Galton survey the land on his route and reportback his findings (Bulmer 
11). Although unversed in the use of the sextant and techniques of surveying, through 
reading and practicing, Galton became competent enough to usehe basic tools and 
techniques of geodesy to survey the country through which he trav led, making careful 
measurements of longitude and latitude (Memories 125-26). As promised, he sent his 
observations back to the Royal Geographic Society which published them in their journal 
in 1852. In 1854, because of his work in Africa, he received on of their two annually 
awarded gold medals, “for having at his own expense and in furtherance of the expressed 
desire of the Society, fitted out an expedition to explore the center of South Africa, and 
for having so successfully conducted it… as to have enabled this Society to publish a 
valuable memoir and map in the last volume of the journal” (150).  
 Galton’s success in his African adventures helped him establi h a place of 
prestige in the scientific community and encouraged him to dev te his time, energy, and 
wealth to the pursuit of science. Of the ethos within te scientific community that his 
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work in Africa afforded him Galton writes, “The Geographical Medal gave me an 
established position in the scientific world. In connection with subsequent work, it caused 
me to be elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1856, and to receive the very high honor 
of election to the Athenaeum Club” (151).  
With these new laurels and the support of a winning personality and disposable 
income to help fund scientific projects, Galton was soon an established member of the 
scientific elite. He was elected to the council of the Royal Geographic Society in 1854 
and made secretary in 1857. He was also elected to various high positions in the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science including general secretary (1863-67), 
president of the Geographical section (1862, 1872), and president of the Anthropological 
section (1877, 1885), turning down the position of President of the entire society twice 
(Gillham 105). He was selected to be a member of the Royal S ciety in 1856 and in 1854 
received the silver medal from the French Geological committee (105).  
 In addition to supplying him with the necessary credibility for prosecuting his 
later mathematical arguments about heredity, Galton’s early scientific exploits prepared 
him with the requisite mathematical skills to develop his arguments. In his African 
travels, his work with geodesy most likely put him in contact with some of the 
mathematical developments in the field which could have included work estimating error 
using distribution tables calculated from the error curve.  
In addition to geodesy, his scientific investigations of weather may have also 
provided him with the necessary mathematical exposure to understand and make 
arguments about heredity using the error curve.  In the early 1860s, Galton became 
interested in the laws of weather which were at the tim beginning to be comprehended 
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with the help of the collection of numerous observations made at the same time over a 
wide area. Specifically, he was interested in the phenoma of wind and how it was 
created. At the time, the only wind model was that of the tropical cyclone in which an 
area of extreme low pressure and a mass of warm moist air moving in different directions 
collided. Galton wondered whether the direction of wind in Europe might not be caused 
by a similar weather phenomenon.  
In order to find out, he sent out requests to observatories, lighthouses, and ships to 
make measurements and observations three times a day of cloud cover, wind speed and 
direction, temperature, and barometric pressure. He sent charts of his compiled data to the 
Royal Society in 1862 and in 1863 offered an analysis of the data which made the case, 
that not only did Europe experience cyclonic conditions similar to those in the tropics, 
but that it also experienced anticyclonic conditions when, during a period of high 
pressure, air from the upper atmosphere would rush down creating windy conditions 
(Memories 229-31).  
Michael Bulmer suggests that the papers and charts compiled by Galton in his 
work with the anticyclone and other meteorological problems reveal his knowledge of 
statistics/probability. Specifically, he suggests that Glton’s “facility for interpreting 
maps and charts, in particular by drawing isobars, isotherms, and so on through points of 
equal geometric pressure, temperature, and other physical qualities” seems to foretell his 
technique of drawing ellipses through data points on tables of the joint frequency 
distribution of the heights of parents and offspring to discover the properties of the 
normal curve in the distribution of the data. Additionally, Bulmer explains that in an 1870 
paper discussing the problem of predicting wind velocity, Galton calculates wind velocity 
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from a crude multiple regression formula which could be seen as a precursor to the ones 
he develops for his hereditary experiments with peas discussed in the next section 
(Bulmer 31). Finally, Bulmer argues that it may have been his work with weather that put 
him in contact with Quetelet, who might have been his supplier for the Belgian data for 
the weather maps he was compiling in the winter of 1861-62 (173).        
 
The Development of a Mathematical Theory of Inheritance 
 
At around the same time as his meteorological investigations, Galton began work 
on his hereditary investigations. Even in his earliest efforts, it is possible to see the 
importance of quantified data in his work. At some point between 1865 and 1869, Galton 
was introduced to the application of the error curve through his friend William 
Spottiswoode, who had used the law of errors in order to provide evidence that mountain 
ranges were “not accidental and that the geologist and the natural philosopher will at least 
have good grounds for seeking some common agency which has caused their upheaval”70 
(Gillham 158).  
Further, he was introduced to the physiological and sociological applications of 
the law through the work of Quetelet. In Memories Galton says that he made the 
acquaintance71 of the Belgian statistician (Memories 304). Though it is not clear what 
transpired during their meeting(s), after reading an English translation of his 1849 text, 
Letters on Probability, Galton decided to incorporate Quetelet’s curve fitting techniques 
                                               
70 William Spottiswoode, “On Typical Mountain Ranges: an Application of the Calculus of Probabilities to 
Physical Geography,” Journal of the Royal Geographic Society 31 (1861): 149-54.  
 
71 Bulmer suggests that this meeting most likely took place eith r through his collection of weather data or 
at the International Statistics Conference which took place in London in 1860. (Bulmer 173)  
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into his assessment of his collected data on talent and its relationship to heredity. The 
results of this application are presented in his first extended work on heredity, Hereditary 
Genius (1869).  
In this text, Galton argues for the first time that the law of errors accurately 
describes the distribution of variation in the traits of human populations. Given that 
Quetelet’s statistical/probabilistic approach had yielded such wonderful results in 
predicting the distribution of qualities like height and chest breadth in a population, 
Galton argues that the same distribution might be applied to traits such as intelligence.  
In the third chapter of Hereditary Genius, entitled “Classification of Men 
According to their Natural Gifts,” Galton uses Quetelet’s application of the law of error 
to a collection of heterogeneous subjects to move his reade  towards his own conclusions 
regarding the distribution of eminence within a population.  
 
I propose in this chapter to range men according to their natural abilities, putting 
them into classes separating them by equal degrees of merit, and to show the 
relative number of individuals included in the several clsses….The method I 
shall employ for discovering all this, is an application of the very curious 
theoretical law of deviation from the average. (Hereditary Genius 26) 
 
Given that Quetelet’s statistical approach had yielded such wonderful results in 
predicting height and chest breadth, Galton suggests that the same distribution might be 
applied to non-physical traits such as intelligence. Thus, one of the differences between 
Quetelet’s and Galton’s approach is that it expands the applic tion of the error curve from 
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easy-to-quantify physical characteristics to more difficult-to-measure qualitative features 
(32).   
 In the sections of the text which follow, Galton analyzes actual scores from the 
Royal Military College at Sandhurst’s entrance examinatio  using Quetelet’s calculations 
of the law of errors and shows that the scores fall approximately within a distribution 
predicted by Quetelet’s tables of calculations (Hereditary Genius 33). This proves for 
Galton that the distribution of intelligence, like height and chest size, can also be 
estimated within a population.  
Although Galton’s application of the law of error to thedata is strictly in keeping 
with the applications as they are described by Quetelet, he interprets the results 
differently. While Quetelet is interested in ascertaining the profile of the “average man” 
and views deviations as errors in nature, Galton is interes d in variation itself. He sees 
the distribution of values of a trait around a mean not as a series of mistakes in nature but 
as the description of the degree of variation of a particular feature in a particular natural 
population (26-30).  
Galton explains that a natural population within a stable environment will have a 
predictable range of characters with a predictable “normal,” i.e. bell shaped distribution. 
He adds that if two populations from different environments are compared, two different 
ranges of characters with different population means will become apparent. As a result, 
the law of error can be used to determine whether or not, “the events of which an average 
has been taken, are due to the same or to dissimilar classes of conditions” (Hereditary 
Genius, 29). Because the law of error can be used not only to describ  the range and 
distribution of variation within a population affected by the same conditions, but also 
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whether a sample contains two distinct populations, it becom s a powerful tool in 
Galton’s later work and in the work of the biometricians for defining homogeneous 
populations and identifying evolutionary changes within or betwe n populations.  
 In addition to describing variation, Galton also occupies readers of Hereditary 
Genius with a discussion of the degree to which the intensity of a particular inherited trait 
is maintained across generations. To ascertain the degree, Galton examines the pedigrees 
of eminent men in various professions and attempts to calculate the number of eminent 
offspring, forbearers, and relations by blood that could be traced from a given set of 
eminent individuals. What he finds is “that the proportion of men of eminence 
continually decreased as one moved away from the most eminent person roughly 
according to the law that, ‘the percentages are quartered at ach successive remove, 
whether by descent or collaterally’” (287). This process of geometrical decrease 
eventually becomes a central feature of his argument in Natural Inheritance and is later 
codified by Galton as the Law of Ancestral Inheritance.  
In Hereditary Genius, Galton develops the germs of several principles which play 
important roles in guiding his later arguments about the nature of heredity. First, he sets 
forth the principle that the distribution of a trait in any given homogeneous human 
population is approximately normal; and second, that the intensity of traits diminishes 
over each successive generation by a geometrical regression. From these principles, 
Galton directs his natural inquiries from specific instances of single characters to general 
instances of multiple characters over multiple generations in hopes of discovering 1) 
whether the normal distribution of traits in small homogeneous populations might also 
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occur in the heterogeneous aggregate of all populations, 2) how heredity affects the 
distribution of traits, and 3) how traits could remain stable over time (Chatterjee 288).  
In order to answer these questions, Galton performs a crucial set of experiments 
on the same natural subject as Mendel, peas. Beginning in the spring of 1874, he 
designed an experiment in which he separated groups of ten peas into seven classes 
according to their seed weight and diameter. Galton treated these classes as homogeneous 
subpopulations in a larger more heterogeneous general population of peas. He sent 
samples from each of the seven groups to different friends to raise according to strict 
instructions. When the seeds were harvested, Galton carefully weighed/measured the 
offspring for each group, calculated the mean, and worked out the distributions of the 
weights and diameters of each of the offspring around the mean. What he found was that 
in each of the seven groups the values of their weights distributed normally around the 
group mean.  
Now that Galton was certain that both the smaller homogeneous weight/diameter 
groups and the larger more heterogeneous population of a single generation distributed 
normally, he felt confident in comparing seed weights/diameters across generations. This 
would allow him 1) to ascertain any change in the expression of a particular trait from 
one generation to the next and 2) to determine whether the mean and the distribution of 
the population changed over time. In order to do these things, he invented a totally new 
mathematical procedure called regression analysis in which two different sets of 
variables, one dependent (marked with respect to the y axis) and one independent 
(marked with respect to the x axis), are plotted with respect to one another. Then, a li e, 
called a regression line, is drawn which minimizes the spr ad in the data points. The 
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slope of this line provides a quantified description of whether and to what degree the 
dependent value of (y) can be predicted by the independent value of (x).  
In his examination of two generations of peas, Galton wanted to know to what 
degree the magnitude of an offspring’s trait (y), such as weight, could be predicted from 
the magnitude of the same trait in the parent (x). Plotting each of the means for each of 
the offspring groups (y) against each of the means for each of the parental groups (x), 
Galton observed that the means lay roughly on a straigh line. After drawing the 
regression line, he measured the slope of the line to find that the predictability of the 
median weight of the offspring (y) from the median weight of their parents (x) was 1/3. 
Galton interpreted this result as meaning that offspring had only 1/3 of the original 
variability of their parents, either above or below the mean, which meant that on the 
whole the offspring tended to regress towards the population mea .  
Given the regularity of the distribution of the means in each of the generations 
and the regularity of the variance of those means from the line of regression, Galton 
affirmed his hypotheses that 1) distributions of traits follow the principles of the law of 
error across generations and 2) traits regularly regressed towards the population mean. 
With regards to heredity, he believed that his findings showed that characters were 
generally stable over time, the same position supported by Mendel, because there was a 
constant tendency towards the population mean rather than aw y from it and because the 
traits were normally distributed over generations.  
After developing his method of bivariate, i.e. two-variable, analysis on plants, 
Galton was eager to apply it to human subjects. His mainproblem, however, was that 
there was no available data. He decided to collect it himself. This Herculean task began 
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in 1884 when he sent out a notice offering a reward for statistical data from family 
records for such characteristics as stature, eye-color, temper, and artistic faculty (Natural 
Inheritance 72, 77). In the spring of the same year, he also set up his anthropometric 
laboratory at the International Health Exhibition in theGardens of the Royal Horticultural 
Society in which visitors paid three pence to have their vital statistics including eyesight, 
hearing, height, and strength recorded (Gillham 211-12). From these statistics, in addition 
to the statistics from a more permanent anthropometric laboratory set up in the Scientific 
Galleries of the South Kensington Museum, Galton was able to obtain information on 
more than 17 different characteristics for over 13,000 indiv duals.  
By the time Galton was ready to make his arguments in Natural Inheritance, he 
had already established for himself through his family connections, wealth, exploits, and 
hard work a significant reputation in the scientific community. Thus, Galton had access 
to and the attention of many influential members of the scientific community. Because of 
his experience with and track record of publishing on inheritance, he also had the 
credibility to speak authoritatively on this subject and to be taken seriously by them.  
In addition to giving him credibility, his early scientific work exposed him to and 
gave him practical experience with statistical methods, which played a major role in 
developing his later work with heredity. Through the application of the error curve to 
biological data on humans in Hereditary Genius and his work with peas, Galton began to 
develop some of his fundamental tools for dealing with variation within and across 
generations of human populations. The application of these tools to plants led to results 
which encouraged further exploration of the phenomena of regression and the geometric 
diminution of traits in humans.     
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Natural Inheritance  
 
 Though Galton’s social and scientific ethos play an important role in the 
acceptance of his theories, the success of Natural Inheritance can also be attributed in 
part to his skill as a rhetor. The next few sections will focus on the arguments in the text 
itself. The goal will be to understand not only how persuasive tactics helped secure the 
positive reception of the text, but also to comprehend how fundamental assumptions 
which ground Galton’s model made it amenable to its readers.  
Although up until the point that Galton published Natural Inheritance he had been 
offering various arguments about the nature of inheritance which relied in some part on 
the law of errors, this text represents the first time he makes an extended coherent 
argument for his theory of heredity based on the mathematical operations and principles 
developed from the law of error. After a first chapter that establishes his ethos and 
promises rewards for those readers who can persevere through his introduction of new 
mathematical methods, Galton provides his reader with a description of the hereditary 
process in chapters two and three which necessitates, or at the very least legitimates, the 
application of special topics from these two mathematical f elds. Then, in chapters four 
and five, he makes the case that the law of errors can be pplied to the study of heredity 
by developing his own particular interpretation of the law, making the case that this 
interpretation does not violate the law’s basic precepts, and presenting arguments to 
establish that the data on hereditary features distribute n accordance with the scheme of 
the law of errors. In conjunction, these chapters 1) establish the basic biological 
principles that Galton is arguing from and 2) persuade his readership of biologists and 
 
150 
other scientists, who, he assumes, have either limited or no general background in the law 
of errors, to accept the application of this law to the study of heredity in humans.    
 
Chapter One: The Author, the Audience, and the Journey 
 
 In the first chapter of Natural Inheritance, Galton supplies the reader with three 
very important pieces of information. First, he present his own credentials. Second, he 
identifies the characteristics of the audience he imagines reading the text. Finally, he 
provides a brief qualitative characterization of the question  he intends to ask and the 
method he intends to employ to answer them.   
 He begins the first chapter by establishing his ethos for his reader and the reasons 
why his particular theory of inheritance is superior to previous theories on the same 
subject. In order to establish his credibility, Galton explains that he has been investigating 
heredity for many years and that he has published many technical memoirs concerning 
the subject. This appeal to past experience and success in publication lets the reader know 
that the theory he is about to describe is not some radically new idea, but rather one that 
has grown up over time: “I have long been engaged upon certain problems that lie at the 
base of the science of heredity, and during several years have published technical 
memoirs concerning them” (1).  
This claim to credibility is important because Galton admits that his theory of 
inheritance is different, and he believes superior, to all previous theories. (He is, of 
course, unaware of Mendel’s work.) He explains that its novelty and strength derive from 
his1) examining multitudes or populations of organisms and 2) employing, “more refined 
 
151 
and searching methods than those usually employed in hereditary inquiries” (1). The 
methods he describes are in fact the mathematical ones dev loped from the law of error. 
He proposes to his reader that by employing the mathematical operations and principles 
of this mathematical law he is able to provide a more precise and credible theory of 
heredity than those who have come before him: “The inquiry relates to the inheritance of 
moderately exceptional qualities by brotherhoods and multitudes rather than individuals, 
and it is carried on by more refined and searching methods than those usually employed 
in hereditary inquiries” (1).   
Once he has made an ethical appeal and an argument regarding the superiority of 
his approach, Galton recognizes his audience and makes the case for the style and 
organization of his argument. One common element that he does not divulge in the 
introduction is his conclusions, though he does suggest a series of problems that he 
intends to address in the text.  
 
The conclusions cannot however be intelligently presented in the introductory 
chapter. They depend on ideas that must first be well comprehended and which 
are now novel to the large majority of readers and unfamiliar to all. But those who 
care to brace themselves to a sustained effort, need not feel much regret that the 
road to be traveled over is indirect, and does not admit of being mapped 
beforehand in a way they can clearly understand. It is full of interest of its own. It 
familiarizes us with the measurement of variability, and with the curious laws of 




In these lines, Galton makes several important rhetorical moves that set the tone 
for the rest of the text. First, he identifies his audience. He recognizes that they are most 
likely unfamiliar with the operations and principles connected to the law of errors. This 
suggests that his argument has been designed primarily for biol gists and not for those in 
the fields of geodesy, astronomy, mathematics, and economics, who would most likely 
have knowledge of the role of the error curve and would, therefore, not require an 
extended explanation of how the law works. 
Once he has identified his audience, he tries to develop his et os further by 
showing them that he understands they might have difficulties with the mathematical 
elements of the arguments. He assures them that their patience with the circuitous route 
of his arguments and their perseverance will pay off in their knowledge of a new, 
powerful method of investigating heredity that will lead them through the tangle of 
traditional problems towards a clearer understanding of the phenomena. In this 
exhortation, he makes the case that that which is harder is b tter. This argument places a 
premium value not only on the endurance of his reader but also on the value of the 
methods employed in and the results reached through his arguments.  
Collectively, Galton’s introductory remarks serve as a warning and a promise. 
They warn the reader that the approach is unorthodox and difficult. However, they 
promise the reader that Galton himself is sufficiently knowledgeable to lead them through 
this difficult approach and that if they follow and persever , they will reap the rewards of 





Chapters Two and Three: Establishing Jurisdiction 
 
Once he has exhorted readers to follow his lead, Galton begins the task of 
persuading them that the mathematical methods he will emp oy in the text are fitting for 
the study of heredity by making the case that heredity is a random phenomenon and can, 
therefore, be best handled by the laws of probability. He begins chapter two of the text 
“Process in Heredity” by explicitly stating his goal.  
 
A concise account of the chief processes in heredity will be given in this chapter, 
partly to serve as a reminder to those to whom the works of Darwin especially, 
and of other writers on the subject, are not familiar, but principally for the sake of 
presenting them under an aspect that best justifies the methods of investigation 
about to be employed. (Natural Inheritance 4)  
 
 In addition to stating the goal of the chapter, this passage provides further 
information about Galton’s intended audience for the text. Although the basic gist of 
Darwin’s work was widely known by 1889, the particulars of his t eory were probably 
not common knowledge for all but a very small group of specialists in the biological 
sciences. Galton’s recognition here that he needs to explain the basic tenets of Darwin’s 
principles relevant to his work suggests that he is targeting his arguments to a broad, 
educated audience who might know something about the rudiments of biology and 
mathematics but who are by no means experts in either field.  
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Once he has described the purpose of the chapter, Galton begins laying out his 
own theory of transmission of characters loosely based on Darwin’s theory of pangenesis. 
According to Darwin’s theory, the cells that are created in the zygote contain minute 
particles called “gemmules” each of which represents a different physiological feature 
inherited from the parent. As the cells multiply, they throw off these small particles 
which, “when supplied with proper nutriment, multiply by self-division, and are 
ultimately developed into units like those from which they were originally derived” (The 
Works of Charles Darwin, 321). Darwin suggests that the differential dispersion of 
gemmules could be responsible for variation and that this dispersion could be affected by 
damage to the reproductive organs caused by changes in their physical conditions and the 
effect of environmental conditions on the parents which would cause them to produce 
modified gemmules in adaptive response to these changes (Gillham 174).  
 Darwin’s basic concept of the particulate gemmule is clearly echoed in the 
opening section of Galton’s second chapter “Particulate Inh ritance” in which he 
describes generally the process by which traits are inherited. With no concepts of genes— 
the term “gene” is not even coined until 191172—Galton makes the case that the 
fundamental unit of inheritance is particulate and sensitive to different environmental 
influences.  
 
We seem to inherit bit by bit, this element from one progenitor that from 
another… while the several bits are themselves liable to some small change 
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during the process of transmission. Inheritance may therefor  be described as 
largely if not wholly “particulate,” and as such it will be treated in these pages. (7)    
 
 In these lines which echo the essential tenets of Darwin’s theory of pangenesis, it 
is also possible to find similarities to the ideas of Mendel, whose work was not known by 
Darwin or Galton.  Specifically, there is a comparable notion in Mendel’s work that 
organisms were made out of a mosaic of different traits and that these traits were 
particulate in that they could be represented as distinct entities.  
Though Galton and Mendel share this common position on the separate 
particulate nature of traits, their concepts of indiviual traits are the not the same. While 
Mendel saw the trait as a single cohesive fundamental u it, Galton argues that traits are 
made up of smaller particulate units. In the second chapter of Natural Inheritance, for 
example, he writes,  
 
So in the process of transmission by inheritance, elements derived from the same 
ancestor are apt to appear in large groups, just as if they had clung together in the 
pre-embryonic stage, as perhaps they did. They form what is well expressed by 
the word “traits,” traits of feature and character—that is to say, continuous 
features and not isolated points. (8-9)  
    
 In some ways, the fact that Galton sees traits as a collection of characters rather 
than indivisible units does not necessarily make his position substantially different from 
Mendel’s. If, for example, similar elements cling together, then they represent in practice 
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a single cohesive unit. However, because they are divisible, this also means that there is 
the possibility of integration between them and the particles of the complementary trait 
from the other parent. This integrated or blended inheritance is similar to the kind 
described by Nägeli.  
 In chapter two of his book, Galton explicitly supports the possibility of both 
blended and mutually exclusive inheritance allowed by a multi-par iculate character 
model.  
 
There are probably no heritages that perfectly blend or that absolutely exclude one 
another, but all heritages have a tendency in one or the other direction, and the 
tendency is often a very strong one. By what we may see in plots of wild 
vegetation, where two varieties of a plant mix freely, and the general vegetation 
becomes a blend of the two, or where individuals of one variety congregate and 
take exclusive possession of one place, and those of another variety congregate 
together. (13)  
 
In this metaphor of seed dispersal, Galton describes trait distribution in terms of 
separate particles which, like different seeds scattered on the wind, find purchase in 
different combinations on different plots of land. In some rare cases, however, the 
resulting flora is equally mixed, while in other cases one type tends to dominate over the 
others. As time wears on, however, organic stability maydevelop in those areas where 
some seeds tend to predominate. This creates a stable position for a particular trait.  
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Although stable positions can be accomplished, the degree to which these stable 
conglomerates affect reproductive outcomes is still influenced by the regular interference 
of chance. At the close of the chapter, Galton makes this argument explicitly. He also 
argues that the influence of chance in the hereditary process, based on an a priori 
probability, makes this process amenable to description by the mathematics of probability 
as they are instantiated in the law of errors.  
 
What has been said is enough to give a clue to the chief motive of this chapter. Its 
intention has been to show the large part that is always played by chance in the 
course of hereditary transmission, and to establish the importance of an intelligent 
use of the laws of chance and of statistical methods that are based upon them, in 
expressing the conditions under which heredity acts. (Natural Inheritance 17) 
 
Though Galton’s vision of the process of trait distribution through reproduction 
includes random selection of traits and dominance, both of which are present in Mendel’s 
theory, Galton’s position on these two issues is not identical. First, Galton and Mendel’s 
concepts of dominance are not identical. For Mendel dominance is an inherent feature of 
one character or another, whereas for Galton it is a position of stability among groups of 
particles that tends to gain a greater degree of permanence over time. Second, the role of 
random selection is different in each of their theori s. For Mendel, the choice of which of 
the two traits from the male and the female make it into the genetic make up of any one 
particular offspring is random. Though Galton has a similar theory for the selection of 
particles, this theory differs to some degree because random selection can act in two 
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different ways. First, there is random blending of characters which can lead to a series of 
different possible character expressions. Second, there is th random selection of groups 
of particles which is similar to the phenomenon described by Mendel.  
Galton’s model of heredity, therefore, embraced both continuous and 
discontinuous variation. This model, which accepted all of the beliefs about hereditary 
outcomes that were accepted at the time he was writing, may have had a substantial 
influence on Galton’s success with his critics, especially in making the case for the 
general applicability of his mathematical law of regression and his principle of 
geometrical diminution of characters. The opposite casen be observed with Mendel 
who was challenged by Nägeli on the grounds that he was presuming to make the case 
that discontinuous variation was the only form of inheritance despite the existence of 
facts which challenged this assertion.   
Throughout chapter two, Galton offers a view of the general t ndencies and 
operations of heredity limited to the process in which hereditary particles combine and 
the contributions of the parents are mixed. In this description, he makes the case for the 
application of the special topics of probability to the study of heredity based on the 
influence of chance on the selection and combination of characters.  
Whereas chapter two restricts its scope of investigation to the mixing of traits in a 
single reproductive instance, chapter three offers the reade  a broad multi-generational 
vision of reproductive outcomes. Despite the difference of its scope, Galton uses his 
examples, explanations, and arguments in chapter three for the same end as he used them 
in the second chapter: to make the case that probability plays a major role in the process 
of inheritance and, therefore, the mathematics of probability and statistics have 
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jurisdiction in making arguments about heredity. The change of scope, however, does 
impact the direction of Galton’s argument because it allows him to argue for the necessity 
of taking a population approach, which Galton describes as a statistical approach, to the 
study of heredity.  
In the opening paragraph of the chapter, Galton changes the scop of his 
investigation from the process of trait combination and selection to a description of the 
distribution of traits within a population.  
 
The total heritage of each man must include a greater variety of material than was 
utilized in forming his personal structure. The existence in some latent form of an 
unused portion is proved by this power, already alluded to, of transmitting 
ancestral characters that he did not personally exhibit. Therefore the organized 
structure of each individual should be viewed as the fulfillment of only one out of 
an indefinite number of mutually exclusive possibilities. His structure is the 
coherent and more or less stable development of what is no more than an 
imperfect sample of a large variety of elements (Natural Inheritance 18). 
 
 In this opening explanation, a few elements are remarkable. First, Galton 
acknowledges that some traits are unexpressed which reveals that he, like Mendel, had 
something like an idea of the distinction between the genotype, the total number of 
characters that exist, and the phenotype, the number of characters which are physically 
manifested in the organism. Second, he makes the case that the elements which are 
expressed are only some out of an indefinite number of mutually exclusive possibilities. 
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This statement reveals that Galton was thinking along the lines of a gene pool of which 
individuals were only samples. This contrasts strongly with the traditional “essence” 
theories of species, such as the ones proposed by Kölreuter, Gärtner, and Quetelet, in 
which variation was only deviation from an ideal type.  
 Once he has made these general characterizations about the distribution of 
variation in populations, Galton makes specific arguments supporting his position. He 
begins by challenging the traditional model of inherited similarity as the direct transfer of 
traits by describing in detail what he believes is an equally plausible gene pool scenario.   
 
It appears that there is no direct heredity relation betwe n the personal parents and 
the personal child… but that the main line of hereditary connection unites the sets 
of elements out of which the personal parents had been evolved with the set out of 
which the personal child was evolved. (Natural Inheritance 19)  
 
In this statement, Galton reveals that he is thinking of heredity in terms of 
populations rather than in terms of individuals because he sees parents and children as 
random expressions of characters out of a collection of traits. This characterization 
provides a rationale for accepting the necessity of statistics as a tool for studying 
inheritance. If heritability is seen as a fairly direct transfer of traits which are only slightly 
altered as a result of environmental or other factors, then the phenotype of the parents and 
the individual offspring can suffice as the subjects for investigating inheritance. If, 
however, individual offspring are simply one of infinitely many combinations of a set of 
heritable traits, then an investigation of the features of single individuals becomes 
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meaningless, particularly because there is no way of directly observing the combination 
of the particles themselves.  
As a result, the study of inheritance by necessity becomes the study of fraternities 
or large samples of population which are capable of revealing patterns in and ranges of 
character combinations, a point also recognized by Mendel. This type of assessment, 
according to Galton, can only be accomplished through the use of statistical analysis.      
 
We are unable to see particles and watch their groupings, a d we know nothing 
directly about them, but we may gain some idea of the various possible results [of 
the combination of character traits] by noting the differences between the brothers 
in any large fraternity… whose total heritages must have been much alike, but 
whose personal structures are often very dissimilar. That is why it is so important 
in hereditary inquiry to deal with fraternities rather than with individuals, and 
with large fraternities rather than small ones. (19-20)  
 
 Once Galton has made this case for his “gene pool” model of inheritance and the 
subsequent need for a statistical approach the study of heredity, he presents his specific 
arguments about how stability of character is maintained  a system where traits are 
randomly selected from a large pool of possibilities. In this section, he turns to analogy to 
make his arguments. His choice to make arguments from analogy nd hypothesized 
description rather than from the authority of previous experiments and observations 
suggests that Galton is trying to make the case for a relatively non-specialist audience 
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that his methodological approach is novel and more effective than previous approaches to 
the study of heredity.   
He begins by positing that for all randomly combining particles there are 
tendencies of attraction and repulsion. He adds that over a p riod of time there will be a 
few groupings that will tend to reoccur and after multiple reoccurrences to become fixed 
as a stable pattern or form.  
 
In every congregation of mutually reacting elements, some characteristic 
groupings are usually recognized that have become familiar throug  their frequent 
reoccurrence and persistence. Being less evanescent than other combinations, they 
may be regarded as temporary stable forms. (Natural Inheritance 22)    
 
 As evidence for his conclusion, Galton presents analogous instances in which 
constituent elements seem to tend towards certain forms. He draws on analogies from 
governments, crowds, and landscapes—all of which are composed of diverse elements 
that tend to commonly combine into certain stable forms such as democracy, an evening 
party, and “true to nature” artistic compositions. These analogies, although illustrative of 
the concept of stable form, seem quite unusual for describing a physiological 
phenomenon because they are social, emotional, psychological phenomena rather than 
physical ones. They seem to serve Galton’s purposes, however, because they are 
accessible to a wide readership and because they can be used to describe entities whose 
constituent parts can take multiple stable forms, which e calls “types,” and whose forms 
can change over time.  
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Throughout the second and third chapters where Galton makes the case for his 
theory of inheritance, there are only three citations f cholarly sources. There is one 
citation each in the field of anatomy and cytology and o e from his own work on the 
faculties of twins. There are no sources from hybridization studies, animal breeding, or 
even from Darwin’s theory of pangenesis, which Galton relies on heavily as a platform 
for his conceptual model, to provide evidence to support his claims. In each case where 
citations do appear, the sources cited do not supply evidence or ethical support for critical 
ideas in the text.   
At the end of the third chapter Galton, who recognizes that this approach to 
developing his theory of heredity may appear dubious to the reade , provides a rationale 
for not drawing on the existent scholarship. He writes, “I have largely used metaphor and 
illustration to explain the facts, wishing to avoid entanglements with theory as far as 
possible, inasmuch as no complete theory of inheritance has yet been propounded that 
meets with general acceptance” (34).  
By refusing to acknowledge the methods and results from previous approaches to 
the question of heredity, he is effectively casting them for the reader as largely 
inadequate and, therefore, obsolete. Having characterized previous scholarship as such, 
he can then position his own approach as a contrastively novel and effective alternative. 
 Rhetorically, the second and third chapters serve three important purposes in the 
overall argument presented in the text. First, they make the case for the collection of data 
on traits in large populations as the only adequate source f evidence for arguments about 
heredity. Second, they provide arguments supporting the jurisdiction of the special topics 
of probability, which represent the general mathematical foundations for the law of 
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errors, in making conclusions about the hereditary process and its results. Finally, they 
shape the reader’s impressions about Galton’s approach as novel and potentially 
successful for solving problems more traditional approaches have failed to solve.  
 
Chapters Four and Five: Demonstrating Compatibility with the Law of Error  
 
 After describing his model for the distribution of traits and generally making his 
case for the application of probability and statistics to the study of heredity, Galton turns 
his attention to arguing specifically for the applicability of the law of error to 
investigations of the hereditary process. Chapters four and five involve particularly 
delicate arguments toward this end. Their delicacy results from the fact that Galton wants 
to make the case, on the one hand, that the principles and the formulae associated with 
the law of error are applicable to the study of heredity. On the other hand, he also wants 
to argue for a new way of interpreting the law of errors, which changes the focus of 
attention from the median value of a measurable trait to the deviation of trait values from 
the median, while at the same time maintaining that this interpretation does not violate 
the basic precepts of the law of error. In order to get his reader to accept his analogy 
between the law of error and the distribution of traits in a human population, Galton 
appeals both to his readers’ subjective experience with trai  variation as well as their own 
Victorian sensibilities about the importance of knowing one’s place or rank in the scheme 
of things.  
 In chapter four, “Schemes of Distribution and Frequency,” Galton begins his 
persuasive efforts by defining his new “science of heredity” and its practices, by laying 
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out for his reader the value of applying the law of error to statistical data, and providing a 
graphical demonstration of what the results of this application yield. Because he is 
introducing a new science, Galton begins by generally defining the objects of study for 
this science and the methods by which these objects are investigat d. In the first sentence, 
he explains that these objects are, “fraternities and lrge populations rather than… 
individuals” (Natural Inheritance 35). In the second sentence, he lays out the 
methodology for the study of these subjects which he describ  as, “a compendious 
method is therefore requisite by which we may express the distribution of each faculty 
among the members of any large group, whether it be a fraternity or an entire population” 
(35).  
 The “compendious method” that Galton alludes to but does n t directly identify 
here is, of course, the law of errors. Though it may seem strange that he does not mention 
his methodological touchstone in the opening of the chapter, his silence here is an 
important strategic choice. The law of error, as it was applied by Quetelet and commonly 
used in physics, history, astronomy and sociology, was most often, if not exclusively, 
employed as a means of ascertaining the mean value of a particular feature in a 
population. Galton recognizes that this particular focus on the mean as the object of study 
is likely the one that his reader, if he has had any experience with the law of error at all, 
will recognize. In Galton’s unique application of the law to the subject of inheritance, 
however, it is the deviation of a particular variation from the mean not the mean itself 
that is the object of interest.  
Because the primary focus and goal of the traditional use of the law of errors is to 
find the median value in a distribution of values, Galton begins his attack on the orthodox 
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application of the law by assaulting the notion that the median value provides the 
researcher with the most significant information about a population. To challenge the 
importance of the median and to persuade his reader that the range of variation is more 
important, Galton offers an example from the financial world. He describes a case in 
which the median income of the English population is known and explains that this 
information tells virtually nothing about the population itself. In contrast, a description of 
the deviation of a particular variation from the mean c  reveal, “what proportion of our 
countrymen had just and only just enough means to ward off starvation, and what were 
the proportions of those who had incomes in each and every other degree” (Galton, 
Natural Inheritance, 35-36). In other words, knowledge of the mean and the standard 
deviation allows individual values to be ranked or compared with all other values. 
Although the mean alone can also serve as a ranking index, it can only supply an idea of 
whether a value is above or below normal, whereas knowledge of the standard deviation 
can reveal precise information about the percentage of the population which does or does 
not share a similar value.  
The concept of rank within the overall population is important for Galton and 
most likely for his Victorian readers, who existed in a culture obsessed with the concepts 
of progress and betterment. Although Galton is a strict believer in the determinacy of 
natural endowment, rejecting much of the Victorian sentiment surrounding self-
improvement, he makes a point at the end of his example to emphasize the importance of 




A knowledge of the distribution of any quality enables us to ascertain the rank 
that each man holds among his fellows, in respect to tha quality. This is a 
valuable piece of knowledge in this struggling and competitive world, where 
success is to the foremost, and failure to the hindmost, irrespective of absolute 
efficiency…. When the distribution of any faculty has been ascertained, we can 
tell from the measurement, say of our child, how he ranks mong other children in 
respect to that faculty, whether it be a physical gift,or one of health, or of 
intellect, or of morals. As the years go by, we may learn by the same means 
whether he is making his way towards the front, whether he just holds his place, 
or whether he is falling back towards the rear. Similarly s regards the position of 
our class, or our nation, among other classes and other nations. (Natural 
Inheritance 37)  
 
 In these lines, Galton explains that knowledge of the distribution of trait values 
could provide the reader with a way of ascertaining how his children, with regards to 
these highly esteemed attributes, would measure up to other children as well as supply 
him with a means of tracking over time the improvement or decline in these attributes. In 
the competitive late nineteenth-century environment, a method by which the rank of 
one’s offspring could be ascertained and tracked would be of the greatest utility. By 
characterizing the usefulness of knowing the distribution of values in terms of the ranking 
of offspring, Galton both draws upon the values of the reader to support his case and 
establishes a link in his reader’s mind between the law of err r and the study of heredity 
which prepares the way for acceptance of his methodology.   
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Once Galton has preemptively made the case for the importance of determining 
the range of values for a given trait in a particular population over the importance of 
knowing the median value, he then introduces the law of err r in the fifth chapter of the 
text titled “Normal Variability.” Here he presents arguments that the law of error can be 
applied to natural data but that a distinction had to be made between the traditional 
applications of the law of error and the approach he is employing.  
In the opening of the chapter, Galton introduces the concept of deviation and 
makes the case that when natural data are marshaled their organization reveals regularity 
in terms of deviation from the median which is similar to the regularity observed in the 
deviations from the median in the mathematically derived law of error. In the first 
section, “Normal Variability,” Galton explains that the mathematically derived model for 
the probable distribution of errors reveals a scheme73 of deviations which is fixed and 
which differs to some degree from the distribution of the values represented in his 
anthropometric data. By mathematically “smoothing” the curve, however, Galton claims 
he is able to make the deviations of the anthropometric data fall nicely into line with the 
scheme derived from the normal law of error. As evidence for this claim, Galton presents 
the values of deviation in the known tables of probability in egrals, which describe the 
scheme of the law of error, side by side with the smoothed values for deviation in the 
anthropometric data for height, weight, arm span, etc. in Table 3 of the text and draws his 
readers’ attention to the visual evidence of their quantitative similarity,74 “All the 18 
schemes of deviation that can be derived from Table 2 have been treated on these 
                                               
73 For Galton the term “scheme” refers to, “a compendium of a mass of observations which, on being 
marshaled in an orderly manner, fall into a diagram whose c ntour is so regular, simple, and bold, as to 
admit of being described by a few numerals… from which it an at any time be drawn afresh” (49). 
 
74 See Appendix H 
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[smoothed] principles, and the results given in Table 3. Their general accordance with 
one another, and still more with the mean of all of them, is obvious” (Natural Inheritance 
54).The close similarities between the values for deviation in the natural data and the 
distribution of deviation values calculated from probability provide sufficient evidence, 
according to Galton, that all of the mathematical formulae and principles that have been 
developed for describing the law of error can also be applied to describing the 
distribution of natural data.  
Although by smoothing the values in the anthropometric data G lton has shown 
that the law of error is mathematically suitable for describing deviations, or errors, from a 
true value in anthropometric data, he has not made the case that that they are suitable for 
describing variability which is the focus of his hereditary investigation. As a result, he 
still needs to persuade his reader that these deviations can be interpreted in terms of 
natural variation. To accomplish this, Galton makes arguments from definition which 
attempt to establish a general similarity between the concepts of error and variation. 
According to the standard application of the law of error, the values of the observational 
results which fall above or below the mean “true value” of an observation represent a 
distribution of erroneous observations. By calculating he deviation of possible errors 
from the median, it is possible to estimate how far away in contrast with other 
measurements from the “true value” a particular measurement lies and, therefore, 
calculate the probability of its erroneousness. As a result, deviations describe, in the 
nomenclature of the law of errors, “probable errors.”  
In the second section of the chapter titled “Normal Curve of Distribution,” Galton 
makes the case that because variations and errors are caused by similar phenomena, “the 
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combined influence of a multitude of accidents,” they can be reasonably classed together 
(Natural Inheritance 55).  
 
But errors, differences, deviations, divergencies, dispersions, and individual 
variations,75 all spring from the same kind of causes. Objects that bear th  same 
name, or can be described by the same phrase, are thereby acknowledged to have 
common points of resemblance, and to rank as members of the same species, 
class, or whatever else we may please to call the group. (55)    
 
 Based on his position that “error” and “variation” are descriptors of the effects of 
the same cause, Galton argues that the mathematics which applies to the calculation of 
errors should also reasonably apply to the calculation of variability.  
 
All persons conversant with statistics are aware that this supposition [that errors, 
differences, etc. are all the result of a multitude of small accidents] brings 
variability within the grasp of the laws of chance, with the result that the relative 
frequency of deviations of different amounts admits of being calculated, when 
those amounts are measured in terms of any self-contained u it of variability. (55)  
 
 Although Galton makes the case for identity between th terms “error” and 
“variation” for the purpose of convincing the reader that te law of error can be used to 
describe variability, he is quick to differentiate his use of the law of error to study 
                                               
75 Here Galton is using the figure congeries to persuade the reader that the terms “error” and “variation” 
share a similarity with one another by offering a series of possible subjects which connect the two terms.    
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variability from the traditional applications associated with it. To make this distinction, 
Galton relies on arguments from definition. He begins with the conclusion that because 
the science of heredity has different ends than those of mathematics, the specific manner 
in which terms are employed by the one is not particularly useful to the other. 
 
It has already been said that mathematicians labored at the law of error for one set 
of purposes, and we are entering into the fruits of theirlabors for another. Hence 
there is no ground for surprise that their nomenclature is often cumbrous and out 
of place when applied to problems of heredity. This is especially the case with 
regard to their term of “probable error.” (Natural Inheritance 57)   
 
Although initially Galton has no quibble with the law of error’s concept of 
“probable error” (Q), and describes it as co-referential with variability, at this point in the 
text, he assaults the term as misleading and in need of proper clarification. He argues that 
in common parlance most people would take the phrase “probable error” to mean the 
most probable error which, mathematically, would be the median error. The median error, 
however, is not an error at all, but instead the “true value” or the case of zero probable 
error. Because the term is so misleading, he claims that his recasting of the statistical 
phenomena of “probable error” as “probable deviation” is not only justified, but 
necessary. In this way, Galton is able to separate his trminology from the terminology 
commonly employed in the law of errors while at the same time maintaining the position 




Making the Case for Regression and the Geometric Diminution of Variation: 
Blended Inheritance. 
 
  After spending chapters two through five arguing for the jurisdiction of statistics 
and probability in the study of heredity generally and the applicability of the law of errors 
to data gathered from the natural world specifically, Galton is ready to introduce his 
reader to the theoretical insights about heredity which e believes can be gained from the 
application of the law of error to anthropometric data on inheritance. These efforts begin 
in chapter seven, “Discussion of the Data of Stature,” where Galton describes the 
mathematical patterns that he has uncovered by applying the law of errors to 
anthropometric data on variation in height revealing blended inheritance. They continue 
in chapter eight “Discussion of the Data of Eye Color” where Galton makes the case 
using eye color data that the theoretical mathematical deductions he has established in the 
previous chapter are also applicable to the study of characteristics that are mutually 
exclusive.   
 In order to describe the laws of heredity, Galton lays out for his reader his work 
organizing and comparing data on the statures (heights) of co-fraternal offspring, with the 
statures of their mid-parents. He begins by defining the theoretical constructions “co-
fraternal” and “mid-parents” and by making the case for the appropriateness of describing 
parents and offspring using these constructions. He defines co-fraternal as, “all the adult 
sons and transmuted daughters of a group of mid parents who have the same stature76” 
and the term mid-parents as “the average of two values; on  the stature of the father, and 
                                               
76 The term “stature” used here by Galton is equivalent to the term “height.” I will use the two 
interchangeably throughout this section.  
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the other the transmuted stature of the mother” (88, 94). He explains that the arithmetical 
“transmutation” of the values for height in females into their male equivalents is 
appropriate because it makes the male and female values compatible so that either their 
contribution of traits or their acquisition of traits can be considered with statistical 
uniformity. He transforms the stature of mothers and daughters by “adding to each 
observed female stature… one inch for every foot” (6). 
In addition to these theoretical constructions and transformations of the 
constituents of the observed population’s heights, Galton lso describes constructions for 
the general population itself. Because he is comparing the valu s for median and 
deviation of heights in two groups, mid-parents and co-fraterniti s, he also has to 
establish a theoretical value for the median and deviation of heights in the overall 
“general” population which encompasses both groups. From these values, he can not only 
make the case that there is no one-to-one correspondence b tween the statures of the 
parents and the statures of the offspring, but also describ  the ratio by which the offspring 
and parents vary from one another. He establishes the valu of the mid-stature of the 
population (P) at 68.5 inches and the value of the variability within te population (Q) at 
1.7 inches.   
 Once he has defined his terms and given the values for the median and variability 
for the whole population, Galton presents his results graphically to his readers and makes 
the case, using graphics as evidence and the method of regression analysis he developed 
earlier with his work with peas, that there is a general t ndency for the stature of the 
offspring to regress towards the norm. The sample used to make his argument is a mix of 
data. One set of data comes from his Records of Family Faculty Data, which he calls his 
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R.F.F. data, gathered through a general offer of prizes for data on the stature of 
immediate family and relations. He also uses a second data set he calls “Special Data” 
which was collected by circulating cards to trusted correspondents asking them to provide 
the measure of stature among brothers. The R.F.F data supply measurements on 928 adult 
offspring and 205 Mid-parents. The special data contained in aggregate the stature 
measures for 738 brothers (Galton, Natural Inheritance, 72-75 and 78-79). Although the 
measurements from his anthropometric laboratory also included height, they did not 
specifically include the height of the brothers and parents of an individual. As a result, 
these measurements were not used in his arguments.  
Galton begins his discussion of his regression calculations of the R.F.F and 
special data by stating the conclusion he draws from it: “However paradoxical it may 
appear at first sight, it is theoretically a necessary f ct, and one that is clearly confirmed 
by observation, that the stature of the adult offspring on the whole must be more 
mediocre than the stature of the parents” (95).  
 After defining his position, Galton provides his reader with a graphical 
presentation (Figure 1) of the data.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Regression from Mid-Parent to Son77 
                                               





In this graphic, the stature (heights) of the mid-parents is listed along the left side 
and the heights of co-fraternities are listed along the top. Dots are placed at the point 
where the statures of the mid-parents, plotted vertically, and the average statures of the 
co-fraternities, plotted horizontally, intersect. Galton hen draws line CD through these 
dots which represents the average relationship between the values of the mid-parents and 
their co-fraternal offspring. Next, he draws a second lie AB which describes, “what the 
mid-statures of the sons would be if they were on average identical with those of their 
mid-parents” (Natural Inheritance 97).  
After establishing that the statures of offspring are different from the statures of 
their parents, Galton makes the case geometrically that the difference between the two 
has a fixed value. By drawing a vertical line EMF though the place where AB and CD 
intersect, it is possible to discover the degree of difference between the stature of the 
offspring and the stature of the mid-parent by taking the ratio of EA to EC which is 
constant throughout the areas EMA  and EMB . Galton reckons that the ratio between EA 
and EC is 2:3 which he calls the ratio of “filial regression” or, “the proportion in which 
the son [co-fraternal group] is, on the average, less exceptional than his mid-parent” (97). 
Because Galton believes that parents contribute equally to the stature of their offspring, 
“the average regression from the parental to the mid-filial [co-fraternal] stature must be 
the one half of two-thirds, or one-third” (98).  
After making the case using regression that the median values of stature for 
groups of co-fraternities regress towards the mean by 2/3, Galton makes the same case 
geometrically from the arrangement of the data on his results table. He explains that 
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while looking at the values as they were listed in rows and columns in table 11, it 
occurred to him that there seemed to be a relationship between values on the chart and 
those values which were near to them. After he smoothed the entries, “by writing at each 
intersection between a horizontal line and a vertical one the sum of the entries in the four 
adjacent squares,” he noticed that, “the lines drawn through the entries of the same value 
formed a series of concentric ellipses” (100-01).  The places where, “each successive 
ellipse was touched by a horizontal tangent, lay in a straight line that was inclined to the 
vertical in a ratio of 2/3, and those where the ellipses w re touched by a vertical tangent, 
lay in a straight line inclined to the horizontal in theratio of 1/3” (101). In the midst of 





Fig. 2. Geometrical Proof of the Filial Regression Value from Natural Inheritance78 
 
                                               
78 Natural Inheritance p. 101 
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This visual represents the resulting transformation of organized raw data into 
geometric proportions. By tracing these geometric proportions from the contours of the 
raw data as it was organized, Galton is again able to bring geometric principles to bear on 
the data in order to provide proof for his conclusions. In the text, however, Galton does 
not do a sufficiently lucid job of explaining the origin of the graphic nor of reproducing it 
in such as way as to clearly reveal the origin of its important elements. In an earlier 
article “Regression Towards Mediocrity in Hereditary Stature” in The Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Galton is much clearer both 





Fig. 3. Geometrical Proof of the Filial Regression Value with the Actual Data79 
                                               
79 Francis Galton, “Regression Towards Mediocrity in Hereditary Stature,” Journal of the Royal 





In the two sections of Galton’s argument described above, he relies on proofs 
based on arithmetic and the axioms of geometry to make the case for the value of 
regression. Because these proofs could be deduced using geometry and arithmetic from 
both the graphical representation of his data and from an i position of a geometrical 
arrangement on the physical data, his evidence for regression in this section is presented 
with multiple sources of credible deductive support.  
Despite the strength of this evidence, however, Galton’s arguments might be 
undone if the evidence cannot be shown to distribute according to the law of error and if 
it cannot stand up to the scrutiny of professional mathematicians. In order to avoid both 
of these problems, Galton has his results checked by sending his values for the variability 
of the general population and the co-fraternity, along with the average value of regression 
from mid-parent to co-fraternity to Mr. J.D. Hamilton Dickson, Tutor of St. Peter’s 
College, Cambridge, to calculate their distributions according to the law of error. The 
results which he receives, though not exactly the same, re similar enough to his own for 
him to proclaim that they correlate with the law of error.  
 
It is obvious from this close accord of calculation with observation, that the law of 
errors holds throughout with sufficient precision to be of real service, and that the 
various results of my statistics are not casual and disconnected determinations, but 




On the basis of this success, he describes his findings from this point on as the 
“law of regression” which holds that, “the deviation of the sons from P [the mid-stature 
of the population] are, on average, equal to one-third of the deviation of the parent from P 
[The population mid-stature], and in the same direction” (104). In other words, the 
offspring have only 1/3 the amount of variability in any given character of the combined 
average of their parents for the same character, thei c aracter values always being closer 
to the population mean. Following this assertion, Galton is careful to explain that his 
assumption of this law is justified because he can prove it using multiple deductive 
methods (an approach that Mendel takes in making his arguments for the law of 
development), because this law has been shown to hold in humans as well as peas, and 
because it holds for both blended and exclusive heredity. 
Once Galton has established his law of regression, he then uses it as a jumping off 
point for making the case that variation in character traits diminishes geometrically 
between each generation. He begins by reasserting his finding that offspring regress from 
their mid-parents towards the norm by 2/3. From this fact he reasons the amount of 
influence that the variation of one generation has on another is 1/3. 
 Once he has posited this value of 1/3 for inherited peculiarity (the value of 
variation from the population mean), Galton inquires as to what the total inheritance for a 
particular trait in a given generation would be if the value of 1/3 remained constant in 
every generation. In order to investigate this, he imagines what the value of transmittable 
deviation would be for a given mid-parent if the value of deviation for each preceding 
generation was 1/3. By adding these values to the degree of variation existent in the mid-
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parent, which is one because it represents an undivided store of variation, he is able to 
calculate the amount of the Mid-parents bequeathable variation: 3/2.  
 
Call the peculiarity [value of variation from the population mean] of the Mid-
Parent D, then the implied peculiarity [value of variation from the population 
mean] of the Mid-parent of the mid-parent, that is the mid-grand-parent of the 
man, would on the above supposition be 1/3D, that of the mid-great-grand-parent 
would be 1/9D, and so on. Hence the total bequeathable property would amount 
to D (1+1/3+1/9+&c.) = D3/2. (Natural Inheritance 134)   
 
 Even though it is a mathematically viable expectation that if each offspring 
receive 1/3 of the variation of a particular character trait from their ancestors over time 
this variation could add up to a value of 3/2, Galton argues that the law of regression 
strictly limits the amount of variation that each generation can pass down to 2/3 D (the 
value of the mid-parent’s variation).80  Galton further offers a series of suppositions that 
he admits have no empirical support but which he believes must hold true given the law 
of regression and the generally accepted principle of reversion.  
His first supposition is that the variation between geerations should always be 
diminished by the same amount. Given this parameter, he argues, we should expect that if 
the value of the bequeathable variation from the mid-parent to the child without 
diminution is 3/2D and the law of regression proves that the value of a particul r 
                                               
80 The total amount of heritable variation in the mid-parent must be 2/3 because it is cut in half when 




characteristics variation is actually 2/3D, then the value of variation must have been 
diminished by 4/9 or approximately ½ in each generation.  
His second supposition asks the reader to accept that for each g neration further 
back variation shrinks geometrically. As a result, “the influence… of the mid-parent may 
be taken as ½, and that of the mid-grand-parent by ¼, and so on” (136). Interestingly, this 
supposition, despite the lack of evidence, proves to be correct n the strength of the 
Mendelian model of trait distribution in which half the total endowment of genes of a 
parent is transferred, in turn transferring ¼ of the endowment of the genes transferred to 
the parent by their parents, and so on. In addition, the argument echoes Darwin’s 
argument for competition based on Malthus’ argument of geometrical versus arithmetical 
progression. 
Galton’s final supposition is that it is possible that some remote ancestor could 
contribute more of a particular character than their mid-parent. This supposition accounts 
for the widely accepted phenomenon of reversion, whereby an offspring resembles more 
closely a grandparent than a parent (Bulmer 110). Though Galton recognizes the 
phenomenon of reversion, he argues that it should be considered an exception from the 
general process characterized in the first two suppositions.  
In this final section, Galton argues for a geometrical diminution in traits over 
time. He makes his case from the law of regression and several hypothetical suppositions 
which have no empirical basis. Because of the thinness of his case, Galton does not 
explicitly argue in this text that this geometric progression represents a hereditary “law.” 
It is not until his 1897 article in Nature, “The Average Contribution of Each Several 
Ancestor to the Total Heritage of the Offspring,” nine years l ter that Galton is finally 
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able to dub this mathematical pattern of trait contribution he “law of ancestral heredity” 
after finding the empirical evidence he needed in breeding data describing the coat color 
of basset hounds.   
 In the seventh chapter of the text, Galton finally makes his case that by applying 
the concept of standard deviation from the law of error to anthropometric data and by 
comparing the standard deviations of two generations to one another using regression 
analysis, mathematical expressions for the patterns of probable similarity and difference 
between generations can be established. First, he uses his stature data to establish a 
mathematically describable law of regression using the special topics of geometry and the 
law of errors. Then, based on this law, he makes the case for the geometrical diminution 
of traits from one generation to the next.  
 
Predicting Regression: Exclusive Inheritance  
 
 Although Galton makes a strong case for his patterns of heredity using empirical 
data and deductive arguments, he understood, as Mendel did, that in order for his 
mathematically describable laws to be accepted as truly rational and deductive they had 
to be able to predict the distribution of hereditary characters. In addition, he also realized 
that for his regression law to be considered a hereditay law, it should apply to both of the 
recognized types of inheritance, blended and exclusive. In this way, his work was more 
comprehensive than Mendel’s which did not seriously address th  cases of blended 
inheritance which ran contrary to his position. In order to make the case that his laws 
were all inclusive and not only empirical but rational, Galton presents his reader in 
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chapter eight, “Discussion of the Data of Eye Color,” with a set of values for the 
distribution of eye colors predicted from his mathematically based laws and compares 
them to the actual distribution of eye color as described in his anthropometric data.  
 Galton begins the chapter by discussing the source of the da a and the methods he 
used to gather and organize it. According to Galton, the eye color data also came from the 
“Records of Family Faculties” (R.F.F.) of 928 adult offspring and 205 Mid-parents. 
Results from the “Special Data” and the anthropometric laboratory were not used because 
neither of these data sets contained information on eye color. 
Unlike stature, eye color is qualitative and, therefore, required Galton to construct 
a special scheme to define the different categories of ye color. Given the data he 
identifies eight distinct categories 1) light blue; 2) blue, dark blue; 3) grey, blue-green; 4) 
dark grey, hazel; 5) light brown; 6) brown; 7) dark brown; and 8) black (Natural 
Inheritance 141).  
 In addition to dividing up his data by eye color, Galton also separates his 
information by generation. To accomplish this, he creates four separate categories of 
heredity: category I represents the children of a pedigree (cl arly identified extended 
family); category II the children’s parents, uncles, and aunts of the pedigree; category III 
the children’s grandparents, great uncles, and great aunts; and category IV great 
grandparents etc. (140). He uses these categories, along with the types of eye color, to 
organize the data in Table 15 of the text.81 In this table, Galton provides readers with the 
number of subjects in each generation with a particular eye color as well as the 
percentage of each eye color in a generation. His results reveal that the total frequency of 
any given eye color in proportion to the frequency of any other eye color does not 
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significantly change from generation to generation. This reveals that there is segregation 
rather than a blending of traits from one generation to the next. Thus, eye color is 
exclusive inheritance in contrast to height which is blended.  
 Having established for each generation the percentage of the population which is 
endowed with a particular eye color type, Galton calcultes, using his principle of the 
geometric diminution of character, the theoretical distribution of eye color in a particular 
generation. The results are listed by Galton in Tables 1982 and 2083 in which he presents 
both the observed and the calculated eye colors for groups f families (Table 19) and for 
individual families (Table 20). The values in these tables ar  arrived at by calculating the 
eye color of the offspring based on the eye colors of the parents (I), the grand parents (II), 
and a combination of the parents and grandparents (III).  
He begins by predicting the eye color of the offspring based on the eye color of 
the parents. Employing the law of regression and the tendency for the geometric 
diminution of traits over generations, he calculates that each parent separately must 
contribute 30% of the child’s heritage: this calculation is based on the assumption that the 
average contribution of variation from both parents according to the law of regression is 
1/3. If one parent contributes 30% of the child’s heritage, th n combined they should 
make up 60%. That leaves 40% to be contributed from other ancstry according to the 
tendency for the geometric diminution of traits (Galton, Natural Inheritance, 149).  
Galton presents these contributions in percentages rather than fractions because 
unlike blended traits such as stature, in which a certain fraction of the final trait’s makeup 
can be contributed by the parent, exclusive traits are eith r all or nothing. As a result, he 
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needs to speak of them then in terms of the probability with which they might be 
expressed in a particular offspring or set of offspring. According to his calculations, there 
is a 30% chance of getting a particular feature from one parent or the other, and a 40% 
chance of inheriting a feature from a distant relative about whom nothing is known 
except that this relative belongs to the same race as the subject. In addition, these 
percentages also describe the percentage of the total populati n of offspring for a 
particular set of parents that should have a particular feature: for example, 30% of all 
offspring should have the features of one parent, 30% should ave features of the other.  
 Once the general percentages for inheritance are assigned to a particular 
generation of offspring, these percentages must be, “rateably assigned between light and 
dark eye color, in the proportion in which those eye colors are found in the race in 
general,” or in the particular generational category in specific (150). If, for example, the 
40% probability of inheriting a particular eye color from some distant relative belonging 
to the same race was divided according to the different percentages for light and dark 
eyes in the total race, 61.2% and 26.1% respectively, then the chance of getting light or 
dark eyes from this possible source for inheritance is, according to Galton, 28% for light 
and 12% for dark. It should be noted that in these calculations the general percentage of 
light and dark eye colors (87.3%) does not account for the total amount of inheritance 
from the race whereas the percentage of light and dark eye colors (40%), which 
represents the possibility of inheriting a particular trait f om the general race, does. This 
discrepancy is the result of Galton looking upon hazel ey s as a blended inheritance of 
2/3 light and 1/3 dark eye color. In order to simplify his inquiry into alternating 
inheritance, Galton decided to allocate the percent value for hazel eyes, which he lists on 
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the chart as 12.7% of the total race, in a 2:1 ratio so that out of the total contribution of 
30% that hazel makes of the 40% of possible inheritance, 20% is allocated to the total for 
light eyes and 10% to dark. In other words, the existing case of blended inheritance, hazel 
eyes, in the predominantly non-blended hereditary category of e e color is made to 
support the 2:1 ratio predicted for its non-blending counterparts, light and dark eyes. This 
resolves the complication of the existence of blended inheritance in a population which 
Galton is trying to use to establish the verity of the law of regression for exclusive 
inheritance.  
The calculations previously described, as well as those for the total percent of 
either light or dark eye colors for grandparents and for the combination of parents and 
grandparents, are all organized by Galton in Tables 17 and 18.84 Following the theoretical 
calculation of these values using the law regression and the geometric tendency for trait 
diminution, Galton compares his calculated values to the actual data gathered on the eye 
color for different generations in Tables 19 and 20. The close similarity between the 
values calculated from the laws and the values observed in nature encourages Galton to 
exclaim, “A mere glance at Tables 19 and 20 will show how surprisingly accurate the 
predictions are, and therefore how true the basis of the calculations must be” (Natural 
Inheritance 152).  
Despite the promising outcome of his results, however, Galton tempers his claim 
with the recognition that his sample is statistically too small to provide robust enough 
results for him to claim complete success in his investigation: “My returns are 
insufficiently numerous and too subject to uncertainty of observation, to make it worth 
while to submit them to a more rigorous analysis” (153). Nevertheless, he considers them 
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robust enough to support his position: “but the broad conclusion to which the present 
results irresistibly lead, is that the same peculiar hereditary relation that was shown to 
subsist between man and each of his ancestors in respect to the quality of stature, also 
subsists in respect to that of eye color” (153).  
With these words, Galton concludes the final portion of his text in which he lays 
out for his readers evidence that his laws of heredity and regression have the power to 
describe if not predict the process of heredity. Though there are three more substantive 
chapters, on artistic faculty, disease, and latent elem nts (i.e. the characteristics not 
expressed in the genotype), and a summary which follows, they do not substantively 
build the theory beyond the point to which he has taken it in the eighth chapter. But they 
do show a willingness to extend the discussion of heredity to behaviors and propensities 
and not just observable physical traits. 
Combined, chapters one through eight represent a deliberate and well orchestrated 
argument in which Galton makes the case for a mathematical pproach to the study of 
heredity. Within these chapters, Galton argues generally for the jurisdiction of probability 
and statistics in the study of heredity, advocates specifically for the applicability of the 
law of errors to anthropometric data, draws conclusions using the special topics of 
arithmetic, geometry, and the law of errors that patterns xist in the hereditary process, 
and provides evidence presented as compelling that these mathmatical patterns are 






The Reception of Natural Inheritance  
 
 The reactions of reviewers in professional journals and in widely-read public 
newspapers and magazines to Galton’s statistical-probabilistic approach to the problems 
of heredity provide evidence that the tactics he used in Natural Inheritance were effective 
in persuading his readers 1) that he was taking a novel approach to the study of heredity, 
2) that statistics and probability had jurisdiction in and were effective methods for 
investigating heredity, and 3) that regression and geometrical diminution were 
fundamental principles of heredity. In addition, they r veal the existence of a readership 
which both understood the principles of probability and statistics and which was 
favorably disposed to their application in biology.  
That Galton’s arguments for the novelty of his work in chapters two and three of 
the text were successful is clear in reviewers’ comments, particularly in their assertions 
that Galton’s work dealt with some important issues about heredity raised by the work of 
Darwin that had not been sufficiently investigated by his predecessors. This position is 
expressed by the mathematician John Venn, originator of the Venn diagram, in his review 
of the book in the journal Mind.  
 
This seems to me a very important contribution to a neglected side of the doctrine 
of heredity or descent. It is an attempt to apply accurate quantitative methods to 
the various successive steps by which one generation of organized beings follows 
another. Statistics in abundance have long been available as to the characteristics 
of each such generation separately…. But no one so far as I know, had hitherto 
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thought of tracking the intermediate steps, and of raising and answering the 
question… Why it is that successive generations thus continue to resemble each 
other (Venn 414). 
 
Another response suggesting that Galton had pushed the boundaries of inquiry 
about heredity in an important direction appeared in the Scottish Leader in which 
Professor Patrick Geddes observed that Galton “had the subj ct of heredity all to himself” 
while “most eminent biologists, from Huxley downwards, despit  their strong Darwinian 
faith and advocacy have… stuck to pre-Darwinian problems instead of attempting the 
solution of the far more important post-Darwinian ones” (Gillham 267).  
In addition to being convinced that Galton was exploring new topical territory in 
his work, there was also a sense among his reviewers that they were persuaded that his 
work offered a new and relevant methodological approach to the subject as well. This 
opinion is expressed in Venn’s comments and by an anonymous reviewer in Science who 
writes, “A prominent feature in this work is the applicaton of ‘the probability curve’ to 
the facts of physical variation—an attempt to apply mathematical conceptions in the field 
of biology, and to found a science of biological statistics” (“Natural Inheritance” 322). In 
this review, the anonymous reviewer not only expresses his agreement with Galton’s 
contention that his use of the principles of statistics and probability to investigate biology 
are novel, but he also accepts Galton’s argument that he special topics of probability and 
statistics have jurisdiction in biological investigations. These convictions are shared by 
John Dewey in his review of Natural Inheritance in Publications of the American 




This work is of double interest. Its primary purpose is biological, being to subject 
the question of heredity to accurate quantitative and mechanical treatment. As 
such it is doubtless the ablest work on the subject extent. But in the course of his 
investigation Galton has collected a large mass of statistic l information, and, 
what is more important, has developed some new and interesting statistical 
methods. (Dewey 331) 
 
 In addition to providing evidence for the overall success of Galton’s persuasive 
efforts in the text, the reviews also offer proof that there were groups in his readership 
who understood and appreciated his statistical/probabilistic approach to heredity. All of 
the reviewers in the scientific journals, for example, discussed the mathematics in detail 
which suggests that at least in scientific professional circles there were some scientists 
who had been exposed to and understood statistical theory (Dewey 1889, “Natural 
Inheritance” 1889, Venn 1889). That Dewey, who was a mathematician writing for a 
statistical journal, understood the mathematical intricacies of the argument is no surprise 
at all.  
 That the scientific reviewers in Nature and Mind could write in detail about the 
mathematics is not as significant, perhaps, as the fact th t they chose to write at length 
about the mathematical aspects of Natural Inheritance. By extensively discussing these 
aspects of the argument, the reviewers indicate that they thought their respective 
audiences in the sciences were ready and, perhaps even able, to appreciate the 
mathematical intricacies of Galton’s argument.  
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Although the scientific and mathematical reviewers discus  Galton’s 
mathematical arguments in depth, the reviews in the popular circulars, such as the 
Scottish Leader and the Spectator, only briefly mention the mathematical elements. The 
reasons for the scant treatment are most likely 1) that the reading publics that they were 
addressing were not familiar with or not generally interested in the mathematics of 
probability and statistics; 2) that unlike the scientific journals they did not have as much 
space to write long explanatory pieces; and 3) that the revi wers in popular publications 
were less familiar with the mathematics of statistics and probability than the scientists 
and mathematicians and, therefore, less comfortable writing in detail about them.  
A common theme running through the commentaries in the popular circulars was 
that Galton’s text presented a novel and important theory which was, however, difficult 
to access even for well educated members of the public. The critic in the Spectator writes 
that the text was difficult, “even for those competent to understand it,” and that it 
required, “careful and concentrated study,” in order to comprehend it. Despite these 
difficulties, however, he writes, “it is well worth t e time and trouble needed to master it. 
It lays the foundations of what one day will be a great science” (Gillham 267).  
 An analysis of the reviews of Natural Inheritance reveals that an audience which 
understood and was receptive to the arguments from probability and statistics existed and 
that for this audience the content and method of Galton’s arguments were novel and 
appropriate for making his case about the process of heredity. In the decade which 
followed the publication of Natural Inheritance, the feelings expressed by the critics 
seemed to be shared by biologists as well. Studies of the proc ss of variation such as 
William Bateson’s “Some Cases of Variation in Secondary Sexual Characters 
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Statistically Examined” (1892)85 and W.F.R. Weldon’s “On Certain Correlated 
Variations in Carcinus moenas” (1893)86 began to emerge which employed Galton’s 
biometrical method of gathering and graphically organizing datafor the purpose of 
studying the change in the frequency of characters in populations.  The fact that Galton’s 
work was not only praised, but also emulated suggests that the time had arrived for 
theories which applied the special topics of probability and statistics to the study of 




Whereas Darwin used quantification and quantitative comparison as a source for 
support and discovery in his arguments and Mendel appealed to the mathematical 
principles and operations of probability and combinatorics to design his experiments and 
support the lawfulness of his conclusions, Galton was the first to use an existing set of 
mathematical principles and operations as an organizing analogy for understanding 
natural phenomena. Although it is impossible to know what specific elements or 
combination of elements to credit with the success of Galton’s argument, this 
investigation of the rhetor, the argument, and the audience reveals several factors which 
most likely played a central role in its triumph. 
 One factor influencing the success of Galton’s arguments was his position within 
the scientific elite of England. Although Mendel’s theory f heredity was also novel in 
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Proceedings of the Royal Society 54 (1893): 585-94.  
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important ways, Galton had a much better chance of being taken seriously because he had 
established his scholarly credibility thorough his earlier wo k and because he was a well-
known figure with social connections within different scient fic institutions. This 
contrasts starkly with the social and academic situation of Mendel who had a sparse and 
unremarkable record of scholarship before he published his “Experiments” and who was 
a virtually unknown figure living far away from the social and academic centers of 
science in Western Europe.  
A second factor contributing to the success of Galton’s argument was that unlike 
Mendel his basic conception of hereditary was not in confli t with the established 
wisdom on the subject. Whereas Mendel’s arguments and evidence embraced the position 
of non-blended discontinuous inheritance exclusively, Galton’s work allowed for the 
possibility of both blended, continuous inheritance and exclusive, discontinuous 
inheritance. That Galton’s inclusiveness played well with h s readers is evident in the 
lack of criticism about the substance of his position and the success he had in persuading 
his readers that his results were generally applicable across all cases of heredity in many 
species. Mendel, on the other hand, is ignored by all except Nägeli, whose criticisms 
were aimed at Mendel’s insistence on the existence of only discontinuous inheritance and 
focused on chastising him for assuming that what he had found to be true in some traits in 
peas was true in all traits in all organisms.  
A third factor influencing the success of Galton’s work was the success of his 
initial persuasive arguments deployed in his first chapters to justify his application of the 
methods and principles of statistics and probability to the study of heredity. The 
importance of this factor is supported in the reviewers’ acceptance and even approbation 
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of Galton’s use of probability and statistics to develop biological laws. Galton’s success 
in this persuasive endeavor probably had something to do with his use of readers’ own 
subject experience with human characteristics as well as their cultural predisposition to 
be concerned with rank and order as common ground for getting them to accept the law 
of error as an organizing analogy for understanding the process of heredity. In Mendel’s 
work, there was no overt attempt to persuade his audience that statistics, probability, and 
combinatorics could be used to describe the distribution of traits and the character of the 
reproductive process: even if there had been, it would have been difficult to construct as 
persuasive an analogical argument using peas. 
With good established ethos, a popular position on inheritance, d a subject of 
study that his audience could identify with, it may, perhaps, come as no surprise that 
where Mendel’s brilliant arguments failed, Galton’s attempts to persuade readers to 
accept the use of the special topics of probability and statistics to investigate the invisible 
processes of heredity succeeded. In the end, Galton’s succes  proved to be a crucial factor 
in the revival of Mendelian inheritance because in the decade following the publication of 
Natural Inheritance, Galton’s statistical probabilistic methodology for the study of 
heredity rose to prominence through the work of William Bateson, Karl Pearson, and 
Frank Weldon—all of whom would develop and provide further evidence to support the 
efficacy of his approach. It is within the context of this growing mathematization of 
biology and the debates which arise between biologists about the continuous or 
discontinuous nature of inheritance that Mendel’s monograph resurfaces and ushers in the 




Chapter 5: Behind the Curve: The Place of Mathematics in 
Making Claims about Heredity at the Opening of the Twentieth 
Century 
 
But I am horribly afraid of pure mathematicians with no experimental training. Consider 
Pearson. He speaks of the curve of frontal breadths, tabulated in the report, as being a 
disgraceful approximation to a normal curve…. This skew curve fits the dozen 
observations at the two ends better than a normal curve; it fits the rest of the curve, 
including 90% of the observations, worse. Now this sort of thing is always being done by 
Pearson, and by any ‘pure’ mathematicians. —Frank Weldon to Francis Galton87 
 
The development of mathematical methods by Professor Karl Pearson and a few others 
promised for a time the key to the riddles of evolution. This moveent, led by a pure 
mathematician, developed a series of beautiful methods for the mathematical analysis of 
data and the comparison of variations. These methods are of the greatest importance 
when rightly used. –George Shull on Karl Pearson88 
 
 
With his arguments in Natural Inheritance, Galton initiated the development of a 
mathematical theory of inheritance and variation that drew on the principles of the error 
curve and employed statistical methodology for gathering and describing biological 
phenomena in populations. This approach to heredity was adopted by a small but 
important group of young natural researchers in the last decade of the nineteenth century 
who began to use the error curve to invent and support arguments about the nature of 
variation, evolution, and heredity.  
 During this period, three of Galton’s most notable disciples—Karl Pearson (1857 
– 1936), William Bateson (1861-1926), and Frank Weldon (1860-1906)—increased the 
number of biological phenomena investigated using Galton’s techniques and developed 
novel mathematical applications for biological research. While Bateson and Weldon 
represented a new breed of biologist who adopted the tools of statistics and probability in 
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their efforts to understand biological phenomena, Karl Pearson was an even rarer 
creature: a mathematician interested in biology for the sake of expanding mathematical 
applications. Inspired by the efforts of Weldon and Galton to apply statistics and 
probability to biological phenomena, Pearson developed not only new statistical tools for 
graphically describing variation and evolution but also a nvel biometric theory of 
heredity based primarily on the principles of the error curve and correlation.  
This chapter investigates two important rhetorical issues: 1) to what extent 
mathematics was accepted by biologists studying variation, ev lution, and heredity in the 
last decade of the nineteenth century, as a legitimate source for arguments about these 
organic phenomena? And 2) to what degree was the acceptability of a mathematical line 
of argument contingent on the acceptability of a pre-existing biological line of 
argumentation? In this chapter, I will make the case that during the last decade of the 
nineteenth century there was a general feeling in the biological community that the 
biological arguments from the special topics of probability and statistics developed by 
Galton in the previous decade were legitimate sources for arguments about variation, 
evolution, and heredity. In addition, I will argue that though mathematically informed 
arguments were generally accepted, the acceptance of a particular line of argument from 
mathematics depended on the audience’s willingness to accept the biological model upon 








 While Francis Galton is considered the conceptual father of biometry, Karl 
Pearson might be best described as its first radical disciple. With his zealous, some would 
say single-minded, efforts and considerable mathematical talents, he became a major 
force, along with Frank Weldon, in developing and promoting he use of mathematical 
models to describe the action of evolution in populations of organisms.   
In recent years Pearson and his work have been getting more attention from 
historical scholars because of their importance in initiating the development of a 
mathematically rigorous program of statistical biology in the early twentieth century. In 
the first extensive biography of Karl Pearson, Theodore Porter suggests that Pearson’s 
drive to expand the purview of mathematics to include biological phenomena was 
influenced by his belief in the humanist ideal of the broad pursuit of knowledge and his 
opinion that a broad base of theoretical knowledge could serve as a source of inspiration 
for finding solutions to practical problems. His belief in humanist education and the 
importance of theoretical knowledge is evident in the range of his interests in his 
formative college years, in his later work as a teacher, and in his contributions to the 
physical and biological sciences.  
In his years as a student and youthful traveler (1875-80), Pearson’s activities 
indicate his multi-faceted interest in language, culture, politics, and literature as well as a 
focused attention on the study of mathematics. From early on, Pearson was encouraged to 
study mathematics by his father William Pearson.89 I  1875, before he was even admitted 
to college, his father hired a famous tutor, E.J. Routh, to prepare Karl for competition in 
the prestigious Cambridge mathematical Tripos, a grueling nine-day mathematical 
                                               
89 A prominent lawyer who garnered the title of “Queen’s Council” in 1875. (Porter 16)  
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examination whose winner garnered perhaps the highest academi pr stige that could be 
bestowed on an undergraduate at Cambridge (Porter 22, 40).  
Though Pearson’s father focused Karl’s ambitions on mathematics, Karl directed 
his own energy into the study of the humanities, especially literature. In1877 he began a 
commonplace book in which he included commentaries on many of the authors he was 
reading including Shelley, Rousseau, Voltaire, and his favorite, Goethe (27). Porter 
argues that these choices were most likely influenced by the friendship that had 
developed between the young student and the celebrated English literary figure, Oscar 
Browning.  
Pearson’s pleasure reading and his relationship with Browning, according to 
Porter, moved his interests toward German philosophy, most i portantly the 
phenomenological philosophy of Ernst Mach. In the summer of 1877, Pearson traveled 
with Browning to France and Germany. In the year following his return, Pearson read 
heavily in German philosophy and began sharing his opinions openly on German 
philosophy and literature with fellow students Robert Parker, John Lawrence Green, and 
Edwin Cooper Perry. Based on his regular conversations with his fellow students, 
Pearson began to develop a “Teutonic metaphysical idealism” which, Porter explains, 
joined a search for individual meaning with a growing social concern for improving the 
lot of the laboring poor (Porter 33).  
Despite his blossoming interest in literature, philosophy, and all things German, 
Pearson continued to grind away at his mathematical studie  to prepare himself for the 
Tripos. After nine grueling days of examinations in the bitter cold of January 1879, he 
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finished third in the competition. His unsuccessful bid for the position of top 
mathematical wrangler left Pearson bitter and filled with self doubt.  
Harboring feelings of failure and resentment and tired of the narrowness of study 
that he had been confined to in preparing for the Tripos, Pearson used the first year of his 
fellowship award from the exam to fund a year of study in Germany. There, he pursued 
the political, philosophical, historical and literary interests he had been developing but 
had not been free to fully explore (42).  
On returning to England, Pearson engaged in a busy academic lif  which reflected 
his varied humanistic pursuits. He lectured and wrote on subjects ranging from 
mathematical physics to German history, politics, and philosophy. From 1880 to 1884, he 
gave lectures at King’s College London on German culture, folklore, and history. His 
writing and lectures focused primarily on the German Middle Ages and the effect of 
Martin Luther and the Reformation on German Medieval society (Provine 27). 
At the same time he was lecturing about German history and culture, Pearson also 
returned seriously to the study of mathematics. His interes  was in mathematical physics 
which used the mathematics of known physical phenomena, such a  the action of springs 
and pulleys, to make arguments concerning the activity of unobservable physical 
phenomena such as the movement of electricity, molecules, etc. (The model for such 
applications was James Clerk Maxwell—who had scored second in the Tripos behind 
Routh the year he took the exam.)  
Pearson’s main source of interest was in the mathematics of the ether, a semi-
elastic substance within which all molecules were supposed by some theorists to be 
suspended and which reacted to their physical movements by telegraphing mechanical 
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waves across space. In his ether theories describing attraction and repulsion between 
matter, Pearson took the position that these phenomena could be described by 
mathematical models based on the harmonious pulsation of atoms within the elastic ether 
(Porter 187).  
Although the content of Pearson’s pulsating atom theory was generally dismissed 
by molecular theorists, his work exhibits important philosophical predispositions which 
are important to understanding his later arguments about heredity. First, it shows his 
predisposition to see natural phenomena in terms of existing physical principles or 
models. In the case of atoms and ether, for example, Pearson believed that their actions 
could be described from the point of view of the physics of elasticity. Second, it reveals a 
tendency to invent and develop arguments about natural phenomena at first exclusively 
from the principles and operations of mathematics and then only later to test through 
observation whether the mathematical description is supported by empirical evidence. 
This approach to developing theories of natural phenomena was recognized in Pearson’s 
physical theories and criticized by George Gabriel Stokes, Lucasian Professor of 
Mathematics at Cambridge. In an 1884 letter to Pearson, Stkes warns him that his 
calculations of the spectra for polyatomic molecules ba ed on the pulsating atom theory 
would not hold up when compared to actual observations in spectral analysis (187).  
Though his physical mathematical theories never got off the ground, Pearson’s 
knowledge of and skill with mathematics earned him a position in 1884 as professor of 
applied mathematics in the Department of Mechanics and Applied Mathematics at 
University College London. In his capacity as an educator, he continued to follow the 
same philosophical line that he had in his work with physical mathematics, that 
 
201 
theoretical mathematics was a crucial first step in developing a better understanding of 
actual physical phenomena.  
At the same time that Pearson was teaching engineers, he was laboring over the 
manuscript of The Grammar of Science (1892), a text whose purposes were to critique 
the fundamental goals of science and to reconstruct the ra ional principles of proper 
scientific methodology. Predictably Pearsonian in its theory-first approach to the topic,   
the text introduces some important elements of Pearson’s philosophy, particularly his 
belief that causation does not exist and his opinion about the future of the biological 
sciences.  
Pearson’s rejection of causation has important ramificat ons for his approach to 
heredity. Primarily, it encouraged him to adopt a probabilistic vision of natural 
phenomena. This conceptualization explains in part why his vision of heredity was so 
tightly associated with the probabilistic law of error. Of cause he writes,  
 
 Scientifically, cause, as originating or enforcing a particular sequence of 
perceptions, is meaningless—we have no experience of anything that originates or 
enforces something else. Cause, however, used to make a stage in a routine, is a 
clear and valuable conception, which throws the idea of cause entirely into the 
field of sense-impressions, into the sphere where we can re son and reach 




Cause, in this sense, is a stage in a routine of experienc , a d not one in a routine 
of inherent necessity. Causation, says John Stuart Mill, is uniform antecedence, 
and this definition is perfectly in accord with the scientific concept. (156)  
 
 Here Pearson explains that we cannot accept the classical notion of “cause” 
because we cannot witness one thing causing another at the most fundamental level. All 
we can observe, he explains is a sequence of stages in a routine. We can infer a 
relationship between these stages over the course of many observations which tells us 
whether those events occur in the same sequence over many instances. (In this sense, 
“cause” can be understood as an observed event which, in most instances, usually 
precedes another observable event.)  
This type of inference is best made using the mathematics of a posteriori 
probability which allows the user to calculate the probability of a future event, in this 
case the probability of a particular sequence happening again, based on past observations 
of this sequence.  
 
Yet the only supposition that we appear to have made is this: that, knowing 
nothing of nature, routine and anomy90 are to be considered as equally likely to 
occur. Now, we were not really justified in making even this assumption, for it 
involves a knowledge we do not possess regarding nature. We use our experience 
of the constitution and action of coins in general to assert that heads and tails are 
equally probable, but we have no right to assert before experience that, as we 
                                               




know nothing of nature, routine and breach of routine are equally probable. (The 
Grammar of Science (1892), 172-73)  
 
In addition to providing evidence of Pearson’s belief in the importance of 
probability to understanding natural phenomena, the Grammar of Science also provides 
further proof of Pearson’s tendency to see all phenomena in terms of theoretical 
mathematics. Just as he developed a theory of molecular forces and hoped to develop a 
study of engineering that involved mathematically describable physical forces, Pearson 
argues in the Grammar for a mathematical theory of biology based on the same 
theoretical mathematics applied to bridges and atoms.   
 
If we look upon biology as a conceptual description of organic phenomena, then 
nearly all of the statements we have made with regard to physics will serve as 
cannons for determining the validity of biological ideas. In particular, any 
biological concept will be scientifically valid if it enables us to briefly summarize 
without internal contradiction any range of our perceptual experience. (395)   
 
 Pearson’s belief that the approach of the physical sciences could be used to 
understand biological phenomena was so strong that he concludes the final chapter of The 
Grammar, “The Classification of the Sciences,” by proposing a new branch of science in 
which the methodology of the physical sciences would be applied to the study of 




A branch of science is therefore needed dealing with the application of the laws of 
inorganic phenomena, or Physics, to the development of organic forms….  
 Thus just as Applied Mathematics links Abstract Science to the Physical 
Sciences, so Bio-physics attempts to link the Physical and the Biological Sciences 
together. (470)  
 
The importance of probability to Pearson’s scientific rationale in the Grammar of 
Science and his belief that the techniques and mathematics used in the physical sciences 
could be applied to the biological sciences provide a theoretical backdrop from which to 
understand the importance of mathematics, particularly p obability, as a source for 
invention for arguments about heredity.  
 
On the Road to Biometry (1893-96) 
 
Although graphical calculation, scientific theory, probability, and biology may 
have initially been independent elements within Person’s spectrum of interests, these 
elements began to coalesce in the early 1890s into a single u ified approach to the study 
of variation. The coalescence began in 1890 when Pearson was appointed the Gresham 
Chair of Geometry at Gresham College. As a professor at G esham, he was responsible 
for giving twelve one-hour public lectures a year delivered on four consecutive days from 
Tuesday to Friday during Michaelmas, Easter, and Hilary terms (Magnello, “Karl 
Pearson’s Gresham…,” 47). In Pearson’s Gresham lectures from 1891 to 1894, he 
presents two series, one on scientific theory and another n the error curve and graphical 
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statistics, the latter of which culminates in a geometrical statistical presentation on the 
process of evolution.  
In the second set of lectures on “The Geometry of Statistics” (1891-92), Pearson 
discussed graphical statistics, the application of geometry to statistical data (Porter 236). 
In 1891 he discussed death rates and used the graphical statistic  presented in the 
previous lecture to measure variation from the mean. Lecturing the next year on the same 
subject he introduced the concept of standard deviation. In combination these lectures on 
graphical statistics, mortality, and standard deviation present the fundamental concepts 
and techniques which prepared his audience for his Gresham Lectures of 1893-94 which 
present new mathematical methods for describing bimodal and skewed curves, one 
example of which had come to his attention through the statistical work of the biologist 
Frank Weldon. It is this lecture that marks the beginning of Pearson’s foray into 
biometrics.  
 
Weldon and Pearson  
 
Frank Raphael Weldon (1860-1906) was a zoologist whose primary inte est was 
in the evolution of marine fauna. He had graduated from Ca bridge in 1881 and was 
made a lecturer in invertebrate morphology in 1884. During the earliest period of his 
research, Weldon worked on developing Darwin’s theory of ev lution through the study 
of morphology and embryology, but he met with no substantial success. After reading 
Galton’s Natural Inheritance in 1889, however, he decided to test the validity of Galton’s 
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proposition that variation distributes according to the law of errors within a population 
(Magnello, “Karl Pearson’s Gresham…,” 50).  
In May of 1889, he and his wife Florence began collecting measur ments of the 
carapace91 length of adult female common shrimp Cragon vulgaris at Plymouth in 
Cornwall and Southport in Lancashire.92 After corresponding with Galton for help with 
the mathematics, Weldon was finally able to confirm with his shrimp data that Galton’s 
argument for the regular distribution of traits was not only true for each separate shrimp 
population, but also that it was true across all of the populations collected. He published 
his results under the title, “The Variations Occurring i  Certain Decapod Crustaceans. I. 
Cragon vulgaris” in the Proceedings of the Royal Society in 1890. 
 In addition to measuring the variation in shrimp, Weldon had also calculated the 
value of correlation between different organs, the degree to which changes in one organ 
were connected with changes in another. He found a significant correlation across organs 
in all the samples, meaning that when the measure of one organ changed the measure of 
the other organ with which it was compared changed as well and to the same degree 
across all samples. This meant that no matter what the size of the shrimp the relations of 
their organs remained the same.  
 Weldon’s work on variation and correlation in shrimp provided further empirical 
confirmation of Galton’s theory and encouraged him to do more exploration. Weldon’s 
next subjects were shore crabs Carcinus moenas. He collected 23 measurements from 
two sets of 1000 female crabs, the first from Plymouth sound and then, in the spring of 
1892, a second set from female crabs of the same species in the Bay of Naples. Of the 23 
                                               
91 The protective back plate of the shrimp.    
 
92 He also enlisted the help of a friend in Sheerness nar the Mouth of the Thames to collect samples. 
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characters measured, all but one distributed normally. However, this one exception 
provided an interesting case which Weldon believed might indicate the presence of a new 
type in the crab population (Magnello 50).      
What he found in his analysis of the frontal measurements of crab shells, was that 
the curve describing the population was bimodal, double humped, rather than a single 
hump distributed around one mean which was expected for the data. This discovery 
engendered excitement in Weldon because a second mean might indicate a new stable 
type or “sport” as Galton called it. He also, however, b lieved that it could represent the 
confluence of two distinct races. With these possibilities in mind, he wrote Galton, 
“Apart from any arithmetical analysis, I tried to draw inside it two “Curves of Error” 
whose sum might represent the observed distribution farly well…. Either Naples is the 
meeting point of two distinct races or a “sport” is in the process of establishment” 
(Weldon to Galton 27 Nov. 1892 quoted in Magnello 51).  
In order to prove mathematically that either possibility existed, however, it was 
necessary to isolate the smaller aberrant mean and find the distribution of the 
characteristics around it. At some point following the spring of 1892, Weldon turned to 
Pearson for advice about how these calculations might be made. Pearson suggested that a 
more precise result could be found using a process called curve fitting in which the 
original values of the data were reevaluated using multiple smaller curves which more 
precisely followed the contours of the data. Pearson worked on the data for all of the 
summer of 1893. According to his results, the two humps in the curve divided nicely into 
two normally distributed curves which he believed revealed th  existence of variation as 
a result of natural selection in the population (52).    
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From the results of these efforts, Pearson became enthused about the possibility of 
a purely mathematical approach to the issue of evolutionary variation. His excitement is 
clear in his notes for his Gresham lectures in 1893 in which e writes,   
 
We are living in an essentially critical period of science, when more exact 
methods and more sound logic… [are] replacing the old ‘scientific gospel’…. For 
the first time in the history of biology, there is a chance of the science of life 
becoming an exact, a mathematical science. Men are approaching the question of 
heredity and evolution from a new standpoint. (quoted in Porter 237-38) 
 
 In his November 21 and 22 lectures on probability and the normal curve, Pearson 
used Weldon’s work to discuss the potential usefulness of statistics in solving the 
problems of evolution, to dispute the ubiquity of the normal distribution in nature, and to 
discuss his own methods of curve fitting to deal with skewed and bimodal curves. In the 
text of his November 21 lecture he writes, “Symmetry is by no means universally the 
case…. The keynote to the most interesting and valuable problems in evolution lies in the 
non-symmetry of the frequency curves corresponding to the measurements of special 
organs in animals” (quoted in Magnello 54)). After this statement, he introduces curve 
fitting for symmetrical and asymmetrical distributions. 
In Pearson’s writings and Gresham lectures, it is possible to witness the 
confluence of different strands of his research from graphical calculation to scientific 
theory and the influence of the statistical work in biology on the direction of these 
combined interests. In the work of Frank Weldon, Pearson fou d the data he needed to 
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illustrate (and, perhaps, even to provide exigence for) his theoretical work with non-
normal and asymmetrical curves. It also provided him with an opportunity to make 
claims about biological processes based on statistical modeling. Though Pearson by no 
means spent the majority of his time in the latter part of the decade working exclusively 
on developing biometric theories, he did devote a substantial mount of it on developing 
mathematical models to describe heredity and evolution. This work, initiated by his 
contact with Weldon, was instrumental in setting him on a path towards developing the 
mathematical theory of heredity which is the subject of this investigation.   
 
Oil and Water?  
 
Although Pearson may not have been as excited about the biological ramifications 
of Weldon’s findings as he was about their providing him with material for new methods 
of graphical statistics, Galton was certainly impressed with Weldon’s results. Galton’s 
interest in Weldon’s work and Weldon’s need for funding to continue it encouraged 
Galton to call for the formation of a committee to support statistical research on plants 
and animals. On January 18, 1894, with Galton as the committee chair, and Frank 
Weldon as secretary, the “Committee for Conducting Statistical Inquiries into the 
Measurable Characteristics of Plants and Animals” was founded under the charter of the 
Royal Society for the purpose of funding statistical research regarding questions of 
evolution and inheritance (Gillham 299). 
Initially, Pearson was not a member of the committee; however, his work with 
Weldon and his zealous support of a mathematical approach to evolution won him a place 
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on it late in the year of 1896. In the next year, the committee was expanded even further 
and renamed “The Evolutionary Committee of the Royal Society” at Galton’s request 
(300).   
The reasons for Galton’s 1897 expansion and renaming of thecommittee appear 
to be two-fold. On the one hand, it was a way of bringing more traditional practitioners of 
biology into the group. This move expanded the committee’s br adth and credibility by 
including, along with biologists doing statistical research, biologists employing 
traditional methods of qualitative observation and experimntation. On the other hand, 
the group’s expansion helped to add to the committee researchers w ose philosophy of 
variation was more in line with the position supported by Galton. Whereas members of 
the committee, particularly Weldon and Pearson, held that variation was predominantly 
continuous, i.e. that it accreted in small increments over time, Galton believed that it was 
predominantly the result of discontinuous variation, i.e. that variation was massive and 
appeared suddenly. (Neither group disagreed with the other about the existence of both 
types of variation, only about the degree of importance one or the other had to the 
development of varieties and species.) 
One of the new members added was William Bateson (1861-1926), a Cambridge 
graduate, an early practitioner of the statistical approach to biology, and an ardent 
promoter of the theory of discontinuous variation. Bateson was a one-time friend of 
Weldon with whom he had had a falling out because of their constant conflict about the 
preeminence of continuous or discontinuous variation in speciation. Bateson began to 
develop his theory of discontinuous variation in 1891 articulating it in an article written 
by himself and his sister Anna Bateson entitled “On the Variations in Floral Symmetry of 
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Certain Plants Having Irregular Corollas” in the Journal of the Linnean Society. In this 
article they are cautious not to dismiss the reality and importance of continuous variation; 
however, they do question the assumption that continuous variation is the only or even 
primary source for variation in natural forms (Punett 158-59).   
 In the next year, the same year that Weldon gathered and examined his data on 
crabs, Bateson published “Some Cases of Variation in Secondary Sexual Characteristics 
Statistically Examined,” in the Proceedings of the Zoological Society in which he 
presents statistical evidence for the bimodal distribution of characters in the forceps on 
earwigs (Forficula auricularia) and in the horns on stag beetles (Xylotrupes gideon). This 
work, with results stunningly similar to those published by Weldon in the following year, 
was, however, different in the sense that it made explicit claims that the bimodal curve 
was evidence of discontinuous variation. Though Weldon does write to Galton that his 
data might be evidence of the existence of a “sport,” nowhere does he suggest in his 
discussion of his data, as Bateson does, that his statistical evidence gives support to a 
theory of discontinuous variation. Bateson, on the othr hand, takes a clear position on 
the matter.  
 
In the common language of naturalists, the facts of this case [the forceps on 
earwigs] suggest that there is, for some wholly unknown reason, a dimorphism 
among males of these earwigs, maintained though all live tog ther….  
For the present we are content to recognize that in this case of the earwig 
there is evidence of a definite and partially discontinuous variation in respect of a 




 Despite any philosophical differences there may have been tween Weldon and 
Bateson about the nature of variation, Pearson saw Weldon’s crab curves and Bateson’s 
earwig curves as statistically similar and included both of t em as examples of bimodal 
curves in the printed abstract of his paper “Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of 
Evolution” (1893). He writes, “Such abnormal curves arise particularly in biological 
measurements; they have been found by Professor Weldon, for the measurement of a 
particular organ in crabs, by Mr. Thomson for prawns, by Mr. Bateson for earwigs” 
(Pearson, “Mathematical Contributions,” 329-30).    
Though their data might have distributed in the same way, B teson makes it very 
clear in his major work, Materials for the Study of Variation (1894), that he supports a 
strict theory of discontinuous variation. In Materials, Bateson catalogues facts about 
variation in specific organisms and speculates about the nature of variation based on 
these collections of facts. He argues that the evidence supports his claims 1) that 
discontinuous variation exists, 2) that this variation has its source within the organism, 
and 3) that this type of variation is not a product of natural selection.93  He writes, “The 
discontinuity, of which species is an expression, has its origin not in the environment nor 
in any phenomenon of adaptation, but in the intrinsic nature of organisms themselves, 
manifested in the original discontinuity of variation” (Materials 567).   
 Once he has sufficiently argued for the existence of discontinuous variation and 
its likely role in speciation, Bateson concludes the text with a discussion about the 
methods whereby these issues might be further explored and cl rified. He argues in favor 
                                               
93 Though Bateson makes the case that discontinuous variation exists and that it plays the seminal role in 
speciation, he does not dismiss the existence of continuous variation.  
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of a continued program of gathering statistical data on discontinuous variations; however, 
he explains that this program should not be purely observational but should rely also on 
experimental breeding to direct or limit the scope of the data set: “The only way in which 
we may hope to get the truth is by the organization of systematic experiments in 
breeding, a class of research that calls perhaps for more patience and more resources than 
any other form of biological inquiry” (574).  
  As an indirect critique of Bateson’s book, Weldon published “Remarks on 
Variations in Plants and Animals” in the Proceedings of the Royal Society. In this paper, 
Weldon makes two things clear about his position on variation. First, he explains that the 
only way evolution can be profitably examined is through the use of statistics. This 
examination includes knowing the distribution of values for a particular trait around the 
mean as well as the frequency of the birth or death rate of organisms within the 
population for different values within this distribution. Second, understanding evolution 
does not require an understanding of heredity. Weldon believes it is not necessary, or 
perhaps even possible, to know how organisms vary between gen rations. All we need to 
know is the magnitude of a particular character for each generation and the difference 
between magnitudes across generations to show the rate of variation.  
 
It is to be observed that numerical data… contain all the information necessary for 
a knowledge of the direction and rate of evolution. Knowi g that a given 
deviation from the mean character is associated with a gre ter or less percentage 
death rate in the animals possessing it, the importance of such a deviation can be 
estimated without the necessity of inquiring how that increase or decrease in the 
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death rate was brought about…. In the same way a theory of the mechanism of 
heredity is not necessary in order to measure the abnormality of an offspring 
associated with a given parental abnormality. (“Remarks” 381)  
 
 In these words, Weldon clarifies the difference betwen his and Bateson’s 
position. Bateson believes that it is possible to find the source of variation within the 
organism. Weldon feels that all the necessary information about variation can be gathered 
statistically from the outward measure of characters. Because the source of variation for 
Bateson is internal, knowledge of heredity from experimental breeding provides the best 
route for understanding variation. For Weldon, the examin tion of heredity is a waste of 
time. He does not need to know the cause of variation to examine its effects on 
differential survival.  
 The differences between these two biologists are important to understanding the 
position taken by Pearson in his hereditary arguments and the arguments presented 
against his position. By the time Pearson makes his case for inheritance, he has been 
working with Weldon closely for ten years; therefore, it is no surprise that his 
mathematical model of heredity is informed by Weldon’s biological assumptions. In fact, 
Pearson’s hereditary argument is actually a defense of Weldon’s model in that it provides 
a theory of heredity which characterizes the phenomenon as simple and mechanical and, 
therefore, unworthy of detailed scrutiny. This exigence explains in part why Pearson 





The Biometrik Response  
 
Given the animosity that developed between Weldon and Bateson over their 
biological theories in the years following the formation of the “Committee for 
Conducting Statistical Inquiries into the Measurable Characteristics of Plants and 
Animals,” it was no surprise that despite Galton’s good intentions to bring traditional 
biologists, mathematicians, and quantitatively inclined biologists together, the resulting 
combination was a disastrous mix. What was initially a difficult marriage between the 
two groups became by 1899 a completely untenable situation. According to historian 
William Provine, under the impression that Galton, the lynch pin that was holding the 
group together, had changed his position on the importance of th study of heredity 
mechanisms by accepting Pearson’s revision of his law of ancestral heredity, Bateson, 
through some skillful maneuvering, attempted to turn the interests of the committee 
towards a program of plant and animal breeding (Provine 54).  
Realizing that the committee had become untenable, Galton, Pearson, and Weldon 
all resigned in January of 1900 in the hopes that the committee would collapse. Through 
some shrewd political wrangling, however, Bateson garnered enough support to keep it 
from folding. As a result, the committee was completely dominated by Bateson and his 
supporters much to the chagrin of Pearson who later wrote tha  their “capture of the 
committee was skillful and entirely successful” (Gillham 307). 
 Angered by Bateson’s success in getting control over the evolutionary committee 
and turning it towards breeding, a of type investigation that Weldon felt was profitless, 
Weldon set out, with the firm backing of Pearson and auxili ry support from Galton, to 
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establish a conduit for their descriptive statistical investigations of biological phenomena. 
To create a conduit for their biological work, they founded the journal Biometrika in 
1901. It’s purpose according to Pearson’s opening editorial, “The Scope of Biometrika,” 
was to, “serve as a means not only of collecting under on  title biological data of a kind 
not systematically collected or published in any other periodical, but also of spreading a 
knowledge of such statistical theory as may be requisite for their scientific treatment” 
(“The Scope of Biometrika” 1).  
 Although the opening lines of Pearson’s editorial seem to represent some 
common-sense goals of gathering data and developing a statistical approach to biological 
questions, further reading reveals that Biometrika was also intended to support a more 
radical platform for the development of a new mathematical biology guided exclusively 
in its investigations of evolution and heredity by the principles and practices of 
mathematics, especially statistics and probability. In the second section of the editorial 
entitled “The Spirit of Biometrika,” Pearson expresses his views that biometrics must be 
focused solely on a mathematical solution to the questions of evolution, variation, and 
heredity. 
 
Whatever views we hold on selection, inheritance, or fertility, we must ultimately 
turn to the mathematics of large numbers, to the theory of mass phenomena, to 
interpret safely our observations. As we cannot follow the growth of nations 
without statistics of birth, death, duration of life, marriage and fertility, so it is 
impossible to follow the changes of any type of life without its vital statistics. The 
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evolutionist has to become in the widest sense of the words a registrar-general for 
all forms of life. (“The Spirit of Biometrika” 3)    
 
In his mission to create an exclusively statistical domain in the study of evolution, 
variation, and heredity, Pearson hoped to reach two different audiences. He makes the 
dual nature of his audience clear in his description of the statistical scientific enterprise 
which included both biologists and mathematicians. 
 
The biologist may find in our pages algebraic analysis which may repel him. We 
would still ask his attention for the general conclusions a d for the formulae 
reached by the mathematician. The biologist will find that they frequently suggest 
observations and experiments which he alone is in position to undertake 
satisfactorily. We shall aid the more arithmetical part of his work by diagrams and 
numerical tables wherever it seems possible. In this manner we hope that 
Biometrika will provide for both branches of science; that it will not only publish 
valuable biometric and statistical researches, but serve as a storehouse of unsolved 
problems for both unemployed biologist and mathematician. (5-6) 
 
As in his earlier days working with engineers and with physical mathematics, this 
characterization of the relationship between the mathematician and the scientist suggests 
a hierarchical relationship with mathematics and the mathematician at the top. In this 
scheme, the mathematician’s job is to come up with formulae and to reach general 
conclusions which then suggest the type of data to be coll cted and the subject and 
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manner of experimentation to be carried out by the biologist—which is exactly what the 
rhetorical topoi do. According to this biometric vision, scien e becomes the process of 
developing and testing mathematical theory through the coll cti n of data.  
 Although Biometrika had been founded as a safe place for Weldon and Pearson to 
present their statistical-biological work, it was not the only outlet for Pearson’s efforts. In 
fact, Pearson had been publishing mathematical papers based on biological examples in 
the series “Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of Evolution” in section A of The 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, the section devoted to mathematics, 
since 1893 and continued to publish there until 1904. At first, the ti les of these papers 
reveal that the primary topics of discussion were either e new statistical tools used in 
biological investigations or new statistical procedures that could be developed to analyze 
statistical problems presented by biological data. In 1895, however, the goal of some of 
these papers began to change including titles suggesting that they were written to 
establish biological principles to support the mathematical models applied to biological 
phenomena. The appearance of these new titles seems to be a response to a new conflict 
within the statistical committee itself between Galton and Pearson/Weldon over whether 
the continuous accretion of variation was sufficient to supply the larger variations which 
could be acted upon by natural selection to create new varieties and species (Provine 35). 
 With the rediscovery of Mendel’s work at the turn of the century and the 
development of Hugo de Vries’ theory of mutation in the same year, the pressure on the 
Darwinians to defend their theory of variation by small steps mounted. In particular, it 
was necessary for them to prove that most variation was both regular and small. It had to 
be small; otherwise, it would be considered discontinuous. It also had to be regular. In 
 
219 
order to measure and compare variation to show the direction and magnitude of evolution 
using statistics, the variation measured had to be uniform ac oss the population and 
change predictably from one generation to the next. If the variation was too haphazard 
either within or between generations, then no available mathematical modeling could 
apply.  
In addition, Weldon and Pearson had to defend their position that their model was 
sufficient to explain evolution. This position was challenged by both Bateson and Galton 
who made the case that small variations would be swamped or blended away in 
subsequent breeding and, therefore, would never accumulate sfficiently to be acted upon 
by evolution. Only radical large changes created by the appearance of stable ‘sports’ 
could serve as the material for selection.  
Realizing that their mathematical model of heredity was being seriously 
challenged, both Weldon and Pearson began to shore up their defenses. Weldon took on 
Mendel’s work in his paper “Mendel’s Laws of Alternative nheritance in Peas” making 
the case that Mendel’s results did not take into account the inherited contributions of 
remote ancestry. Pearson, on the other hand, took on aspects of Galton’s work in part 
nine of his series “Mathematical Contributions to the Thory of Evolution” in an article 
entitled “On the Principle of Homotyposis and its relation to Heredity.” In this article, 
Pearson proposes a theory of heredity which challenges Galton’s belief that heredity is a 
process of selection and combination which takes place inside the organism. Though both 
Weldon’s and Pearson’s arguments are important to the debate, Pearson’s is of greater 
interest here because it is directly involved with supporting the mathematical model 
developed by himself and Weldon using arguments from the special topics of the error 
 
220 
curve. Also, Pearson’s communications with Bateson regarding this publication reveal 
the importance of mathematics to establishing the credibility of scientific arguments.  
 
Homotyposis and Heredity 
 
 In Pearson’s homotyposis paper, he proposes a model of h redity in which 
variation in organisms is the result of external and random phenomena which alter the 
reproductive material when it is produced. This particular vision of heredity supports his 
and Weldon’s statistical Darwinian model in which variations had to be small and 
regular. At the same time, it challenged Galton’s conception of variation as an internal 
process driven by selection and combination. 
 In order to make the case for the minuteness and regulaity of variation, Pearson 
argues for the existence of hypothetical organs called homotypes or undifferentiated like 
organs which by definition vary regularly and minutely within a generation and from one 
generation to the next according to the law of error. Pearson’s choice of the phrase 
“undifferentiated like organ” to describe this central phenomenon is unfortunate in that it 
appears at first glance either contradictory or unnecessarily redundant. Though Pearson 
himself is, “fully conscious of the verbal difficulty of the phrase,” he nonetheless 
believes that the distinction between differentiated an  undifferentiated is mathematically 
clear (Pearson, “On the Principle of Homotyposis,” 287). Essentially, the difference 
between these two phenomena is in their source and graphical distribution. An 
undifferentiated population is homogeneous and distributes according to the law of errors 
symmetrically around a single mean. A differentiated population, on the other hand, is by 
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definition heterogeneous and does not distribute normally around a single mean, like 
Weldon’s crabs. Because it is made up of two or more populations of types with different 
means, its values will distribute multimodally with humps around each of the means of 
the population types mixed in the sample (287).  
According to this explanation two things can be said about undifferentiated like 
organs. First, because they distribute according to the law of errors, their variation is the 
result of a large number of small, unknown influences. Scond, we know that they are all 
essentially expressions of some true value. The former point is explicitly stated by 
Pearson when he writes, “variability in ‘undifferentiated like organs’ is not to be 
associated with any one or two dominating factors which could be isolated, it is due to 
that combination of many small causes, inherent and environmental, which leads to… a 
homogeneous chance distribution” (287). The latter point is made in his use of the word 
“like” in the phrase “undifferentiated like organs.” What he means by this term is that the 
organ being described is produced from a single non-variable mold or true value. He 
makes this point when he writes:  
 
I shall call undifferentiated like organs homotypes indicating that they are types 
produced by the same mold or individual. Thus two leaves of the same tree or two 
blood corpuscles from the same frog are homotypes; their resemblance will be 
homotypic, and the character by which their resemblance is quantitatively 




Pearson’s model of similarity and variation in terms of replication and error meets 
the criteria for supporting the mathematical practices and models that he and Weldon 
developed to make their case for continuous variation. First, the process is regular in the 
sense that a feature is struck from the same mold and tht the variation which affects it 
can be described by an error distribution. This allows the results to be mathematically 
rendered and makes variation subject to the principles of the law of error. Second, it 
keeps variation small which is a necessary criterion of Darwin’s model.   
Once Pearson has argued for the existence of organs whosefeatures meet the 
specifications of his and Weldon’s model variation, he goes on to make the case that 
heredity and variation can be understood in terms of the variations found in like “organs” 
in a single individual. In order to make the connection betwe n undifferentiated like 
organs and heredity/variation, he first argues that the sperm and ovum are 
undifferentiated like organs: “But turning to the process of reproduction, the offspring 
depend on the parental germs, and it would thus seem that the degree of resemblance 
between offspring must depend on the variability of the sperm cells which may be fairly 
considered “undifferentiated like organs” (“On the Principle of Homotyposis” 287-88). 
Then he argues that if the sperm and ovum are considered undifferentiated like organs, 
the process by which they vary must be the same process by which undifferentiated like 
organs vary: “Inheritance will not be a peculiar feature of reproductive cells…. If this 
view be correct, variability is not a peculiarity of sexual reproduction, it is something 
peculiar to the production of undifferentiated like organs in the individual, and the 
problems of heredity must largely turn on how the resemblance between such organs is 
modified” (288).     
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Based on Pearson’s assumptions that sperm and ovum are undiff re tiated like 
organs and that the process of their production is the sam as the production of 
undifferentiated like organs, it is possible to understand the similarities and differences 
between Galton’s model of heredity and Pearson’s. In one important way, both Galton 
and Pearson’s models are the same. They both hold that chance plays an important role in 
variation and, as a result, that the error curve can be used to describe it. The difference 
between the two, however, is how chance influences heredita y outcomes. For Galton a 
large number of unknown causes influence the selection of traits from a pool of available 
features, the influence of this selection being evident mostarkedly in the normal 
distribution of traits which blend.  
Unlike Galton, however, Pearson holds that the action of chance on reproduction 
does not operate on the selection of internal characters during fertilization. Instead, 
chance acts in the production of undifferentiated like organs,  process which can be 
analogized to a factory production line. Like a factory, the body of the male or the female 
produces either sperm or ovum from the same mold. During the process of production, 
however, many small unknown influences affect the replication creating slight variations 
in the sperm and ovum produced. These variations are then coll ctively passed on to 
offspring.94 As a result, the variability observable in the phenotype of the offspring has its 
source not in the characters inherent in the sperm or ovum r their combination, but 
rather in errors during the replication of these undifferentiated like organs.  
Once Pearson has argued that the sperm and the ovum are ndiff rentiated like 
organs and that the hereditary process is the reproductin of undifferentiated like organs, 
                                               
94 Pearson assumes that the contributions of each of theparents are equal and blend together during most 
instances of reproduction.  
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he has to provide sufficient evidence to support his case. He believes that if he can show 
both mathematically and empirically that the correlation value, i.e. the degree of 
relatedness, between undifferentiated like organs is the ame value as the correlation 
value between offspring, this would support that they were produced by the same 
process.  
Pearson begins by mathematically proving that, “The correlation between 
brothers… [is] equal to the mean correlation between the undifferentiated like organs put 
forth by an individual” (“On the Principle of Homotyposis” 291). He offers a 
mathematical proof for this relationship in the second section of the article entitled 
“Theoretical Discussion of the Relation of Fraternal Correlation to the Correlation of 
Undifferentiated like Organs” with equations for variation, correlation, mean and 
deviation based on the principles of the error curve.95 
Once he has deduced mathematically that the average of th combined correlation 
values of sperm and ovum and the correlation of offspring should be equal, Pearson 
provides observational evidence from undifferentiated like organs to support his case. In 
his opening statement of the third section of the homotyposis paper, “On the Variability 
and Correlation of Undifferentiated Like Organs in the Individual,” he explains the 
rationale behind his choice of evidence.  
 
What I have endeavored to do is to take as wide a range of different organs as 
possible in different types of life and trust to the bulk of my statistics to give me a 
substantially accurate value of ρ [correlation of undifferentiated like organs] to 
                                               
95 See Appendix M 
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compare to the values of R [fraternal correlation] we have determined on other 
occasions. (292) 
 
True to his word that he is going to give evidence concerning, “as wide a range of 
organs as possible,” Pearson provides correlation values from undifferentiated like organs 
such as leaf veins, mushroom gills, and Shirley poppy seeds. Using leaf veins as an 
example, he explains his statistical method for calculating the correlation. In conducting 
this type of analysis, he gathers 26 leaves each from 100 trees in the same district at a 
given height. He then counts the number of veins in each leaf. Next, he places these 
values on a correlation table pairing each leaf with every other leaf to generate a total of 
325 entries (½(26x25)). In order to maintain symmetry in the correlation values, he also 
creates a second table in which the order of comparison is switched. This results in a total 
of 650 entries for each tree and 65,000 values for 100 trees.Once all the values are 
gathered, he calculates the mean and standard deviation of he sample which allows him 
to generate a correlation value for the data (292-93, 295). Finally, he compares the mean 
values of correlations to the fraternal correlation R= .4 as it is described by his version of 
Galton’s law of ancestral heredity. 
Pearson’s ability to make his case using a wide variety of correlative values from 
different types of undifferentiated like organs is only possible because of his assumption 
that the difference in the production of these organs in all organisms is uniform and 
small, i.e., it is the result of regular error precipitated by a large number of small 
unknowable causes. He confesses the importance of this feature of the error curve in his 




Now if the degree of resemblance between undifferentiated lik  organs vary 
largely from organ to organ we could proceed no further with th s investigation. 
We should have shown that there was a relation between, namely (iii)96 between 
the R [fraternal correlation] and the ρ’s [correlations of undifferentiated like 
organs] but as the characters in the spermatozoa are unknow  and unmeasurable 
we could not proceed further. On the other hand, if the correlation between 
undifferentiated like organs is approximately constant, than we may replace 
correlation coefficients… with their mean value ρ, say. (“On the Principle of 
Homotyposis” 290)  
 
 Here Pearson admits that without assuming that variation is regular and small 
there would be no way of making a general case about the proc ss in heredity in the large 
population using correlation values measured in individual instances. He argues, 
however, if variability is small and we can find a regular correlation in measurable 
features, such as the veins in tree leaves in a sample of trees, this value can then be used 
along with the average values of other trees to determine the correlation value of leaf 
veins in the whole population. In addition, because correlation is measured from the 
mean of a sample in units of its own standard deviation, it is a standard unit of measure 
(Chatterjee 297). As a result, it can be used to compare variables as diverse as mushroom 
gills and leaf veins. Because correlation allows for b th an inter- and intra-specific 
                                               
96 See page 290 of the section of Pearson’s paper entitled “Theoretical Discussion of the Relation of 
Fraternal Correlation to the Correlation of Undifferentiated like Organs” provided in Appendix M.  
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comparison, Pearson believes that if a mean value of correlation of all undifferentiated 
like organs for all forms of life exists, he will be able to find it using his method.  
Though Pearson hopes that his model of heredity based on the law of error will 
allow heredity to be described within a circumscribed quantitative range using correlative 
values, his results suggest that this model of heredity is problematic. He begins the results 
section of his paper by making an ethical appeal to his audience to accept his results 
despite their imperfections based on the claim that he has been honest in reporting his 
findings and has not tried to obscure data which he might have left out to make his case 
stronger.  
 
In summing up my results and comparing them with those obtained from fraternal 
correlation by my coworkers and myself I felt some difficulty. If I made selection 
of what I considered the best homotypic correlation series and the best fraternal 
correlation, I might well lay myself open to the charge of selecting statistics with 
a view to the demonstration of a theoretical law laid down before hand. (“On the 
Principle of Homotyposis” 355)  
 
 After making this appeal, Pearson reports all of his figures.97 Despite this show of 
integrity, however, he does not actually use all of his results in calculating the mean 
correlation for undifferentiated like organs. He chooses to leave out the data gathered 
from the measurements of correlation in mushroom gillsand ivy leaves because he 
believes these measurements are unduly influenced by “correlation due to stages of 
                                               
97 See the chart labeled “General Results for Homotypic Correlation” in Appendix N “ 
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growth” (356). This elimination is acceptable in Pearson’s pinion because such growth 
would be considered a differentiating influence.  
A closer inspection of the summary of values on the chart, owever, reveals that 
Pearson’s elimination of these values, at least the values for ivy, seems to be motivated 
exactly by a desire to fit the data rather than for any valid exception of outlying data. The 
correlation values he presents for the length of ivy leaves, their breadths, and the 
combination of their lengths and breadths are respectively .56, .53, and .51. A glance at 
the values on the acceptable portions of the chart reveal that there are no less than 8 of a 
total of 22 acceptable measures which actually exceed the highest value presented by the 
ivy and a total of 11 that are larger than the lowest value in the ivy measurements. If the 
ivy results based on their value are in fact aberrant, then so are half of the results 
presented as acceptable.  
Basing the exclusion of the results on factors of growth seems even more 
treacherous for Pearson who admits that he is not a trained botanist and that quantitative 
data are the only acceptable means of assessing inheritanc. This leaves his argument 
caught up in a contradiction whereby it accepts data as the arbit r of truth but then rejects 
quantitative results based on supposed qualitative conditions. 
In addition to irregularities evident in Pearson’s eliminat ng certain values from 
his calculation of overall correlation, there is also an unusual tendency on his part to 
admit data which might reasonably be eliminated based on their values falling far outside 
the normal range. If we take Pearson’s own calculation of the mean for the correlations in 
his research, .4570, and the highest correlation value he has accepted into his normal 
distribution, .6313, we can assume that he believes that reasonable values fall within 
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.1743 of the mean. If this is the extent of the accepted values for the lower limit, then for 
the sake of symmetry of outlying values in a binomial distribution there should be a 
similar limit below the norm. This would mean that any values below .2827 should be 
eliminated as well. A brief inspection of the lower values on Pearson’s chart, however, 
reveals that he has not applied this practice to his data.In f ct four or more than 1/3 of the 
data in his chart, fall below this value, yet they are still included in the final computation.   
The combined result of leaving out values which fall above the mean but below 
the upper limits established for the data and including data whose values fall below the 
reasonable limits is that the mean value of the distribution is artificially lowered. A 
recalculation of the results, which extends the upper limits of acceptable data to the same 
degree as the lower limits are extended and includes all of the data which are excluded by 
Pearson but fall well within the limits of the distribution, results in a shift of the mean 
upwards. The new upper limit based on a recalculated spread of the acceptable lower 
values (.2837) from the mean is .7407. This new limit includes all of the unacceptable 
data with the exception of the length of mushroom gills. By including all the data within 
the new acceptable range, the mean value of correlation moves from .4570, which already 
differs from his original hypothesis of .4, to .4826 an even greater difference.  
Further evidence that Pearson is massaging data to get a better fit with his theory 
can be found in his revaluation of the fraternal correlation98  to a value higher than his 
own original estimation at the beginning of the paper. In the beginning of the text, 
Pearson clearly states that the value of the fraternl correlation is .4. In the results section, 
however, he gives a different value for this correlation, .4479. This new calculation is 
made from a combination of statistics taken from plants d animals as well as humans. 
                                               
98 See the “General Results for Fraternal Correlation” chart in Appendix N  
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His calculations include such correlations as the coat clor in basset hounds, the same 
data Galton used in developing his Law of Ancestral Heredity, and horses, whereas the 
original calculation is based solely on the statistics gathered from human brothers. The 
correlation statistics for plants and animals are all substantially higher than those in 
humans; the highest correlation value for humans is .5424, a full .15 lower than the 
highest correlation value for Daphnia at .6934, pulling the average value of the 
correlation considerably higher.   
Ignoring these obvious discrepancies in data selection, Pearson argues that the 
similarity between this new value for fraternal correlation .4479 and his average 
correlation for undifferentiated like organs .4570 is close and seems to provide proof for 
his conclusions 1) that sperm and ovum are undifferentiatd like organs and 2) that 
reproduction is a case of the production of undifferentiated like organs. In other words, 
progeny differ from each other just as leaves on the sam tree do. 
  
I do not propose to lay great stress on what at first sight might look like a most 
conclusive equality between the mean values of homotypic and fraternal 
correlations—within the limits of probable errors .4479 and .4570 are indeed 
equal. I am quite aware that a few further series added to ither the homotypic or 
fraternal results might modify to some extent this equality. But what I would ask 
the reader to do is to examine the two tables side by side, to note how the first and 
last several results of both may be fairly held to be subject to quite definite 
modifying factors, and then to consider whether there is not very substantial 
evidence gathered from a fairly wide range of characters in nearly as wide a range 
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of species to show that homotypic and fraternal correlation fluctuate about a mean 
value between .4 and .5. (“On the Principle of Homotyposis” 358)   
  
Despite all of his efforts to minimize the difficulties inherent in trying to reduce 
biological qualities to exact quantities within his mathematical model, Pearson is forced 
to recognize the formidableness of the obstacles facing his hereditary theory. Following 
his efforts to legitimize his conclusion he writes, 
 
I do realize that it is extremely difficult with the complex system of factors 
influencing living forms to reduce our conditions to that theoretically perfect state 
in which we shall measure solely the factor we are investigating…. In the first 
place the theoretical conception of undifferentiated like organs is very hard to 
realize practically…. Secondly, the environmental factor omes into play. It is 
difficult to obtain a hundred individuals with like environment; soil, position with 
regards to other growths, sunlight, insect life, etc…. Thirdly, the difficulty that 
ensuring all individuals are of the same age or in the same stage of development, 
is very great. (358)   
 
Undaunted, Pearson remains confident that the principles of the error curve can be 
usefully employed to describe the action of heredity. He closes his paper by making an 
argument from the law of large numbers which holds that the more data which are 
gathered on a phenomenon, the closer the researcher can get to its true value. Within a 
large collection of data, Pearson argues, the differentiati g factors which would skew the 
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true value of the sample either upwards or downwards would cancel each other, leaving 
only the true value for the “bathmic influence,” i.e. the influence of regular error on the 
undifferentiated like organ.    
 
If homotyposis had a practically constant value throughout nature, I should only 
expect this value to be ascertained as the result of the average of many series in 
which the opposing factors of differentiation… may more  less counteract each 
other. In this manner we may approach to a fair appreciation of the bathmic 
influence of individuality [the value of the set of many small unknown causes that 
effects the production of sperm and ovum in individuals] in the production of 
undifferentiated like organs. (“On the Principle of Homotyposis” 359) 
 
In his concluding remarks in the text, Pearson expresses hi  confidence that his 
evidence and arguments have sufficient credibility to support his conclusions 1) that the 
value of correlation found for the production of different organic homotypes, leaves, 
mushroom gills, etc. was remarkably similar to the correlation values found for different 
physical features in brothers and 2) that, as a result of this similarity, it is logical to 
conclude that heredity is an example of the process of homotyposis. Because 
homotyposis produces small and regular variability under the same conditions assumed 
by the mathematical law of errors, the statistical modeling that Pearson and Weldon have 
been using and promoting as the only method for studying the magnitude and direction of 
evolution is justified. In addition, homotyposis supports the veracity of a Darwinian 
model of evolution in which the major variations that are the basis of specific formation 
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through natural selection are developed by the accretion of small variations in offspring. 
Finally, it refutes Galton’s hereditary model in which variation finds its source within the 
organism and is the result of the random selection of phenotypic features from a 
genotypic pool of traits.   
At first blush, Pearson’s argument appears to be a triumph of theoretical 
mathematical reasoning in making biological arguments. It begins with a hypothesis 
proved deductively from mathematical principles and incorporates the mass collection of 
empirical data to test the validity of his conclusions. A closer inspection of his methods 
for selecting data to make his calculations and of the challenges surrounding the 
identification of pure homotyposis ( i.e. a process of replication/variation unaffected by 
factors which might increase or decrease the degree of variation/similarity beyond the 
limits allowed by chance influences) reveals, however, that there are major weaknesses in 
his model.     
 
Bateson’s Critique  
 
In the fall of 1900,99 the same year that Weldon, Pearson, and Galton left the 
evolutionary committee, Pearson submitted and presented his Homotyposis paper to the 
Royal Society. A few months later, in January and February of 1901, William Bateson 
submitted and read a critique of Pearson’s ideas in front of the same body. The fact that 
Bateson responded to Pearson’s attempts to defend his mathematical model of Darwinian 
variation comes as little surprise given Pearson’s cloe relationship with Weldon and the 
                                               
99 In the spring of 1900, some time after May 8, Bateson became acquainted with Mendel’s “Experiments 
in Plant Hybridization.”  
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friction between Bateson and Weldon over the priority of continuous or discontinuous 
variation in supplying the material for specific variation. What may come as a surprise, 
however, is that up to the publication of Pearson’s article and even in his critique, 
Bateson was actively trying to recruit Pearson to abandon Weldon’s theory of continuous 
variation. Why would Bateson try to recruit his arch enemy’s right hand man? I contend 
that his actions were motivated by his belief in the power of mathematics to make or 
break scientific arguments.  
This position is not without controversy, however, because some historical 
evidence describes the debate as antagonism between Bateson’s biological method and 
the mathematical methods developed by the biometricians. A commonly used phrase 
around the time of the disputes which developed between Bateson and Weldon/Pearson, 
for example, was the “Biometrician-Mendelian controversy.” This antithesis suggests that 
the definitive difference between the two sides in the debate was that the biometricians 
were mathematical while the Mendelians were non-mathematical in their approach to 
heredity, a position disputed in this chapter and in the chapter on Mendel. Evidence that 
biologists at the time of the debate split the groups along the lines of mathematics and 
biology is present in a 1910 book review by George Shull of Wilhelm Johannsen’s (1857-
1927) Heredity as an Exact Science.  
 
An essential part of the reaction [which occurred at the end of the nineteenth 
century against speculative theories of evolution and heredity], the development 
of mathematical methods by Professor Karl Pearson and a few others promised 
for a time the key to the riddles of evolution. This movement, led by a pure 
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mathematician, developed a series of beautiful methods for the mathematical 
analysis of data and the comparison of variations….  
Parallel with this movement toward the use of mathematically precise 
methods, there has been a rapidly increasing utilization of pedigree culture or 
genetic methods… in Mendelian investigations of heredity which methods lay 
stress chiefly on biological methods of analysis. The antagonism of active 
workers with biometric and genetic methods in the study of heredity scarcely 
permitted it to be hoped that a work might soon appear… utilizing the results 
gained by both biometry and genetics. (Shull 226)   
 
Shull’s division of the two groups into the biologists and the mathematicians was 
most likely encouraged by comments made by Pearson who, being the only professional 
mathematician engaged in debates with a group of biologists, often took criticism of his 
qualitative biological assumptions as an attack on his novel mathematical approach by 
backward-looking biologists. For example, Pearson wrote Galton fter the first meeting 
of the new evolutionary committee which included Bateson to complain, 
 
The committee you have got together is entirely unsuited…. [It] contains far too 
many of the old biological type, and is far too unconscious of the fact that the 
solutions to these problems are in the first place statistical, and in the second place 




    This statement reveals that Pearson believed that there was a division among 
members of the group, which now included Bateson, along the lines of traditional 
qualitative biologists and modern mathematical biologists. S atements such as this one 
and others like it may explain why modern historians rely on the division between 
biology and mathematics in the two groups to explain why the Evolutionary Committee 
of the Royal Society became disorganized: “the new members showed little sympathy to 
the biometrical approach, and in some cases antagonism” (Provine 51). The split is also 
used as the motivation for the formation of Biometrika: “Biometrika, established in 1901, 
became the official organ of the new statistics the standard bearer of a quantitative 
program in opposition to the biological mainstream” (Porter 269).  
 Although these characterizations of a split between th  biological and the 
mathematical camps seem to be justified by certain historical evidence, other evidence 
suggests that an alternative interpretation of the divisions between the two groups can be 
made in which Bateson is a supporter and not a detractor of the biometrical approach. An 
historical review of Bateson’s work, for example, reveals that there is ample evidence 
that he can be fairly grouped among biologists who relied on mathematics as a source for 
evidence and invention in his arguments. His use, for example, of the law of errors and 
the error curve to draw conclusions about the dimorphism in stag beetles and earwigs two 
years before he published his work on dimorphism in shore crabs suggests that, if 
anything, Bateson had beaten the biometricians to the punch.  
In addition to the evidence that Bateson was not opposed t  biological arguments 
which drew support and inspiration from mathematics, there is also evidence in Bateson’s 
history with the biometricians that his primary critique of their mathematical solutions to 
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biological problems was not that they were mathematical, but rather that they were only, 
as Pearson contends, in the third place biological. He had complained, for example, that 
that the work done by Weldon on the carapaces of Carcinus moenas in measuring 
variation did not take into consideration the fact thahe had not measured crabs in the 
same stage of molting. As a result, the distribution of the shell characteristics he was 
measuring would not be accurate and, therefore, could not provide evidence for the action 
of continuous variation in evolution (Provine 49).   
In the events surrounding the publication of Pearson’s paper and Bateson’s 
response, we can actually see the same high regard for mathe atics in investigating 
biology and the same criticism of the biometrician’s disregard for biological phenomena 
that is evident in Bateson’s previous work and critique. In the winter or spring of 1901, 
conflict arose between Pearson and the Royal Society when, without Bateson’s 
permission, the manuscript of his critique of Pearson’s paper was distributed to referees 
before the referees had received a complete manuscript of Pearson’s work. Needless to 
say, Pearson was angered by this unorthodox procedure and saw it as more evidence of 
discrimination in the biological establishment against hi  attempts to develop a 
mathematical biology (62).  
When Bateson found out what had happened, he immediately wi hdrew his 
critique until Pearson’s paper was published. He also promptly wrote him a letter 
apologizing for the incident. Bateson’s response soothed Pearson’s ire to some degree 
and initiated an interesting exchange of communication between the two over the course 
of the next year (62-63).   
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The proof that Bateson saw mathematics as an important source for biological 
arguments is made clear in his attempts during his correspondence with Pearson from 
1901 to 1902 to recruit Pearson and his mathematical talents way from Weldon. In 
October of 1901, Bateson sent a translation of Mendel’s paper to Pearson in the hopes 
that, after reading the text, the mathematician might be persuaded to accept Mendel’s 
theory of inheritance. Though Pearson read it, in his reply he “expressed skepticism about 
the general applicability of Mendelian inheritance” (Provine 63).  
Even though Pearson was not receptive to these initial efforts, Bateson remained 
hopeful that he might yet persuade Pearson to join forces with him. With the publication 
of Weldon’s critique of Mendel in Biometrika (January, 1902), however, Bateson realized 
that the level of enmity developing between the two camps was such that his window of 
opportunity for recruiting Pearson was almost gone. In a last ditch effort, he wrote 
Pearson on February 13, 1902, exhorting him to reconsider.  
 
I respect you as an honest man and perhaps the ablest and hardest worker I have 
met, and I am determined not to take up a quarrel with you if I can help it….  
 There has probably been no discovery made in theoretical biology that we 
can remember which approaches Mendel’s in magnitude, and the cons quences 
that it leads to. This is not a matter of opinion but cerain. You have worked well 
in the same field and if through any fault of mine you were to be permanently 
alienated from the work that is coming, I should always regret it. With Weldon it 




 Ultimately, Bateson’s efforts failed. In his response, P arson tried to maintain an 
appearance of rational balance by writing that though his heart was with Weldon his head 
was still open to various positions. Despite this posture of fairness, Pearson made it 
known in no uncertain terms that he was firmly behind Weldon’s philosophy of 
continuous variation. Shortly after this exchange, Bateson’s critique of Pearson’s paper 
“Heredity, Differentiation, and other Conceptions of Biology: A Consideration of 
Professor Karl Pearson’s Paper ‘On the Principle of Homotyposis’” (1902) was published 
as well as a scathing attack on Weldon’s critique of Mendel titled Mendel’s Principles of 
Heredity: A Defense. Any chance of détente between the two men vanished.  
Though 1902 marked the end of friendly communications between Bateson and 
Pearson, it was not because Bateson was an ardent foe of biometrics. His interest in 
recruiting Pearson’s talents to help further develop the theory of Mendelian inheritance 
suggests that, though Bateson was at the core a biologist dedicated to experimental 
breeding as a way of unlocking the mysteries of heredity, he was also keenly aware of the 
power of mathematics as both a tool and as a source for making biological arguments.    
 The respect that Bateson shows for the use of mathemics to make biological 
arguments in his communications with Pearson is similarly evident in his critique of the 
mathematician’s homotyposis paper. In this critique, Bateson does not attack Pearson for 
making an argument about the nature of heredity using mathe atics; instead, he attacks 
the validity of the biological model which Pearson’s mathematical arguments are 
supporting.   
In the beginning of the text, Bateson seems to continue his overtures to Pearson 
by making the case that they both share similar interes s. He commends the 
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mathematician for adopting a philosophical position that is near his own and draws 
parallels between Pearson’s concept of homotyposis and his own work in Materials for 
the Study of Variation (1894) in which he argues that variation has its source in symmetry 
and repetition (Materials for the Study of Variation 242).    
 
At the outset I wish to express the conviction that the leading idea which inspired 
and runs through the work is a true one. Professor Pearson suggests that the 
relationship and likeness between two brothers is an expression of the same 
phenomenon as the relationship and likeness between two leaves on the same tree, 
between the scales on a moth’s wing, the petals of a fl wer and between repeated 
parts generally…. 
 This idea first came to me—as it has perhaps to others—when I was 
studying the phenomena of variation in meristic series,100 and in writing on that 
subject I introduced an outline of the conceptions involved. On that occasion I 
ventured to carry this reasoning a step further… and to suggest that the 
resemblance which we call heredity may be a special case of the phenomenon of 
symmetry. (Bateson, “Heredity, Differentiation,” 194)  
     
 Following a few complimentary words, Bateson lays out his critique of Pearson. 
He argues that there are essentially two major problems with his theory of homotyposis. 
First, given the current qualitative biological knowledge of organisms, it seems unlikely 
                                               
100 Meristic variation refers to changes in the number and geometric organization of the physical features of 
an organism such as, for example, changes in the number of p tals or their distribution on a particular 
species or variety of flower. Bateson claims in Materials that this type of variation was the primary force 
involved in speciation. (Materials for the Study of Variation 243) 
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that Pearson would be able to obtain the results he is trying to obtain using the methods 
he is employing. Second, even if such a value as a universal correlation constant were 
calculated, it would not be a meaningful descriptor of the processes of heredity.  
  In presenting his case against Pearson, Bateson begins with a step-by-step 
summation of the particular claims that the biometrician is making. He starts by restating 
Pearson’s arguments concerning the assessment of homotypicali  in organisms recalling 
the basic premises set forward by Pearson: 1) that homotypes, by definition, are a series 
of organs whose variability has its source in many small random influences and 2) that 
the homotypic correlation of undifferentiated like organs in a series can be lowered if 
variation in an organism has its source in differentiati g influences (i.e. that two organs in 
a series have not been produced by the same process).  
After laying out the mathematician’s claims, Bateson challenges the 
biometrician’s distinctions between differentiation, the occurrence of significant variation 
between two organs which leads to their being distinguished as two different types, and 
variation, the occurrence of slight changes within a homogeneous p pulation of types 
which account for their distribution according to the law of error. He argues that from the 
outset Pearson’s argument is in jeopardy because no clear distinction between these 
phenomena can be made in nature.  
 
It is not, however, the difficulty of recognition I would now emphasize, but the 
fact that between the two phenomena [differentiation and variation] no absolute 
distinction exists in nature. An “undifferentiated series of like parts” means only a 
series of like parts which have varied and are varying among themselves but little. 
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A series of highly variable like parts is a series in which differentiation exists or is 
beginning to exist in a complex and irregular fashion. A “differentiated series of 
like parts” means a series among which variation is or has become definite of 
regular. Between these classes there is every shade and degree. No one can say 
finally where each begins and ends, and, by appropriate selection, we could find 
homotypic coefficients of any required value. The av rage value of such 
coefficients taken at random has no significance in nature. (“Heredity, 
Differentiation” 197)  
 
 In this section of the critique, Bateson’s criticism of Pearson’s biological model is 
a direct result of his own belief in Galton’s and Mendel’s models of inheritance, which 
hold that variation is the result of the random selection from a pool traits within the 
organism. Based on these models, different hereditary conditions can exist in different 
organisms at any given time in nature. In some populations of organs, there will be very 
little variation, because the population has reached what Galton would refer to as a place 
of stability for that organ. In other cases, however, there is shifting back and forth within 
the population between different places of stability. Finally, in still others two clearly 
distinct places of stability have emerged. The result i  that across all organs there will be 
a wide rang of possible conditions with no clearly demarcated boundaries or values.    
Because there is no way of knowing where variation ends and differentiation 
begins, Bateson argues that a researcher can select any set of values for correlation that 
they desire. As a result, they can come up with any average value for correlation they 
want. This, he argues, is what Pearson has done. He has simply selected a subset of 
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correlation values which yield the closest value to fraternal correlation. As a 
consequence, his contention that the correlation of undi ferentiated like organs in nature 
is between .4 and .5 has no real purchase in nature.  
Once he has made the case that the nature of heredity cannot be ascertained by 
statistical analysis because it is impossible to define the sample, Bateson makes the case 
that the only other alternative is to turn to close scrutiny of the individual. This position 
is, of course, in accordance with Mendel’s and Bateson’s approach to the study of 
heredity. It begins with gathering specific qualitative knowledge of individual instances 
through experimentation and then collecting and organizing the results of these 
experiments statistically to create a general picture of the hereditary process.  
 
But let us now suppose that we could define differentiation fr m variation in 
general, say, as orderly variation. Even so we could not istinguish it unless its 
order was conspicuous…. Does not, then, the presence of orderly differentiation, 
in various degrees, compel us to an analysis of individual instances? In plain 
language, we shall have to pick and choose our cases, and the value of our 
coefficient of homotyposis will depend entirely on how we do it. (202)     
 
For Bateson, the only way the appropriate sample can be found is through the 
development of qualitative knowledge of the organisms being observed. As an example 
of how this biologically-oriented experimental technique might be applied to the study of 
these phenomena, Bateson reconfigures Pearson’s statistical observations of leaves on 




He [Pearson] speaks of the extreme difficulty of determining whether his material 
is homogenous in respect of the environment, but I miss from his work any deep 
appreciation of the subtle and evasive quality of differentiation. If anyone would 
obtain a conception of this difficulty, let him go to any tree or large plant and set 
about pruning it, or better, let him try to choose the shoots for propagation. Until 
he tries, it seems simple enough; but when he begins, he finds the shoots are of 
many complexly differing kinds, and unless he has experience pruning or 
propagating, he will not know which to choose. If he studies th  tree attentively, 
he will soon see that the kinds of shoots are largely definite and, in fact, 
differentiated. (“Heredity, Differentiation” 202)   
 
 Bateson suggests here that if Pearson simply took time to study the individual 
instances in detail through experimental trial and error, as any naturalist worth his salt 
would do, he would soon be able to recognize which shoots represented distinct types and 
which did not. The results of this experimentation would lead him inevitably to Bateson’s 
conclusion that different kinds don’t develop in a series of mall connected changes but 
rather from radical character saltations. From there, Pearson might then be able to 
construct a viable mathematical theory of heredity.  
 Such a theory, Bateson suggests, would not be statistical n the grand sense that it 
would seek, as Pearson’s theory does, to statistically g ther all variation big and small 
together to find a mean value for the degree of variation. Instead, it would involve 
identifying points of stability, the degree of variation around those points of stability, and 
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places of discontinuity. This approach would describe variation and explore its range not 
to distill it into a meaningless universal average value.  
 
By the one word variation we are attempting to express a great diversity of 
phenomena in their essence distinct though merging insensibly with each other. 
The attempt to treat or study them as similar is leading to utter confusion in the 
study of evolution.  
 If normality thus imagined can be shown a real phenomen it is 
conceivable that we might then profitably attempt to determine in specified cases 
the average value of homotypic correlation for each case, but the average value 
for a miscellaneous collection of cases would still have no natural significance. 
(203-04)  
 
 In Bateson’s critique of Pearson’s paper on homotyposis, it is possible to see both 
the power and the limits of mathematics in biological arguments. Just as Darwin, Mendel, 
and Galton recognized the power and the precision of quantific tion and mathematical 
formulae, operations, and principles, Bateson too recognizes their strength and does not 
attempt to make an issue of Pearson’s application of correlation and the law of error to 
the study of heredity. What he does take issue with in his arguments, however, are the 
inconsistencies that he believes exist between Pearson’s mathematical model and the 
actualities of nature. In taking this rhetorical approach, he argues not against Pearson’s 
use of mathematics per se, but rather against Pearson’s eduction of variation to a single 
average value, warranted by the law of large numbers. His opposition is predicated on his 
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belief in the Galtonian and Mendelian models of heredity in which traits can be in 
different modes of stability and in which sudden radical ch nges in traits can take place 
making the concept of an average value of variation an unhelpful if not meaningless 
measure for describing variation.  
 As history reveals, Pearson’s arguments for a homotypic heory of heredity 
ultimately failed to persuade biologists. This failure, however, was not the result of his 
employing the principles, operations, and formulae from probability and statistics in 
making his arguments; rather, it was the result of a general movement away from 
Darwinian continuous variation and toward Mendel’s apparently discontinuous theory of 
heredity. That the mathematical argumentation was not responsible for his failure in the 
minds of other biologists can be evidenced by quoting again George Shull’s evaluation of 
Pearson’s arguments: 
 
The development of mathematical methods by Professor Karl Pe rson and a few 
others promised for a time the key to the riddles of evolution. This movement, led 
by a pure mathematician, developed a series of beautiful methods for the 
mathematical analysis of data and the comparison of variations. These methods 
are of the greatest importance when rightly used but owing to the almost 
invariable lack of an equally keen biological analysis, the applications of these 








 From his early work with physical mathematics and graphical calculation to his 
later development of a theory of heredity based on the mathematics of the error curve, 
Pearson consistently advocated the importance of a theoretical understanding of 
mathematics to the exploration of both physical and organic phenomena. This belief in 
the primacy of mathematics as a source for discovering knowledge about nature informs 
the developments of his arguments in “On the Principle of Homotyposis and its Relation 
to Heredity” in which he makes the case for a mathematical model of heredity based on 
the error curve supporting Darwin’s theory of evolution by continuous variation.  
Though Pearson’s belief in the importance of mathematics was generally accepted 
by scientists of all stripes from physics to biology, despit  Pearson’s complaints to the 
contrary, his zeal for theoretical mathematics as a source for inventing arguments about 
nature met serious resistance from both physical and biological researchers. In the case of 
his biological arguments, William Bateson challenged Pearson’s insistence on the 
mathematical average of correlation as a fundamental value for the process of heredity. 
Bateson’s complaint was not over whether lines of arguments developed from the 
principles of probability and statistics could be used to describe biological phenomena, 
but rather that Pearson’s mathematical model and its goals were based on a biological 
model that was not indicative of actual biological conditions.  
In the end, Pearson’s theory was rejected and forgotten as Darwin’s theory of 
discontinuous inheritance was swept away in the early twentieth century in a tide of 
evidence supporting Mendelian heredity. The mathematical tools that Pearson helped to 
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develop for determining correlation and testing goodness of fit, however, endured. The 
survival of these mathematical applications in biology testify not only to the importance 
that mathematics had assumed by the last decade of the ninete th century in making 
biological arguments, but also to the importance of KarlPearson as an advocate for the 
value of statistics and probability as sources of invention and support for biological 
arguments. Without the heightened awareness of the importance of mathematics to 
biology and without the environment of competition which demanded a mathematical 
response to discontinuous theories of evolution, the mathematically described laws of the 
monk from Brünn may not have had the opportunity to shine. Thoug  substantively 
Mendel’s work had appeared limited in scope to hybridists and botanists for thirty five 
years because they were a detailed analysis of a few traits in a few species, with the dawn 
of the twentieth century and the rise of statistical bio ogy, the hidden value of Pearson’s 
broad, mathematically informed methods and laws began to be recognized and to 





The goal of this project has been to explore the rhetorically unexplored territory of the 
role of mathematics in making arguments in evolutionary biology from the middle of the 
nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century and to extend the analysis of the 
arguments of nineteenth century evolutionary biologists past D rwin to the works of 
Mendel, Galton, and Pearson. The analyses undertaken to meet these goals reveal some 
important trends in argumentation in evolutionary biology in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century which have been previously overlooked.  
First, rhetorical analyses of the texts and contexts of he arguments of Darwin, 
Mendel, Galton, and Pearson suggest that they believed that their arguments could be 
strengthened with the deductive logos and ethos of mathemaics. In Darwin’s work, for 
example, he employed quantitative comparison as a persuasive tool for making the case 
for variation, natural selection, and the principle of divergence of character. Additionally, 
Mendel used combinatorics to develop experiments to prove the invariability of character 
traits over many generations of breeding.  
A second trend revealed by these analyses is the importance of mathematical 
concepts as a source for inventing arguments about nature. In chapters four and five, for 
example, analyses of the arguments of Galton and Pearson illuminate the importance of 
the error curve and the principles of the law of error to develop new lines of arguments 
about the nature of variation, evolution, and heredity. Chapter four reveals how, by 
replacing the concept of “error” with “variation,” Galton transformed the error curve into 
an instrument for describing the distribution of variation within human populations for 
any measurable physiological or psychological feature. Additionally, it illustrates how 
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this transformation opened up for him new paths of empirical investigation and 
encouraged the development of new methods for mathematically establishing the degree 
of change in quantifiable heritable features from one generation to the next which served 
as the foundational arguments for this law of ancestral heredity.  
Similarly, chapter five shows how Pearson, inspired by Galton’s arguments from 
the error curve, developed arguments for a phenomenologica  theory of heredity based on 
the law of error in which Galton’s concept of “error as variation” was transformed back 
to Quetelet’s original notion of “variation as error.” This transformation brought 
arguments about the biological process of variation, error, and evolution completely 
under the jurisdiction of mathematical evidence and principles.  
In addition to revealing important general trends in the rol  of mathematics in 
making arguments in evolutionary biology, this investigation also illuminates specific 
instances of the limitations of mathematical arguments in persuasion for some audiences. 
These limitations are brought to the surface in the analyses of the failure of Mendel’s 
brilliantly constructed mathematical arguments in “Experim nts in Plant Hybridization” 
and in Karl Pearson’s mathematically sound but biologically ill-conceived theory of 
homotyposis.  
The rhetorical analysis of Mendel’s “Experiments” in chapter three reveals that 
though Mendel employs in his argument a carefully implemented system of 
mathematically informed experiments, his results were ignored by biological researchers 
in Western Europe. By analyzing the rhetorical context in which Mendel makes his 
arguments, the case was made that Mendel’s conclusions, despite their underlying 
mathematical rigor, were ignored because he failed to take account of in his work, and in 
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fact argued against, biological phenomena which were widely accepted by biologists at 
the time. Without the proper professional ethos to attract supporters to his unorthodox 
position, Mendel’s conclusions languished in obscurity for m e than thirty years despite 
the fact that they were mathematically supported. Similar persuasive limitations were 
revealed by the rhetorical analysis of the context and co tent of Pearson’s arguments in 
chapter five. This investigation concludes that his mathematical arguments also fail 
because they support a vision of heredity at odds with the biological evidence accepted 
by the majority of biologists at the time he is writing.  
While my analyses of the content and context of Mendel and Pearson’s arguments 
provide evidence that there are persuasive limitations for mathematical arguments, my 
investigation of Galton’s arguments explores how other rhtorical circumstances and 
strategies can furnish the necessary support to persuade readers to accept potentially 
controversial mathematical arguments. My analysis in chapter four of Galton’s position 
in the social and scientific community suggests that the success of his arguments for an 
analogy between the law of error, variation, and heredity can be attributed in part to the 
strength of his ethos and in part to his direct persuasive efforts. The investigation of 
Galton’s personal and professional history in the chapter reveals that he was a well 
regarded member of the highest social and intellectual circle and, therefore, well 
positioned to inspire in British scientific audiences a willingness to consider his 
arguments in Natural Inheritance. In addition, a rhetorical analysis of his arguments i  
Natural Inheritance provides evidence that some of Galton’s success can be attri uted to 
his skill as a rhetor. This skill is evident in the second and third chapters in which he 
deftly argues for the jurisdiction of the error curve in arguments about variation, heredity, 
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and evolution. Galton’s powers of persuasiveness are also illu trated in the later chapters 
of his text where he appeals to the prevailing social and scientific sentiment of the 
audience to persuade them to accept the analogy between the rror curve and variation in 
nature.  
Though this project has focused specifically on the role of mathematics in making 
arguments in evolutionary biology and the success or failure of these arguments for 
specific historical figures in particular rhetorical contexts, the use of mathematics in 
biology, in particular the error curve, has important implications beyond the current limits 
of this investigation. Future areas of rhetorical explorati n might include the role of the 
error curve in the debates over fate and free will in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
the influence of the error curve in the development of arguments for eugenics in the end 
of the nineteenth century, and the use of the error curve as support for communist 
ideology in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  
Although the debate over whether fate or free will governed human life has been a 
staple topic of disagreement at least as far back as Plato, at different times in history this 
debate has dominated the public forum. In the middle of the nineteenth century, an 
increased interest in the debate developed following the publication of H.T. Buckle’s 
History of Civilization in England in which Buckle used the error curve to support a 
historical argument that the course of human societies was strictly determined by climate 
and locality (Chaterjee 278).  
A rhetorical examination of Buckle’s work would offer further detail about the 
social and rhetorical dimensions of the error curve in the nineteenth-century public 
imagination in England. Importantly, it might give further clues about the involvement of 
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the mathematical construct in the complex debates over causation which developed with 
the emergence of positivist philosophy in the late nineteenth a d early twentieth 
centuries.  
In addition to controversies over personal fate and free will, the error curve as a 
rhetorical warrant also plays a role in debates about the degree to which societies can 
control their evolutionary destiny. Fears of eradication resulting from evolutionary 
change seem to be the central impetus around the formati n of the eugenics movement in 
England in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Both Francis Galton and Karl Pearson 
play seminal roles in articulating and promoting the precepts of eugenics. Given their 
interest in the error curve and their belief in its power to describe the limit and 
distribution of variation in organic populations, it is more than likely that the curve 
played a role in developing and supporting eugenic arguments.  
The importance of eugenics to social and political debates of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century encourages a more detailed rhetorical examination of the 
nature and degree of influence of the error curve in developing eugenic arguments. Such 
an investigation might profitably explore how the concept of “ rue value” might have 
affected a new definition for a biological ideal. It might also investigate how the concept 
of regression and the possibility of a shifting population mean may have provided 
inspiration for the necessity of and possibility for a eugenic program of social 
improvement.  
In opposition to some elements of Galtonian eugenic sentim , the error curve 
may have also been a source for arguments supporting communist ideology. One of the 
major lines of argument that communist ideologues sought to discredit was that the 
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structure of the social class was simply the expression of an innate biological superiority 
of some blood lines. The appearance of the law of error, which allowed for the 
mathematical description and comparison of biological traits, provided the opportunity to 
challenge, if not to refute, elitist arguments for biological determinism. An investigation 
of the role of the error curve and concepts such as regression spawned from the curve 
might offer some useful insights into the role of biology and bio-mathematical arguments 
in communist rhetoric. It might also open a useful line of investigation into the 
relationship between the eugenics and the communist movements, particularly in the 
arguments of Karl Pearson, who was an ardent supporter of both (Porter 2004).    
 The number and variety of these lines of investigation underscore the importance 
of the error curve as a guiding topic for developing arguments in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. In addition, they reveal the importance of mathematics in the 
nineteenth century as a source for arguments not only in sciece, but also as an influence 
on some of the most important socio-political movements a d debates of the period. 
Although the role of mathematics in argumentation currently receives slight attention in 
rhetorical scholarship, the possibilities for rhetorical nvestigation offered by the error 
curve in the latter half of the nineteenth century alone should provide encouragement that 
a broad and virtually untapped source for rhetorical investigation is waiting to be 
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1) “Mathematics” in the index:  p. 13-14 discusses Darwin’s weakness in 
mathematics. Page 79 explains that Darwin read N ture but that he did not 
understand most of the articles which used mathematics. / Gale discusses the 
contents of Darwin’s arguments in depth. He looks at his arguments, their 
weaknesses and the problems of evidence in chapter 7 of the tex . At no point 
does he discuss the role of mathematics in presenting Darwin’s evidence.  
2) “Mathematics” in the index: p21 Defends Darwin’s not using mathematics to 
make his geological arguments. He argues that something can be logical whether 
it is expressed in a language of formal logic like mathematics or not. P65 Again 
he attacks mathematical argument in the harder sciences. P127 Darwin uses 
geometry to describe changes in the physical shape of organisms. P170 Darwin 
quantifies different physical features in organisms to present precise 
morphological comparisons. P175 Discusses Darwin’s hybridizat on experiments. 
It claims that his results were subjected to statistical an lysis by Galton (though 
its not clear whether this was done before or after publication)  
3) Gillespie doesn’t mention mathematics in the index. He doesn’t discuss it with 
regards to Darwin’s approach to his subject. 
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Appendix A (continued)  
 
4) Brent doesn’t mention mathematics in the index of his text. In skimming chapters 
4 and 5 “Origin of all My Views” and “The Speculatist” I found no discussion of 
mathematics.  
5) Bowlby doesn’t mention mathematics in the index of his text. Chapter 22 “My 
Abominable Volume” discusses generally the contents of the argument in 
Darwin’s text. It does not, however, go into specifics. Al o, it does not include 
any mention of mathematics.  
6) Browne doesn’t mention mathematics in the index of her text. She talks at length 
in chapter 2 “My Abominable Volume” about Darwin’s use of evidence but at no 
time discusses the role of mathematic notation in presenting that evidence.   
7) Bowler doesn’t mention mathematics in the index of his text. On P104 of his text 
he mentions that Darwin undertakes arithmetical studies of the number of species 
to prove that population pressure within a given area forces sp cies to diversify in 
order to compete more successfully. On P 117 he also discusses the importance of 
mathematical reasoning in Malthus’ argument which informs his concept of 
natural selection.  
8) Hull has an entry for mathematics with 6 page references in the index. On P 11 he 
comments how Darwin was no more confused about the diffrences between 
scientific laws, mathematical axioms, and metaphysical principles than most 
people in the period in which he lived. Hull claims that despit  his 
misunderstanding of these differences Darwin understood the general distinction 
between deductive and inductive reasoning. On P 14 Hull explains that Darwin 
was caught in the middle of a debate about the differenc between, “the nature of 
mathematical axioms and their relation to their experience”. On page 20 Hull 
argues that mathematics for Aristotle was different from empirical science 
because it required fewer observations to reach a conclusion. On p 32 Hull claims 
that Darwin’s theory is not mathematical in form or in the type of reasoning. P34 
Hull claims that in the 1930s different scientist tried through genetics to create a 
mathematical science of evolutionary biology. This was not effective in creating 
verifiable outcomes, however. P61 Hull argues that evolution d d not exhibit 
mathematical regularity as did the laws in hard science.   
9) Aydon doesn’t mention mathematics in the index of his text. His only reference to 
it is in his comment that Darwin was not particularly good in mathematics in 
school on P 30.  
10)  Mayr doesn’t mention mathematics in the index of his text. In chapter 5 p48 
Mayr notes that the concept of science in Darwin’s time was completely 
dominated by mathematics and the physical sciences.  





List of Scholarly Journals Analyzed for Citations of the Role of Mathematics in 
Darwin’s Arguments. 
 
1) Browne, Janet. “Darwin’s Botanical Arithmetic and the ‘Principle of Divergence,’ 
1854-1858”. Journal of the History of Biology 13 (1980): 53-89.   
2) Campbell, John Angus. “Why was Darwin Believed? Darwin’s Origin and the 
problem of Intellectual Revolution.” Configurations 11.2 (2003): 203-37. 
3) Campbell, John Angus. “The Invisible Rhetorician: Charles Darwin’s ‘Third 
Party’ Strategy.” Rhetorica 7.1 (1989): 55-85 
4) Moore, Randy. “The Persuasive Mr. Darwin.” Bioscience 47.2 (1997): 107-14.  
5) Gould, Stephen J. “False Premise Good Science.” Natural History 92.10 (1983): 
20-26.  
6) Manier, Edward. “‘External Factors’ and ‘Ideology’ in the Earliest Drafts of 
Darwin’s Theory.” Social Studies of Science 17.4 (1987): 581-609.  
 
 
1) Complete discussion of the role that mathematics in the form of botanical 
arithmetic played in developing Darwin’s principle of diverg nce in species.  
2) No discussion of mathematics. Campbell is more interest d in Darwin’s linguistic 
choices than in his use of evidence to support his arguments.  
3) Does not discuss mathematics.  
4) Moore recognizes the role of data in making Darwin’s arguments but not the role 
of mathematical operations or principles (pp107-108). He focuses primarily on 
the linguistic strategies that Darwin uses to present his arguments.  
5) Gould discusses the debate about the age of the earth between Darwin and Kelvin. 
His point is that calculations aren’t everything and instead it’s the frame of 
thinking. There is little discussion of Darwin’s argument xcept to say that he 
stuck to his guns for a long time regarding the age of the earth. It doesn’t provide 
any in-depth discussion of Darwin’s argument per se.  
6) On page 589 Manier suggests that Darwin rejected, “The Cartesian criteria for 
mathematical clarity and distinctness in biological concepts”. Here he suggests as 
Hull does that Darwin’s arguments are in form non-mathematical. This, however, 
does not preclude the use of mathematics in his argument. H  also suggests 
(P.529) that Darwin did not rely on empirical evidence. There is a two-fold 
definition of empirical evidence in Webster’s which is something, “capable of 
being verified or disproved by observation or experiment”. I believe that Darwin’s 
observations were verifiable in the sense that he had testimonials from others who 
said that what he witnessed was so. Later Manier argues that Darwin was a 
pioneer in statistical thinking and that his arguments were bas d on statistical 
probability rather than vera causa. This comment focuses on the mode of 





Mathematical Tables Created by Darwin Used in The Variation of Animals and 
Plants under Domestication 
 
CharlesDarwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, 2 vols. 2nd 
ed. (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1883) 175, 182.  
 
Page 175 
The following table will serve as a summary, and will show the most remarkable 
deviations in the number of the vertebra and ribs which I have observed:— 









12 12 12 12 
The 12th bore 
a small rib. 
Dorsal Vertebræ 
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8 
" Ribs ..      
8 
The 6th pair with 
processes, the 7th 
pair without a 
process. 
    
8 
The 6th and 
7th pair with 
processes. 
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Sacral Vertebræ 12 14 11 11 
Caudal Vertebræ 
    
7 
8 or 9 
    
7 
    
7 






Appendix C (continued)  
Page 182 
TABLE II.  
Pigeons with their beaks longer than that of the Rock-pigeon, proportionally to the size of 
their bodies.  






actual and calculated 
length of feet, in 
proportion to length of 
feet and size of body 
in the Rock-pigeon. 





Short-faced Tumbler, bald-head 1.57 0.11 . . 
Carrier 2.60 . . 0.31 
Carrier 2.60 . . 0.25 
Carrier 2.40 . . 0.21 
Carrier Dragon 2.25 . . 0.06 
Bagadotten Carrier 2.80 . . 0.56 
Scanderoon, white 2.80 . . 0.37 
Scanderoon, Pigeon cygne 2.85 . . 0.29 
Runt 2.75 . . 0.27 






A Mathematical Table Created by Darwin Used in Natural Selection 
 
Charles Darwin, Charles Darwin’s Natural Selection, ed. R.C. Stauffer (Cambridge:  







Mathematical Tables Created by Darwin Used in Natural Selection 
 
Charles Darwin, Charles Darwin’s Natural Selection ed. R.C. Stauffer (Cambridge:  














An Example of Kölreuter’s Graphical Presentation of Crosses.   
 
Joseph Gottlieb Kölreuter, Vorläufige Nachricht von einigen das Geschlecht der Pflanzen 
betreffenden Versuchen und Beobachtungen, Microform (Leipzig: Gleditschischen 








An Example of Quantitative Comparison in Kölreuter’s Work  
 
Joseph Gottlieb Kölreuter, Vorläufige Nachricht von einigen das Geschlecht der Pflanzen 
betreffenden Versuchen und Beobachtungen, Microform (Leipzig: Gleditschischen 








Table of Massaged Measures from Natural Inheritance 
 






Appendix I  
 
Galton’s Table of the “Frequency of Different Eye Colors in Four Successive 
Generations” 
 







Galton’s Tables Comparing the Observed and Calculated Frequency of Eye Color 
in 16 Family Groups 
 









Galton’s Tables Comparing the Observed and Calculated Frequency of Eye Color 
in Several Generations 
 
Francis Galton, Natural Inheritance (London: Macmillan and Company, 1889) 216-17. 
 






Appendix K (continued) 
 









Calculated Contributions of Eye Color from Different Generations 
 




























Excerpts of Pearson’s Mathematical Arguments in the Homotyposi Paper 
 
Karl Pearson, “Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of Evolution. IX. On the 
Principle of Homotyposis and Its Relation to Heredity, to the Variability of the 
Individual, and to that of the Race. Part I. Homotypos in the Vegetable Kingdom,” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers 
of a Mathematical or Physical Character 197 (1901): 288-91.  
 




























Appendix N  
 
Pearson’s Table of Average Homotypic Correlations  
 
Karl Pearson, “Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of Evolution. IX. On the 
Principle of Homotyposis and Its Relation to Heredity, to the Variability of the 
Individual, and to that of the Race. Part I. Homotypos in the Vegetable Kingdom,” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers 







Appendix N (continued) 
 
Pearson’s Table of Average Fraternal Correlations  
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